Grenier on the indifference of the Arab world to the death of Bin Laden

In Al Jazeera [May 13, 2011] Robert L. Grenier has commented on the relative indifference of the Arab world to the death of Osama Bin Laden. I have copied below a portion of that statement that aptly describes the issues that have informed some of the public demonstrations in the Middle East. [Click on the title for a link to the whole article.]

From Al Jazeera

The end of one dream and the birth of another: The Arab Spring has empowered Muslims to create new forms of leadership - dictators and mass-murderers "need not apply".

. . .

Osama's resistance was outdated
No matter how steadfast the Sheikh may have seemed in resisting perceived western encroachment, no matter how sincere he may have been in pursuit of his twisted aims, it is difficult to muster great sympathy for a man so utterly misguided, whose takfiri legacy was to inspire the wanton murder of thousands of Muslims by other Muslims in East Africa, in Iraq, and in any number of other places extending from Morocco to Indonesia.
Even in South Asia ... - even there, one cannot find the groundswell of popular emotion one might have found had bin Laden been killed, say, in 2002.

Too much has happened since.
The response of the West to 9/11 and the explosion of regional militancy it has inspired has led, ultimately, to a degree of Muslim-on-Muslim violence heretofore unimaginable, employing the most alien and macabre of methods, in what was already a violent part of the world. Even the demonstrations of the usual suspects, from the Jamaat-e-Islami to Lashkar-e-Taiba, have had a ritual, self-serving quality - and their participants betray the dispirited knowledge that they can hope to generate little resonance in the population at large. Indeed, their public outpourings appear to have more to do with them than they do with genuine devotion to Osama.
It was the fate of bin Laden that, in the end, he would become to most in the Muslim world a sterile symbol of ineffectual resistance, fundamentally rejected by those whom he would presume to represent. There is no greater indictment of the legacy of bin Laden than that his appeal was based upon an overwhelming sense of Muslim weakness. It thus is fitting that he should meet his demise precisely when a new generation is rising up to forge a different path, one based on an overwhelming sense of popular strength.

There is precedent for this. I remember well the feeling in the Arab street in 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and defied the calls of the West and of the international community to withdraw. I saw it from the streets of Algiers, where mass demonstrations built inexorably in size and vigour as momentum increased for a US-led attack on Saddam's Republican Guard. Those who surrounded the US embassy chanting pro-Saddam slogans surely had no illusions about the man: He was a thug and a known mass-murderer of his own people, whose greatest atrocities were yet to come. But then and there, the reality of the man counted for little. What mattered was the image, the symbol of a seemingly powerful Arab leader willing to stand up to the West.
Paper tigers
When, in the end, Saddam was overwhelmingly and ignominiously defeated, and his army revealed to be a paper tiger, one might have expected to see a popular explosion. In fact, we saw nothing of the kind. It is the singular fate of the personally discredited symbol to lose all popular support when his resistance is revealed to be a sham - and has come to an end. In the case of the Iraqi dictator, it was like air escaping from a balloon: As Saddam's legions fled northward in disorder, the headline of a popular newspaper in Algiers said it all: The End of the Dream. In the Arab street, there was a collective shrug, and everyone went back to what they were doing before.
In truth, the promise represented by Saddam Hussein was not a dream, but a nightmare. It should not be the fate of the Muslims to be "liberated" by mass-murderers, whether Saddam or Osama, whose contempt for the core beliefs and aspirations of most of those whom they pretended to lead was palpable.
Instead, and in spite of the many obstacles ahead, one can see in the middle distance a very different sort of liberation, one forged by and for the people themselves, based on models which exist within the Muslim world, and carrying the tangible hope of a future where the leaders are servants to the desires of the people, and not the other way around.

Raymond Davis Affair and the Plot against Osama Bin Laden

My student Fahim has been saying all along that there was something strange about the Raymond Davis affair. No one really believed that the reason he shot the two men following him in Lahore on January 27 was because they were trying to rob him, as he claimed. There were more reasons to ask questions once it became known that the two men were with the ISI, Pakistan's notorious intelligence service. Fahim repeatedly said that there had to be something more to the affair than the public was being told.

If so, we may never know. Whatever the reason, Davis made sure that both of the men were dead -- he shot them in the back as they were fleeing and then went back to put more bullets into one of them who seemed still to be alive.

But now we may have an additional piece of relevant information: for many months the Americans were planning an attack on a location they supposed was Osama Bin Laden's hiding place. The raid on the Bin Laden compound was planned with utmost secrecy. Now that it has been pulled off, with impressive speed and efficiency, we wonder: Could Davis have been protecting information critical to the plot against Osama? Was that why he took such pains to exterminate his ISI pursuers?

We of course will never know. This is pure speculation. Even so, it is hard to deny Fahim's point: Davis was up to something important; his behavior makes little sense unless something else was at stake.

One issue is evidently beyond speculation, as many have noted: Pakistan's military should be embarrassed: They were either incompetent or in cahoots with Bin Laden, one or the other. It's hard not to believe that they were aware of his presence in their midst -- how could they not have been protecting him?

But whatever one might speculate, Fahim seems to have it right: Davis was protecting the critical plot to attack Osama Bin Laden.

The Daily Beast has a report on the plans of Libyan members of Al Qaeda to leave Pakistan and join the opposition in Libya. For what it's worth, the issue is certainly worth following. [For the whole article click on the title.]

Al Qaeda's Libya Pilgrimage by Ron Moreau & Sami Yousafzai

As debate rages in Washington over whether to arm anti-Gaddafi rebels, an exclusive report by The Daily Beast indicates al Qaeda forces are gearing up to join the rebels and seize power in Libya.

As the battle for the future of Libya continues, the excitement is almost palpable among Libyan-born al Qaeda fighters and other Arabs hunkered down in Pakistan's remote and lawless tribal area. According to Afghan Taliban sources close to Osama bin Laden's terrorist group, some of the 200 or so Libyans operating near the Afghan border may be on their way home to steer the anti-Gaddafi revolution in a more Islamist direction.

"We have heard a number of fighters have already departed from the tribal area," says an Afghan commander who is linked to the powerful Haqqani network, a North Waziristan-based organization that shelters many al Qaeda fighters. Others may be on their way. "Libyans and Arabs seem to be getting ready for departure and are eager to go home and fight," says the Afghan source. "I've heard that some fighters are saying goodbye and giving thanks with kind words to their (Pakistani) tribal friends who have been sheltering them." 


Since the anti-Gaddafi revolution began last month, al Qaeda—especially Libyan-born affiliates—have viewed the fighting as an opportunity to spread their radical Islamist ideology. Indeed, as one Afghan Taliban operative who helps facilitate the movement of al Qaeda militants between the tribal area and Pakistani cities told The Daily Beast earlier this month: "This rebellion is the fresh breeze they've been waiting years for. They realize that if they don't use this opportunity, it could be the end of their chances to turn Libya toward a real Islamic state, as Afghanistan once was."

If Yahya is successful in reaching rebel-held territory inside Libya, at least he'll be able to operate with relative freedom, without worrying about Gaddafi's secret police.

Now, as the White House and NATO continue to debate the possible ramifications of arming the Libyan opposition, the Haqqani network-linked Afghan commander says Libyan al Qaeda affiliates seem to be more "enthusiastic" about the war against Gaddafi every day. And from what the Afghan Taliban commander has seen, there appears to be more than "flickers" of al Qaeda's presence in Libya, the description given by NATO commander Admiral James Stavridis. According to the Afghan commander, al Qaeda fighters can't believe their good luck that U.S. and NATO aircraft—the same forces that have dropped bombs on their heads in Afghanistan and Pakistan—are now raining down ordnance against Gaddafi.

So far, Muammar Gaddafi's clumsy efforts to blame al Qaeda for the popular uprising against his dictatorship would be a joke, if only he weren't using that claim as an excuse for mowing down so many Libyans. In fact, it's been many years since Libya has seen significant numbers of radical Islamists—or any other organized opposition, for that matter. Nearly all have been killed, locked up or chased into exile years ago by the regime's secret police and security forces. Although the country's most feared insurgent entity, the al Qaeda-affiliated Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (known in Arabic as Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya), has been seeking to topple Gaddafi since the early 1990s, and up until now, it's been unlikely that more than a handful who pledge allegiance to Osama bin Laden remain inside the country.

Today, along the tribal border region, al Qaeda's thirst for more immediate news has led even top leaders like Abu Yahya al-Libi, a Libyan who serves as the movement's senior Islamist ideologue and bin Laden's head of operations for Afghanistan, to become almost foolhardy. The Afghan commander says that Yahya and some of his countrymen have even risked visiting villagers' houses that have satellite television dishes on the roof to watch the latest Western and Middle Eastern news feeds from Libya. Their movements in public areas could easily expose these high value targets to human and UAV surveillance, and a deadly drone strike. 


Over the past few decades, several Libyans have held top roles in al Qaeda. Some traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight the Soviets and stayed, eventually teaming up with bin Laden after his return from Sudan in 1996. Taliban sources estimate there were some 200 Libyans with bin Laden in Afghanistan at the time of the 9/11 attacks. Since then some of bin Laden's senior-most operational aides have been Libyans. One was Abu Faraj al-Libi, who was captured by Pakistan forces in 2005 and is now a prisoner in Guantanamo Bay; another was Abu Lais al-Libi, his replacement as al Qaeda's third in command, who died in a U.S. Predator attack in 2008. Apart from his hardline sermons and jihadist exhortations that are widely distributed on DVD and posted on jihadist websites, Yahya may be best known for his daring escape along with three other al Qaeda prisoners from the high-security lockup at the American airbase at Bagram in July 2005. Yahya, who is believed to be in his late 40s, is smarter, more charismatic, a more articulate speaker and a more learned Islamic scholar than either Faraj or Lais, according to Afghan Taliban sources.

Some new information on Al Qaeda's activities in Karachi

Information that seems authoritative on Al Qaeda is so rare that when any article appears with details we peruse it with great care. Here is an article worth perusing from the The Friday Times, written by Ali Chishti, that tells us about Al Qaeda's activities in Karachi; also, about the measures taken by the Pakistani government to apprehend them. I reproduce the main elements of the article here because the magazine is relatively unknown in the West even though it is a great source of information on South Asia. Thanks to a friend for making this available to me. [http://www.thefridaytimes.com/graphics/alpha1/o.jpg]


On May, 2, 2003 a plot by Al Qaeda to crash a small aircraft loaded with explosives into the US Consulate in Karachi was uncovered after the arrest of Walid Ba'Attash who played a significant role in planning the September 11 attacks. By late 2001, Al Qaeda fighters started infiltration into Pakistan and made Karachi their base. Their modus-operandi was simple but elaborate. Local jehadi organizations were instructed to rent apartments across Karachi at least two months in advance and wait. They came in one by one, and it took the Al Qaeda's top echelons 15 to 20 days to occupy an apartment. By 2002 Al Qaeda re-established itself and made Karachi the centre of its activities.

Al Qaeda selected Karachi as its springboard because Karachi was known for its ethnic and sectarian violence, which made it prone to terrorism. With the arrival of Al Qaeda, a new dimension was added to worsening law and order problems - the culture of suicide bombing.

The suicide bombing of French Naval workers in Karachi in May 2002 came as a surprise to many and was officially the start of Al Qaeda operations in Karachi. It was also the first time a local jehadi group, Harkat ul Mujahideen al Almi, was used for logistics while the suicide bomber was an Al Qaeda operative. President Musharraf and the US consulate were targeted later in June 2002 in Karachi. By September 2002 Pakistan had extradited 422 Al Qaeda members, 86 of which were caught from Karachi alone. The first major breakthrough was the arrest of Ramzi Al Shaibah in Karachi who once worked for the Hamburg Cell of Al Qaeda.

Sheikh Khalid Muhammad (SKM), Al Qaeda's operational chief by 2002 had formed a close operational link with Lashkar e Jhangvi and ran Al Qaeda from flats in the posh areas such as DHA and Bahadarabad Society. The news about the location of SKM came in June 2002 when Al Jazeera anchor Yosri Fouda received an invitation from Al Qaeda to conduct an interview in Karachi where he met both SKM and Ramzi bin Al Shaibah. Finally in January 2003, Jack Thomas, an Australian Al Qaeda fugitive, was captured in Karachi and gave 'actionable intelligence' on the whereabouts of SKM who was finally caught from Rawalpindi in March 2003 but it was too late by then. By 2003, SKM with Sheikh Omar had beheaded Daniel Pearl and established a strong nexus with the local sectarian groups working in Karachi. Lashkar e Jhangvi turned into Al Qaeda's team B and transformed into Jundallah.

Jundallah's Karachi chapter was founded originally by a Jamaat-e-Islami's (JI) student activist, Attaur Rehman, in 2003. Jundullah was initially a well-knit cell comprising 20 militants, most of them in their twenties and thirties, educated from professional classes. Jundallah attacked Karachi Corps Commander General Ahsan Saleem Hayat, bombed a US Consulate and carried out a series of terrorist attacks, including last year's triple bombings in an Ashura procession in Karachi.

In March 2004, the Karachi police arrested brothers, Dr Akmal Waheed and Dr Arshad Waheed, linked to JI who were suspected of assisting wanted militants to escape from the authorities and providing medical treatment to three fugitives Abu Massab, Gul Hasan and Qassam Al Sani, who were wounded in the attempt on Gen Hayat. The Waheed brothers were sentenced in 2005 to 7 years imprisonment but were later acquitted. Following his acquittal Dr Arshad Waheed shifted his activity to South Waziristan and was running a clinic in Wana, FATA region until a US missile drone killed him. Al Qaeda's media wing, Al Sahab Media Foundation, released the third part of a series of videos entitled "The Protectors of the Sanctuary" in memory of Dr Arshad Waheed confirming his association with Al Qaeda. This was also the first time Al Qaeda had used Urdu instead of Arabic which was significant in confirming doubts that Al Qaeda had indeed turned "desi".

In Karachi, Al Qaeda remains the biggest mastermind and financier of terrorism where the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, Qari Zafar Group) with its huge Mehsud population based in the outskirts of Karachi provides logistical support and suicide bombers. The operational aspects are entirely outsourced to sectarian-terrorist groups such as Jundallah.

While it is important to understand that Al Qaeda has successfully merged with the local jehadi organizations, it should be noted that Al Qaeda is constantly shifting its base from North Waziristan to urban areas of Pakistan to avoid drone attacks. The central thesis of Al Qaeda's philosophy is to create "fitna". Al Qaeda spreads fitna with the help of Lashkar e Jhangvi, by attacking MQM's legislator Raza Haider to create anarchy, or more strategically abetting the 26/11 Mumbai attacks with manufactured Frankensteins to help its main ally, the TTP. Al Qaeda's plan in Karachi is to exploit the sectarian and ethnic conflicts, create a trap for the Pakistan Army in the commercial capital, and disrupt NATO supplies. Karachi with such a strong base of Al Qaeda remains the most dangerous and venerable cities in the world.

Ali Chishti is a writer based in Karachi. He can be reached at akchishti@hotmail.com

Full Text of the Peshawar Declaration, February 10

A friend of mine has sent me a copy of an interesting declaration prepared in Peshawar last February 10. It is interesting for a number of reasons, but one of them is that this is a formulation by some notable Pushtuns developed presumably on their own and clearly in their own words [although below is merely an English translation]. It is evident from the tone that this meeting was not organized or scripted by the Pakistanis. In that sense it resembles an attempt by a group of Afghanistan notables (I think in 1980; see Kakar's book on the Soviet war in Afghanistan) to form an organized resistance program against the Soviets who had recently invaded. The Pakistanis, however, shut the affair down in order to establish more direct control over the anti-soviet resistance movement among the Afghans. This one sounds like a similar group of notables, in this case Pakistani Pushtuns, trying to deal with what is obviously a tragic problem in their midst: the continued activity of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, which is costing the peoples of FATA and Malakand dearly. Because it is so interesting I reproduce this document here in the form I received it. RLC


The Peshawar Declaration
The documents of *Peshawar Declaration* which is endorsed by Political Parties and Members Amn Tehrik, (an umbrella organization of all walks of civil society), was formally launched in a gathering in a local Hotel on 10 February 2010. http://pukhtunkhwa.com/id70.html


On December 12 and 13, a two days workshop/conference was held in Peshawar with the sole agenda "Terrorism - the ways out." The workshop was attended by the political parties and civil society organizations that actively opposed terrorism. The participants were keen to contribute and participate in discussions regarding the political, ideological, strategic, economic, and cultural and education/ awareness related aspects of the agenda. The participants were divided into Five Groups and they freely expressed their opinions about the topics they had selected by choice. On the first day every group came up with a rough draft. On the second day final recommendations were drawn from the rough drafts. In a commendable show of unity, members with different political affiliations and shades of opinion succeeded in agreeing upon a single document of consensus. The workshop was attended by the provincial leadership of Awami National Party (ANP), Pukhtunkhwa Mili Awami Party PMAP, Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians (PPPP), Pakistan Peoples Party Sherpao PPP(S), National Party (NP) and Awami party Pakistan (APP). Civil society organizations under the banner of Amn Tehrik, (Peace Movement)[1]businessmen, doctors, lawyers, teachers, students, laborers and intellectuals also participated in the workshop. Representatives from all the agencies of FATA, Swat, Malakand and Buner also participated. A significant number of female participants were also present. Each group presented its report before the Conference. Every report was critically analyzed, objections raised and recommendations for improvement discussed. It was decided that all the reports should be amalgamated into a joint declaration namely Peshawar Declaration. A five member committee was constituted to prepare the documentation. After deliberation it was decided that all the organizations that attended the conference will jointly struggle to translate Peshawar Declaration into actions. For this purpose, ten members Coordination Committee (Rabita Committee) was constituted comprising of members from ANP, PMAP, PPPP, PPP Sherpao, Awami Party, National Party and Amn Tehrik (Peace Movement). After the discussion the participants made political, ideological and strategic aspects as a single/one report.

Defining Terrorism:

Terrorism is to create fear on someone to achieve certain ends. A person can be terrorized by a mere threat or he/she can be beaten, abducted, jailed and killed. An individual, a particular group, a sect, a nation or a country can indulge in terrorism to achieve certain objectives. People can also engage in terrorism for money, property or women.

The Current Wave of Terrorism:

Man has been indulging in the ruthless treatment of other human beings throughout the history. The modes of terrorism were different in different times. In the conference all the participants agreed upon the idea that the current surge of terrorism is the most dangerous, the worst type. This kind of terrorism is a complex mixture of religious extremism, fanatics, sectarian, anti-civilization, anti-humanity and coercive ways of life which are most ruthless one. The aim of this kind of terrorism is to impose a self-proclaimed global agenda by killing humanity. What madness is this that the terrorist teacher issue the ticket of paradise to his soldier and marry him to a Hor (beautiful women in paradise) and the soldier confirms the ticket of the paradise by ruthlessly killing innocent humanity including women and children! The obvious madness and in-human thinking behind the rationale of killing fellow human beings including women and children for ones material and animalistic yearnings (Pure Wines and Beautiful Women) is beyond any comprehension and does not deserve any sympathy or empathy. To defeat this kind of terrorism of our region, it is mandatory to understand its causes and modus operandi, without which cure or elimination will not be possible.

Causes of the Terrorism in our Region:

The current wave of terrorism emanates from two sources i.e. Al-Qaeda and the Strategic Depth policy of Pakistan. Al-Qaeda is a caricature of Arab Expansionism in the disguise of global Islam. Due to the prevalence of Wahabism in the historical hub of Islam, Arabs have dominated the other Muslims. Due to this Al-Qaeda is a specialist of this kind of terrorism including all its ingredient, organizational structure, techniques and strategies. The second ingredient contributing to this kind of terrorism is the Strategic Depth policy of Pakistan army. The purpose of this policy is to use Jihadi Culture in order to counter India and protect nuclear weapons: to subjugate Afghanistan and making it fifth province or like Azad Kashmir model. The policy was advanced further in 1995 and was decided to make Central Asian Muslim states as their clients states. The Strategic Depth policy of Pakistan army has a complete background. The ideology of nationhood on the basis of religion served its foundation. Cantonments were labeled with the slogans of Jihad Fi Sabel-e-La (Jihad in the name of Allah). Big crossing and turn- abouts in cities were furnished with tanks, fighter planes and replica of the Chaghai hills to make a war-like environment. Instead of a welfare state Pakistan was made a security state. The Objective Resolution (1949) gave birth to Mullah-Military Alliance. The same resolution was included, in letter and spirit, in the constitution by General Zia ul Haq. As a result of religious background, war-like environment, security state and Mullah-Military-Alliance, the first terrorist organizations in the names of Al-Shams and Al-Badarwere launched in Bengal. The defeat in Bengal should have been an eye-opener for the establishment and should have signaled end of the military-Jihadist nexus but unfortunately the same policy was practiced in Kashmir, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Terrorist organizations like Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkatul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Tayeeba and Jash-e-Muhamamd were installed in Kashmir. In Paksitan Sibah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangwi and in FATA Lashkar-e-Islam, Ansar-ul-Islam, Amarbil-Maroof, Tahreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi and Tahreek-e-Taliban have been operational.[5]All these organizations were termed as strategic assets. In Afghanistan terrorism was started in 1972. First of all Gulbadin Hikmatyar was brought to Peshawar and Colonel Imam was sent to Afghanistan. During that period and till 1978 Gulbadin Hikmat Yar, Professor Mujadidi, Burhan ud Din Rabbani, Pir Gilani and Abdul Rasool Siaf were trained to be the leaders of terrorists organizations.When these people conquered Afghanistan they tried to stop their patrons from interfering in Afghanistan. Thus strategic assets did not help their patrons. Even then the Army did not learn any lesson here and another asset with the name of Taliban was formed which tuned out to be more aggressive and destructive for Afghanistan. During this time the marriage between Taliban and Al-Qaeda took place and they became the rulers of Afghanistan. Due to the policy of strategic assets the country had already plunged deep into the abyss of terrorism even before 9/11. The riots between Shia and Sunni Sects were a common phenomenon. The suicide bombing in the country was started in 1993. The suicide attack that killed Ahmed Shah Masood was carried out just one day before the 9/11. India and Afghanistan had already been suffering from such attacks. But in due time Pakistan religious extremism spread its tentacles in Pakistan and sectarianism grew. Besides Shia, the Barelvi were also targeted. This is a historical fact that the US, China, Arab countries and Europe helped Pakistan in its aggression against Afghanistan. To quote just one example 24 billion petro-dollars were spent to establish seminaries (religious schools).Military aggression was named as Jihad. The whole environment was favorable to nurture the already strong triangular Mullah-Military-Militant nexus. During the rule of the afore-mentioned religious and military components of terrorism, terrorists from Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Sin kiang and other parts of the world came to Afghanistan. Thus Afghanistan became the hub of international terrorism. After 9/11, all these peoples were shifted to FATA. No doubt these terrorists are now present in FATA and elsewhere in the country. There is no denying the fact that these terrorists have occupied FATA and some parts of Punjab like central Punjab and Muridke are their strong holds.

A contradictory Perception in the minds towards terrorism by the people of those areas who are under direct control of terrorists and those who are less are not effected:

FATA and Malakand are the most affected areas due to terrorism. Similarly not a single village or city of Pukhtunkhwa province is spared by terrorists. Although the whole country and even the whole world is suffering from terrorism and the fact that central Punjab or Mureedki is also the hub of terrorists, still it remains a bitter fact that the people of FATA and Pukhtunkhwa are virtually hostage to the terrorists. The perception of terrorism and its causes or their opinions about military operations, the involvement of foreign hands in terrorism and drone attacks are poles apart from the rest of the country.

Why is this contradiction?

One of its reasons is a natural one. There is a Pushtu proverb that burns are felt where there is fire. The second reason is the policy of the government. For example the media policy during General Pervez Musharaf allowed massive coverage to those people who were supporting terrorism. This also includes some of the retired generals, a few journalists and analysts. As a result, those living in other parts of the country or those who were not directly affected by terrorism were uninterruptedly indoctrinated with ideas for about eight years which further helped terrorism. Those living in the war zone are eye witness to all that is happening there and they have their own perception of this war of terrorism. A few examples are:
* It was propagated over the media, though in an implied manner, that terrorism is the continuation of Jihad against the Soviet Russia. The fact is that almost all of those who were fighting against the Russians are eagerly and actively painting on the political canvas of Afghanistan in order to bring stability to the democratic process in Afghanistan. They are the foremost opponents of terrorism. They include professor Mujadidi, Burhan ud Din Rabbani, Pir Gilani and Abdul Rasool Siab, Rasheed Dostam and the party of Ahmed Shah Masood late.
* Only two of the anti-Soviet campaigns are now involved in terrorism i.e. Gulbadin Hikmatyar and Jalal ud Din Haqqani. Gulbadins party is almost non-existent. Only one of his commanders Kashmir Khan and a few friends are supporting him. Haqqani had already joined the Taliban.
* Uzbeks, Chechens, Sudanese and terrorists from Sank yang came to Afghanistan during the period of Taliban. At that time the Soviets had withdrawn and Dr. Najeebs government was toppled. These terrorist did not exists during the war against Soviets.
* None of the Pakistani terrorists organization like Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkatul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Tayeeba, Jash-e-Muhamamd Sibah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jangwi, Lashkar-e-Islam, Ansar-ul-Islam, Amar-bil-Maroof, Tahreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi and Tahreek-e-Taliban had participated in anti-Soviet campaign.
* Even the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan have no direct linkage with the anti-Soviet campaign. Despite this, it was propagated over the media that the on-going war is a continuation of the so-called Jihad in Afghanistan. It is propagated that these terrorists were part of the anti-Soviet campaign and they have been living in the tribal areas for thirty years where they had married the local women and thus became part and parcel of the tribal society. The fact is that in the tribal areas a forefinger is never called a native even if had taken asylum and lived there for centuries. Mahsud tribe of South Waziristan had the peculiarity that did not allow a single non local to stay in their area during this whole period.
* Another false propaganda over the media is the number of foreign militants. In the media the number of foreign militants is portrayed as hundred to two hundreds. The reality is that there are 11000 Uzbeks, 6000 Arabs and 9000 Punjabis.From Waziristan to swat the number of Pushtun terrorist is merely 4000 but despite of this fact the whole Pushtun nation is falsely propagated as extremists and terrorist.
* On other issues such as military operations, peace deals and the fighting between army and Taliban the people of war-affected areas have quite a different outlook than those living in the mainland. For example the people of the war-affected areas think that the army and Taliban are not enemies but friends. They have been persistently asking the question why the military failed to target the core leadership of the militants in all the 17 military operations in FATA? This is true that during the military operations the top as well as the second and third cadre leadership were neither killed nor wounded or captured. Moreover, the news of the killing of many terrorist leaders is telecasted several times over the media but they are still alive. Commanders like Ibn-e-Amin, Shah Duran and Ikram ud Din are the prime examples of such false propaganda.In Swat, the news that Fazl Ullah is under a siege was three times telecasted by the ISPR but in the same month it was propagated through media that he had escaped to Afghanistan. Fazl Ullahs close associates Muslim Khan, Haroon and Mahmood were arrested by the militants but six months have passed and nobody knows what happened to them.In the past, Sufi Muhammad was arrested and then released in a so-called peace deal which was imposed upon the political leadership at gunpoint. The valiant police of the province once arrested 28 terrorists with suicide jackets but these terrorists were taken by the intelligence agencies took them away with the plea of further investigation. These people were kept somewhere for few months. They were released on the day when General Pervez Musharaf imposed Emergency Plus.Only a few words came to us about their release. It is due to these reasons that the people of the war-affected areas are neither satisfied with the military operations nor do they entertain false hopes.
* The people of the war-affected areas demand that these terrorists should be hanged in open space like they used to hang innocent civilian or like what they did to Shabana.These people call for a real and targeted military operation and strongly condemn the dramas in the name of military operations. These people do not support any peace deals with the militants but unlike them the rest of Pakistan talk of putting an end to the military operations and resuming the so-called peace deals.
* The issue of Drone attacks is the most important one. If the people of the war-affected areas are satisfied with any counter militancy strategy, it is the Drone attacks which they support the most. According to the people of Waziristan, Drones have never killed any civilian. Even some people in Waziristan compare Drones with Ababels. (The holy swallows send by God to avenge Abraha, the intended conqueror the Khana Kaaba).A component of the Pakistani media, some retired generals, a few journalists/analysts and pro-Taliban political parties never tire in their baseless propaganda against Drone attacks.
* The same is true of the discourse of foreign hands in militancy. In FATA there is either military or the afore-mentioned militant organizations. Majority of the local people have migrated to other parts of the country. Those who could not flee are helpless and nothing is in their control. The questions arises which one of the militant organization is not created by the Pakistan army and which one is serving a foreign agenda? If such is the case Pakistan should raise the issue on UN forum or name the organization which is serving a foreign agenda by using the diplomatic channel. The possibility remains that there is a second or third tier terrorist with a few suicide bombers and he exchanges them for a handsome price. But this is not possible on organizational level and if the chaos persisted for a longer period there is also the possibility that some other countries would jumped into the fray or the UN would bring peace forces to these areas. All the participants agreed that the failure of military operations and the ongoing terrorism which is spreading its tentacles very fast are not because of the inability of the Pakistan army but rather it is a deliberate attempt on the part of our establishment to secure its military assets at every cost.

Terrorism and the Identification of Friends and Foe:

The conference agreed upon the idea that every individual, writer, intellectual, organization or country who is against the terrorists is our friend. Every individual, organization, party or country that provides sanctuary to the terrorists, extend financial or moral support to them or support them in any way like diverting peoples attention to non-issues by concealing the truth about them is a friend of the terrorists and hence an enemy of the participants of the conferencean enemy of Pushtuns, Pakistan and humanity in general. The conference applied the above mentioned criterion to gauge political parties. The participants unanimously reached the conclusions that Jumat-e-Islami, both factions of Jameet-Ulema-e-Islam, Jumat Al-Hadis Sajid Mir Group, Tahreek-e-Insaf, a component of the Pakistani media and establishment are pro-terrorists. All the Baloch Nationalist Parties are apposing terrorism and supporting Drones so they are our friends. Pakistan Muslim Leg (N, Q) are primarily Punjab based parties, and very closed to establishment. There stand against terrorism is vague so they are on our watch list. MQM in it self is a terrorist organization. Though MQM is apposing terrorist but its because that they see their own terrorism vanishing if the new phenomena enters their constituency.

A) Political Recommendations for the Elimination of Terrorism:

1. The conference agreed upon the decision that the strategic depth policy is not only the cause of terrorism but also it is an end in itself regarding terrorism. The policy caused thousands times greater harm to Pakistan than any NRO or writing off debts could do. Due to this policy hundreds of thousands people killed or injured. The policy has pushed Pakistan into such abysmal depths that its foundations are eroding. The conference agreed upon the idea that the people of Pakistan would still be resolute to oppose terrorist ideology even if the US, NATO or ISAF are defeated in Afghanistan and the terrorist capture the throne of Kabul. If the terrorists succeeded in Afghanistan their next target would be Pakistan. Therefore, this policy is destructive for Pakistan and should be abolished above board.

2. Those who framed this policy should be tried in courts.
3. Interference in Afghanistan should be stopped at one and it should be treated as a sovereign neighbor state.
4. Sanctuaries of terrorism in FATA, Pukhtunkhwa province and other parts of the country like those in Bara, Darra Adam Khel, Mechanai, Mirnashah, Mir Ali, Kurram Agency and central Punjab should be destroyed. A brief and targeted military operation should be launched against the terrorists. A half-hearted military operation is only spreading and helping the terrorists. Therefore, the blunders of the past should not be repeated.

5. NATO and ISAF are sent to Afghanistan under UN mandate. NATO and ISAF should stay in Afghanistan until terrorism is uprooted, foreign interference in Afghanistan must be stopped and the institutions of army and police are established on solid footings. However they should offer a clear time frame for the withdrawal of troops. The US has supported some of the terrorist and it still holds a double standard. Americans are blamed to supporting Jandullah Group. Similarly they are least interested in dealing with the terrorist from Sang kiang. Therefore, no peace loving person would tolerate them after terrorism is uprooted.
6. The conference appeals Saudi Arab and other Arab countries to stop financing the terrorists.
7. The Pakistan army should not indulge it self in registration of the IDPs or Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of affected areas. This job should be done by the civilian authority the army should concentrate on elimination of the terrorist.
8. Some political forces and a component of the media and establishment are supporting terrorists. These people are enemy of Pushtuns and Pakistan. Such anti-human forces should be defeated and uprooted.
9. The conference urged to promote AFPAK people to people contacts and demanded both the countries not to pose obstacles in them.
10. Besides uprooting terrorism in FATA the people of FATA should be compensated for the damage done due to terrorism. A comprehensive developmental package should be planned and the people of FATA should be allowed to choose any administrative system for themselves.
11. The so-called nonfunctional terrorist organizations are still operative in the country. Merely naming them dysfunctional would not help. These organizations should be practically eliminated.
12. The conference demands that Pakistan army and intelligence agencies should not interfere in politics. They should do their jobs for which they have been recruited. Army and intelligence agencies should be made subservient to the parliament and their control should be in civilian hands.
13. The conference believes that every democratic government should complete its term. Any conspiracy to derail democracy will be defeated. The conference condemns the media trial of the politicians and the so-called corruption charges against them. The conference strongly demands that the establishment should stop dividing the political parties.
14. The IDPs as a result of army operations should be treated as per UN resolution.
15. The conference agreed that Pushtuns in FATA and Northern Pukhtoonkhwa are made hostage by the terrorists. The terrorists and security personnel are apparently engaged in fighting but their targets are innocent civilians. Four millions Pushtuns are living as IDPs. Our schools are closed and our youth unemployed. Whether there is chance for festivity or an occasion of mourning terrorism is feared. Our Jargas are the target of terrorism. Jargas and Lashkars are banned in tribal areas. In settled areas gatherings and processions are not possible. Local Pushtuns names like Aimal Khan, Darya Khan and Khushal Khan are changed into Abu Zar and Abu Jandal. Pushtun nation is not only hostage to these terrorists but there is also an organized campaign to Arabize them. The whole world is playing its due role against terrorism but the most affected people of this menace are unable to play their effective historical role. The participants in conference agreed that if Pushtuns are given an opportunity to fight terrorism they would definitely deal with the terrorists in their historical courageous way. It is suggested that a grand Pushtun Jarga of the Pushtun of Pakistan should be called upon under the auspices of United Nations. If possible, Afghanistan should also be given representation. The Jarga should deal with the sole agenda how to eliminate terrorism. The Jarga should not be arranged on the traditional pattern; rather it should be given a broader touch by inviting all the Khels and tribes so that they can discuss the matter for two or three days the participation of women in this Jirga must be mandatory. It should be conveyed to all non-Pushtuns that these Jargas are actually time-tested indigenous workshops. We believe that this Jarga would supersede all effective counter terrorism efforts. If succeeded, the same experiments should be repeated with the Pushtuns of Afghanistan.
16. The conference unanimously analyzed that the ground realities suggest terrorism is on the rise and Pushtuns are drifting along the tides of national, social, educational and psychological hopelessness. If terrorism is not uprooted in the upcoming months or if it further increased, Pushtuns would distrust all state institution vis-à-vis eliminating terrorism. In that case Pushtuns will be forced to invite UN peace keeping forces. To avoid the worst scenario the problem of terrorism should be taken seriously. Participants of the conference were unanimous in their thinking that all responsibility would fall on the shoulders of the Pakistani establishment if UN peace-keeping forces landed in the area are the world finally opted to redraw the marking of various countries in the region.

B) Economic Recommendations to Eliminate Terrorism:

Fata and Pukhtunkwha province are the most deprived areas for the past 62 years. The irony is that despite of having vast natural resources and being the richest nation, Pushtuns are the poorest, the most uneducated, the most unemployed and perhaps the most displaced people of the world. The ongoing surge of terrorism is only adding insult to injury. To defeat terrorism, all the deprivations of Pushtuns should be dealt with and their economic problems should be solved. 1. All the aid and international assistance in the name of counter terrorism should be spent on FATA, Pukhtunkwha province and other terror-affected areas. The aid should not be diverted to other provinces or institution as is the routine in Pakistan.
2. Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (Roz) should be established in FATA and the people of FATA should be given its ownership and they should also be equipped with the relevant technical know how.
3. Pukhtunkwha province should be declared as war-affected area and support should be extended till terrorism is uprooted in the from of exemption from taxes and utility bills.
4. In FATA the damages done due to terrorism should be compensated and a comprehensive developmental package approved to compensate the deprivations of the past.
5. An economic database should be established in FATA and Pukhtunkwha province for planning and keeping record of the economic needs.
6. Small and medium enterprises and large scale industries should be planned with the aim of imparting technical know how to the local population.
7. Fata and Pukhtunkwha province should be granted ownership of the resources of water, electricity, tobacco, gas and petrol and full fiscal autonomy should be granted accordingly.
8. Pushtuns living in four divided administrative unitesshould be merged to be gather and made a single united province. Full national autonomy should be granted to this Pukhtun province named Afghania, Pukhtunkhwa or Pukhtunistan. All the liabilities of this province in regard to their resources that are due to the federal government should be paid immediately.
9. Canals from Indus should be networked in Swabi, Shakardara, Laki Marwat and Dera Ismael Khan in order to irrigate and cultivatable 80% of the land which will contribute to the overall agricultural output of the country.
10. In order to increase the hydroelectricity output, the proposed plans in Pukhtuns land should be materialized.

C) Education and Awareness Related Recommendation to Eliminate Terrorism:

The need of education and awareness to combat terrorism should be overemphasized. Terrorism is a global phenomenon but it has become the core issue of Pakistan. The rulers of Pakistan openly admit that Pakistan is in a state of war but unfortunately an open willingness to declare war on terrorism is still a far cry. Minor and poorly coordinated military operations have aggravated the crisis even further. A close examination reveals that the menace of terrorism is spreading deeper and deeper into the society by eroding the basic social fabric.

Recommendations:

Media:
* The government of Pakistan should institute and initialize a concentrated media campaign against terrorism and activities such as dramas, educational pictures, documentaries etc against terrorism should be promoted.
* The media should play its due role in the fight against terrorism. Pro-terrorism broadcasts should be banned. The media should also realize that discussion of non-issues further plays into the hands of the terrorists. The political parties, civil personalities and Lashkars constituted against terrorism should be given proper media coverage. Positive portrayal of terrorists should be discouraged.
* Suicide bomber is the most lethal weapon in the hands of the terrorists. The experience of last many years has proved that the age of suicide bomber is from 12 20 years. This age group should be educated that this act is against humanity and Islam. A massive campaign in this regard should be lunched in all the schools, seminaries, every house and village and off course the media should be utilize for this propos and repeatedly re-telecasted. If we are able to educate this age group it would been that the terrorists will use their major weapon.

Education and Religious Seminaries:

1. Budget allocation for education should be increased.
2. Education should be acknowledged as a basic human right.
3. Education till matriculation should be provided free of cost and elementary education up to grade 8 should be made compulsory. Female education should be emphasized.
4. Admission to higher educations should be based on merit while special arrangement should be made to secure the rights of the backward areas and lower classes.
5. Participatory teaching methodology should be introduce in education.
6. Corporal punishment should be banned in educational institutions.
7. The syllabus of education should be renewed. The curriculum should be designed on broader humanistic goals and the aims of good citizenship.
8. Modern scientific knowledge should be imparted on the basis of research and creativity.
9. Laboratories and libraries should be declared necessary for all institutions and all areas.
10. The need to inculcate the qualities of tolerance, peace and democracy should be emphasized and the contributions of people having these qualities should be highlighted to inspire the youth.
11. All the material regarding hate, prejudice and Jihad should be removed from the curriculum.
12. Sectarianism and religious hatred in any form should be termed as terrorism and the persons involved in such activities should be severely punished.
13. All the seminaries that have direct or indirect link with terrorists should be closed and Fatwas (Religious Decree) should be obtained from the remaining against the current terrorists.
14. Orthodox seminaries should be streamlined and made answerable to the government.
15. Old history of the region and the consequent major historical events should be incorporated in the curriculum.
16. The curriculum should cater for broader national, regional and international understanding.
17. Healthy co-curricular activities should be made compulsory.
18. Gender equality should be ensured in Education and it should be taught to the students. Discriminatory customs, traditions, laws and curriculum against women should be undone.
19. Parent Teachers Association/ council should also be made compulsory for every school.
20. Students Unions should be reinstated and literary and cultural activities should be termed mandatory in colleges.

D) Cultural Recommendation for the Elimination of Terrorism:

Pushtun nation has 6000 years old strong cultural heritage. Pushtun society and culture is the main target of the current wave of terrorism. Jargas, Lashkars and Collective Responsibility are the three hallmarks of social and cultural fabrics in the tribal areas. Terrorism has targeted these three pillars of the tribal structures in a very organized way. As a result the society has become vulnerable.
If we empower Pushtuns socially and culturally it would mean we have won 50% of the war against terror.
1. There is a dire need to instill a new life in Jarga, Hujra and Lashkar and reorganize them on modern modalities.
2. Arts Councils should be established in every district.
3. Community Centers should be set up in every district.
4. Pushtu Literary and Cultural Centers should be organized keeping the Press Clubs modality in view.
5. In this regard the literary organizations which are already contributing should be supported and Peace Committees should be organized in all parts of FATA and Pukhtunkwha province.
6. All illegal FM channels should be closed at once and the perpetrators should be severely dealt with.
7. FM channels should be started by the government to promote peace, development and Pushtun culture.
8. The artists who suffered due to terrorism should be compensated on emergency footings The female artists must also be compensated.
9. Fine Arts departments should be opened in colleges and universities and other educational institutions should be encouraged in this regard.
10. Pakistani media should take measures to discourage the negative trends of presenting Pushtuns as backward, ignorant, extremists and terrorists.
11. A national TV channel for Pushtuns should be started.
12. All those cultural activates should be banned which are against the basic human rights especially against the rights of women.
13. In FATA and Pukhtunkwha museums related to the historical, literary and political personalities should be established for example Khushal Khan Khattak, Aimal Khan Momand, Darya Khan Afridi, Umara Khan, Pir Rokhan, Faqir Ipi, Baacha Khan, Abbdul Samad Khan Achakzai and Sanubar Hussain Kaka Ji.
14. Pushtu should be declared as official language and it should be made the language of education courts and offices.
15. The sign boards should be written in mother tongue.

What al-Qaeda gives as its reasons

Social movements appeal to a body of individuals by having as their ideological basis a set of formulations that are broad enough, vague enough, to allow people in various contexts to read their own interests in the movement's definition of the extant social situation. People participate for reasons that can vary.

Many of us in this country are still asking "Why do they hate us.?," and once in a while someone sympathetic to the violent activities of some Muslim groups explains the problem in terms that can help us understand. Always, of course they formulate the problem in terms that are meaningful to themselves, but their formulations can vary a good deal without betraying the ideals of the movement.

In his latest Op-ed piece in the NYTimes Tom Friedman cites the Associated Press as the source of an interesting statement by Farouk Abdulmutallab, the man who tried to blow up an airliner on the way to Detroit on Christmas Day. He wrote his father to say that “he had found a new religion, the real Islam” and that he was never coming home again. On an Internet site attributed to him he wrote in February, 2005,

“I imagine how the great jihad will take place, how the Muslims will win ... and rule the whole world, and establish the greatest empire once again!!!”

His vision entailed looking back to a period of [imagined] Muslim dominance of the world, and forward to a recovery of that dominance by the re-institution of [I presume from the statement] the Muslim Caliphate, a theme promoted by Bin Laden. The period of Muslim dominance that Farouk Abdulmutallab looks back to -- presumably the time of the Abbasid Caliphs -- may not have been so glorious as he supposes, but his vision of it, in any case, informs his reading of the present need to revive the great Muslim empire of the past.

Since 2003 another animating force for Islamist insurgency seems to have gained salience: the American invasion of Iraq. Nasser al-Bahri, a Yemeni who would become a bodyguard for Bin Laden, was persuaded in in 1996 by bin Laden's critique of U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf War, namely, that Muslims need to be unified against the West and recover the Caliphate (WashingtonPost [1/6/2010]). He has recently said of Bin Laden:

NASSER AL-BAHRI (through translator): I have often said I love Osama bin Laden more than my father. We shared many experiences, and he defends the Islamic nation. He doesn't like killing.

Notice his use of the term Islamic Nation -- singular. The implication is that "Islam" is a single "nation." This has indeed long been an ancient ideal among Muslims but it has never actually been anything more than an concept. The concept informs the Bin Laden's critique of the current situation in the Middle East, and the salience of the appeal to some Muslims, especially unemployed young people, indicates how eager some of them are for a meaningful world, one that makes sense in "Islamic" terms.

When Nasser Al-Bahri was asked why anyone, such as Farouk Abdulmutallab, would want to blow up an airplane in the United States his response reveals his own understanding of why Muslims are justified in attacking the United States.

NASSER AL-BAHRI (through translator): I wish the question wasn't so naive. Britain and America are in Iraq and in Afghanistan. They intervene in the affairs of Islamic nations. There are a million people out there like the Nigerian [who are ready to attack the United States].

Al-Bahri's explanation for attacking the United States is that the US is "intervening" in the affairs of Islamic nations, specifically in Iraq and in Afghanistan. It's not the same as the hope of establishing a Muslim world power, but it seems to be an aspect of Bin Laden's more general critique.

In any case, the movement needs this kind of ambiguity in its conceptual appeal -- in it's "annunciation and promise" (Weber's term) -- if it is to capture the imagination of real human beings. That this kind of critique resonates among a few Muslims, especially those who are in quest of a just and equitable moral order within their own personal horizons, suggests how hungry some of them are for a cause worth giving themselves to.
[Source of the quotations: PBS, News Hour, Jan 6, 2010.]

Images of "heaven" for young suicide bombers

Below is a report by the Pakistan Times on the kind of training ("brainwashing"?) that the Taliban give to young men whom they want to become human bombs. It speaks for itself. RLC

Taliban create artificial 'jannat' to lure suicide bombers
PTI - Peshawar, December 12, 2009

Taliban fighters in Pakistan's lawless South Waziristan tribal region created an artificial "jannat" (heaven) that they used to brainwash teenagers into becoming suicide bombers, describing it as a depiction of the place they would go to after carrying out attacks.

The "jannat" was part of a sprawling militant-held compound in Nawazkot area that was recently captured by security forces after intense fighting.

A group of journalists were yesterday shown the facility where boys aged 12 to 18 years were turned into human suicide bombs under the supervision of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan chief Hakimullah Mehsud.

The "heaven" consisted of four rooms, each with crude paintings of "jannat" or paradise, which is depicted as a place with lush green fields and trees, flowing rivers of milk and honey, lofty mountains and homes with red roofs and blue walls.

The "jannat" also depicted other heavenly pleasures awaiting suicide bombers after their "martyrdom", army officials told the journalists.

Some paintings showed "hoors" (angels) who live in heaven.

The walls of the rooms had slogans saluting the Taliban and the names of would-be suicide bombers were written in blood on them.

Syed Saleem Shahzad on the unsettled life of Al Qaeda leaders

Syed Saleem Shahzad of Asia Times Online has the fullest treatment of the location of major leaders of AlQaeda that I have seen in a long time. RLC

Osama can run, how long can he hide?
Asia Times By Syed Saleem Shahzad 12/11/2009

"I believe that al-Qaeda can be defeated overall but I believe it is an ideology and he [Osama bin Laden] is an iconic leader, so I think to complete the destruction of that organization, it does mean that he needs to be either captured or killed, or brought to justice."- General Stanley McChrystal, United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization commander in Afghanistan

"We don't know for a fact where Osama bin Laden is, if we did, we'd go get him." Robert Gates, a former US Central Intelligence Agency director and the current defense secretary.

ISLAMABAD - General Stanley McChrystal, as in the testimony quoted above to United States congressional committees this week, is unequivocal on the need to first roll back Taliban gains in Afghanistan as a prerequisite for the capture or elimination of Osama bin Laden and then the "ultimate defeat of al-Qaeda".

Apart from the difficulty of rolling back the Taliban, despite an additional 30,000 US troops surging into the country, US intelligence, as per admissions this month, are further away from catching bin Laden than they were eight years ago, when US forces notoriously let him slip through their grasp in the Tora Bora mountains.

There is little dispute that bin Laden and his close associates, including his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, move around in the vast and inhospitable mountainous territory that straddles the Afghanistan-Pakistan border; the porous border exists only as a line on a map.

"Intelligence reports suggest that the al-Qaeda chief is somewhere inside North Waziristan, sometimes on the Pakistani side of the border, sometimes on the Afghan side of the border," US National Security Adviser James Jones said this week. The US has a US$50 million bounty for the "capture, killing or information leading to the capture or killing" of bin Laden. This had been doubled from $25 million in 2007. He remains on the US Federal Bureau of Investigation's most wanted list.

Apart from one legal border crossing, 15 mountain passes are frequently used to travel between Pakistan and Afghanistan, by militants, traders, smugglers and innocent travelers. These paths originate in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and feed into the Afghan provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, Nuristan, Khost, Pakita and Paktika.

It is this area that will become the stage for the next chapter in the hunt for bin Laden, with US forces on the Afghan side and Pakistan troops on the other. The theory is that al-Qaeda and its allies will be caught in the middle.

Interaction with generally well-connected militant sources leads Asia Times Online to believe that bin Laden, 52, is alive and healthy, despite a history of kidney trouble. Since the construction of a US base in 2007 at the intersection of the Afghan province of Kunar and Bajaur Agency in Pakistan, bin Laden is confirmed to have flitted from place to place on either side of the border.

He is definitely known to have spent time in Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal area, but all sources say that nowadays he is more often than not in Afghanistan.

Bin Laden has numerous safe houses and is protected by a strong network of diehards in the Pakistani tribal areas, in addition to an intelligence network on both sides of the border that has to date managed to stay a step ahead of both Western and Pakistani intelligence.

Top Taliban and other commanders adopt a similar pattern in avoiding the attention of unwelcome visitors. Even though a former Afghan premier, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, is known to move around Kunar and Nuristan provinces in Afghanistan, he remains at large. Hekmatyar also makes brief trips into the adjacent Pakistani regions of Chitral and Dir.

Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of legendary Afghan commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, runs the largest and most effective Taliban network in Afghanistan. He moves in the provinces of Khost and Paktia, and also in North Waziristan, always one step ahead of his pursuers - including drones.

Similarly, Ilyas Kashmiri, now one of al-Qaeda's most wanted men as he is intimately involved in defining and directing al-Qaeda's and the Taliban's struggle, moves between bases of operation in Pakistan and Afghanistan, never staying in one place for more than a night or two.

Not so fortunate was Baitullah Mehsud, the Pakistani Taliban leader killed in a drone attack earlier this year. He stayed only in the districts of Ladha and Makeen in South Waziristan and did not have other sanctuaries, making it easier to track him down.

The difficulty in trying to trace bin Laden is that he moves across such a broad area, and that, unlike even the Taliban, there is no defined target. Coalition forces have a broad idea of where the Taliban's command centers are and in which areas to expect resistance.

By comparison, bin Laden and his few dozen al-Qaeda deputies are shadows shifting across an endless landscape on which Taliban fighters, Pakistani tribal people and jihadi youths are more visible.

There is no recent credible first-hand information on when bin Laden was last seen. A few Taliban fighters who were arrested a few weeks ago could only share with their American interrogators what they had heard from their contacts - that bin Laden had moved between North Waziristan and South Waziristan.

It is safe to assume that he has not been in South Waziristan since the Pakistani military began major operations there about two months ago to take on the Pakistani Taliban. His most likely immediate destination would have been Khost, directly across the border.

Such speculation, though, has been around for years and bin Laden is nowhere nearer to being caught, let alone his chasers seeing his dust trail. Indeed, from the Pakistani perspective, their last verifiable sighting was in September 2003 near Bush Mountain in the Shawal Valley of North Waziristan. By the time the army arrived, he had long gone; all that was left were first-hand accounts of his having resided in the area.

All the same, the net might be getting tighter. Late on Thursday night, CBS News reported that a Hellfire missile fired from a Predator drone had killed a top al-Qaeda official in the Pakistani border area. Unnamed officials said the person killed was not bin Laden or Zawahiri, but that he was "one of the top five terrorists on the US wanted list", according to the report.

Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief.

The many Al-Qaeda operating in Pakistan

According to a UPI report [December 2] a “senior US intelligence official” says only about 100 al-Qaida members remain in Afghanistan.” But there are “several hundred” al-Qaida "operating from" Pakistan. That much we could surmise. What the article then reveals, again, is that the issues that have to be dealt with are in Pakistan. And yet the Pakistani military usually act insulted that anyone would suggest such a thing.

But what is frustrating to me is that the headline is about the few in Afghanistan, not the many that are "operating" in Pakistan.

A revealing interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai on the Taliban and Pakistani sentiment

Kaustav Chakrabarti of Open Security has published an interview on the Taliban and related issues in Pakistan with the deservedly respected journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai. This interview is a treasure trove of valuable information on the situation in Pakistan today. Thanks to Chakrabarti and Open Security for making it available. I reproduce here the latter 80% of this interview. The earlier portion is on material that is generally well known. [Click on the title above for a link to the whole article.]

Links between the Taliban and al Qaeda have grown stronger

Kaustav Chakrabarti, 24 November 2009

. . . .

RY: . . . Osama Bin Laden was given refuge by the Jalalabad shaura (council) of the Mujahideen headed by Haji Qadir. The Taliban inherited these Arabs and Osama Bin Laden. I am witness to the fact that they were initially suspicious of each other. Osama thought that the Taliban was a US-Pakistan creation and that he could not work with them. The Taliban thought that since Osama was working with the Mujahideen earlier he must still be friendly to them.

They had a few meetings, and they resolved their differences; he was allowed to stay on in Jalalabad. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan militants and other Central Asian groups were also allowed to stay. They were already there before the Taliban came to power. But their presence in Afghanistan increased after the Taliban came to power because Taliban gave refuge to everyone who wanted to come; Arabs, Central Asians, Chinese Muslims, and Indonesians.

The Taliban's links with al Qaeda, however, have grown over the years, since they have been fighting together for long. They have fought a common enemy in a common trench, given blood to each other; so now the bonds are much stronger. The Taliban would still like to confine themselves to Afghanistan. Maybe they would not be very happy to give refuge to people like Osama. But now that the bonds have been strengthened, I do not know if they can push them out.

KC: Mullah Omar regarded Bamiyan Buddha as an Afghan heritage and wanted to protect it. Then why did he allow it to be destroyed? Was there a change in his outlook?

RY: Regarding the destruction of Bamiyan Buddha, the radical elements within the Taliban movement had their way. Mullah Omar, in spite of being the leader, did not have the power to stop this. What they did was something very unwise; it was a heritage, why destroy them. One incident provoked them. A famine had exasperated the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. People had been displaced because of the fighting. The Taliban had appealed to the world for help including the UN. No one was forthcoming as the Taliban was like a pariah. And this got them angry. They thought that while the world was concerned about the statues, no one was concerned about the Afghans. That there was more concern for the dead than for those who were still alive and could have survived if they were given help.

KC: Saudi Arabia maintains that the Taliban would become moderate in due course of time. Do you agree with it?

RY: I think that's a good point. You know, if you interact with these radical groups and bring them into the mainstream, I think it can moderate their policies. I know at that time [late 90's], there were some NGOs – Danish, Swedish, the Red Cross – they were interacting with the Taliban and they were influencing them. In fact, Swedish NGOs were allowed to run girl schools. The security situation in Afghanistan was very good during the time of the Taliban.

KC: I understand that the Taliban were hugely popular when they came to power. But what was their popularity among the Afghans in later years?

RY: They emerged in the autumn of 1994. I was the first one to go to Kandahar and tell the world about the Taliban. In fact I was there in Kabul immediately after Najibullah [the Soviet -backed president who had taken shelter in a UN compound prior to his execution by the Taliban], was hanged. I did not see the execution but I saw their bodies hanging from the electricity pole. I spent the previous night in Jalalabad. I was told by the Taliban commanders that the next day Kabul will fall. I was with the BBC team. We left Jalalabad at four in the morning, we got special permit to leave before the curfew was relaxed. And there was jubilation, people were happy. It was the grape season and people were distributing grapes to everyone.

The Taliban were able to stop lawlessness in a very short time. During the rule of the Mujahideen, there were about 42 check posts between Chaman (border town in Balochistan) and Kandahar. Under the Taliban there were only three. The security was excellent. I traveled at night and nothing happened. Under the Mujahideen robberies were common, I too was robbed.

They brought peace after so many years of war. Those who claim that the Taliban were a Pakistani creation were missing the whole point. I was there when the Taliban came to power. The people welcomed them since they were tired of the excesses of the Mujahideen. The people thought that they would bring peace, and they wanted nothing of the Mujahideen. A term was used at that time in the Kandahar region ? Topakayan, which is Pashto for gunmen. The Mujahideen were called the gunmen. Things had become to such a pass that Kandahar was divided into five different regions. Kabul was also like that; Dostum was controlling the northern parts, the Palace area was controlled by Ahmed Shah Masood and Rabbani, the south was controlled by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, western Kabul was in the hands of the Hazara-Shiite groups led by Mazari, and the North west was controlled by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. And this was true of every city in Afghanistan. These groups set up numerous checkpoints which made life miserable for the people. That's why the people welcomed the Taliban. Earlier there were at least five to six centres of power. With the Taliban there was only one centre of power. They controlled ninety percent of the land.

Their third achievement was ending drug trafficking. They did it with very few resources, no international help and no alternative crops for the farmers. They simply issued a decree banning poppy. And look now; it is feeding the insurgency and has increased manifolds under the watch of the Americans and their allies. And today, it's not only the Taliban which is benefiting from narcotics trade but others in power also have a share in it.

But this security came at some costs. Their laws were very tough. The non-Pashtuns were a bit apprehensive. The Taliban's biggest criticism was that the fighting never ended. The Taliban in due course of time became like any other armed group. They were unable to transform themselves from an armed group into a political organisation. So the Taliban became another armed faction which wanted power at all costs, especially since they were in war with the Northern Alliance. They never held any peace talks. They wanted to rule alone, there was no effort made to forge alliances. They really never had any socio-economic policies to improve the life of the people.

KC: What was Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban?

RY: The Pakistanis were initially not even aware of the Taliban movement. I was in Kandahar, and in my presence a phone call came from the ISI office in Rawalpindi. The ISI wanted to exchange some pleasantries. Mullah Omar spoke in Pashto and the ISI guy spoke in Urdu. Mullah Omar's response was clear: "I don't know you, I don't have any work with you, I cannot communicate with you in Urdu, and I don't want to talk with you". This was in 1995. People who write about these things have never been to these places, they have never met Mullah Omar or his Shaura. When I came back, the ISI debriefed me about the Taliban. Officers of the rank of Brigadier asked me: “Who are the Taliban, who is Mullah Omar, what kind of person he is.” Had they known, why would they ask me?

At that time, the Taliban were very popular, the movement was spreading like wildfire. And that phone call was the first attempt at contact between the Taliban and the ISI. And then, they thought- wait, hang on, we can offer them support.

The belief that the Taliban were a Pakistani creation is not true, although eventually there were contacts. Pakistan asked the Taliban not to bomb Bamiyan Buddha, they refused. Pakistan asked them to hand over Osama Bin Laden, they refused. Pakistan asked Taliban to hand over Pakistani criminals and militants who had taken refuge in Afghanistan and some of them were with the Taliban, they refused to hand over even one Pakistani. The Taliban were very angry with the transit trade conditions placed on Afghanistan by Pakistan. Pakistan had declared many items as negative which Afghanistan could not longer import through the Pakistani territory since these items, like tires and gadgets, were being smuggled back into Pakistan. This created problems between the two.

Current Situation in Afghanistan

KC: Let us talk about the present situation-How popular is the Taliban now?

RY: Among the Pashtuns they are the strongest group. Western polls suggest that the Taliban control only eleven percent support, I don't believe that. When the Americans wanted to defeat the Taliban initially, they sided with the wrong people, they befriended these warlords. The same warlords who were defeated by the Taliban were brought back to power. These warlords were hated, that's one reason why the people turned against the government in the first place.

However, for many reasons, they are not the most popular movement, majority of Afghans don't like the Taliban. You must understand that it's a very fragmented tribal society. The Taliban militias are heavily armed, well funded and enjoy the requisite manpower. What has the other side [government troops] got? Hamid Karzai, and the Afghan Army is not a very well organized force. There is no organised military force in Afghanistan.

If you live in places like Kandahar or Helmand, the most powerful group are the Taliban. You have no choice, if you want to live in peace and survive, then you have to agree to cooperate with the Taliban. When the government displays authority in some area, the people will support them. The government is not powerful, and that's where the problem lies. The tide will turn if the people realise that now the government and the Americans are winning, and the Taliban are weakening. That can happen.

KC: What do you think of the counterinsurgency strategy suggested by Gen Stanley McChrystal?

RY: The Americans are faltering. They have lost the way; they do not know what to do. They are moving from one disaster to another. Obama came up with a new policy when he came to power. He inserted 21000 new troops and changed the commander. He also started focusing more on Pakistan. Now they are doing another review since the first policy has obviously failed. Now the second review is going on. The Americans are actually trying to extradite themselves from the problem. The memories of Vietnam are still fresh, that is the problem. Obama has been asked for 40,000 more troops, which is going to push Obama deeper into the Afghan problem. Afghanistan is known as a graveyard of empires for a reason.

KC: The counter argument could be that Afghans have got the wrong end of the stick from all those who tried to invade Afghanistan. No one ever really did hearts-and-minds in Afghanistan. Can such a strategy work?

RY: How do you do a hearts-and-minds policy with people in uniform. And that too with foreign troops! The foreign presence is not liked- the way they behave, their cultural and religious ignorance. The way they carry out their search operations, the way they bomb people which cause civilian casualties-- all cause deep resentment.

It's too late. Hearts and minds means that you go out of your camps and heavily-guarded fortresses and you interact with the locals on a very regular basis. You ask them for their problems and help them with money and other assistance. But they can't go out like that, wherever they go, the roads are mined. Children have been taught how to explode the bombs; IEDs are planted by the Taliban and the remote is given to a child and when they see the vehicle coming, they push the trigger. They might be living in areas under the control of the government but they are not for the government. Because people have lost family members, they have suffered. Their family members have been arrested and they have been jailed in Baghram and Guantanamo Bay. So there are many issues involved here. I think that it's a bit late in the day to revive the policy of wining the ?hearts and minds'.

What they can do is perhaps to buy some people. Which I think is the new policy-- 'to buy' the insurgents. The Americans have come up with a very insulting term ? 'ten dollar a month Taliban'-- the notion that 10-15 percent are committed Taliban and the rest are fighting for money.

The Pakistan Taliban

KC: Can you explain the Taliban's meteoric rise in Pakistan.

RY: Many tribal militant groups were tolerated by the Pakistan army when they took refuge in the tribal areas as they were attacking foreign troops in Afghanistan and not the Pakistani forces. Such arrangements began changing in early 2004 when the Taliban started fighting inside Pakistan . In January 2004, the army launched military operations in Waziristan. That was the turning point. The operation was conducted under the American pressure, hoping to dislodge al Qaeda. It was a shock, the fighting was very tough and the army lost many men. Since then the Taliban's influence has been spreading. Instead of being controlled, it has spread. After every military operation we have seen that the Taliban presence has expanded - from South Waziristan to North Waziristan and then to Bajaur, Mohmand and Swat. The Taliban is spreading in Pakistan largely because the army is using heavy weapons against the people.

KC: Why did Baitullah Mehsud turn against Pakistan Army?

RY: As long as he was concentrating on Afghanistan, Baitullah Mehsud was being tolerated. He told the Pakistan government, "I won't fight you, but you must not stop me". He wanted to send his people to Afghanistan and continue to maintain his base. He could not afford to lose his own centre of power in Waziristan. Under the American pressure, the army acted against him. Subsequently, when he turned against Pakistan, the state's whole focus fell upon his group.

Baitullah was not an al Qaeda member. You can say that Baitullah was pushed into the laps of al Qaeda. Even in the last days of his life he maintained that Mullah Omar was his leader because he was fighting a genuine jihad against the US. He had fought in Afghanistan as a Taliban member. He was very close to the Afghan Taliban. Al Qaeda is asking its fighters to fight on two fronts--If they lose their territory in Waziristan, then where will they find refuge?

KC: Many experts in India and the US feel that Pakistan is still supporting former proxy groups.

RY: The Haqqanis are from Afghanistan, they have been living in Waziristan since 1979. If the Taliban is not interfering in Pakistan, then Pakistan will not like to harm them. I don't know how much support the Taliban are getting from Pakistan, I don't think that the Taliban need much support. They get a lot of money from the Arab countries. But even tolerating them is a support. This is the bone of contention between the US and Pakistan; the US wants Pakistan to take them out.

You know, the jihadi groups like Jaish-e- Mohammad were being tolerated by the Pakistan government. Some of them were being used by the State in Kashmir. Musharraf changed the policy in 2004; it was a turning point. When he made the commitment to root out terror groups, he actually meant it. The backlash after the Lal Masjid operation was also a significant turning point. However, you don't really snap all your contacts. The disengagement has to be gradual. Pakistan has suffered so much, I don't think that there will be any tolerance for these groups. At one time, they were allies. They were used in Kashmir, and Afghanistan. But I think that that policy is now a thing of the past.

If Pakistan is still supporting the Haqqanis and Afghan Taliban, it is because they want to retain some influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan is very suspicious of the Northern Alliance and vice versa; its mutual hatred. Pakistan will like to have friends in Afghanistan after having invested so much in Afghanistan.

India-Pakistan Relations

KC: What do people in Pakistan think about India now?

RY: I think that there has been a big change in people's views towards India. People don't have the stomach for any more wars with India or with any body else. There are so many issues ? security, poverty, unemployment. They know that if they have another war, the problems will become even more acute. I don't think that there is any support for any hostility with India. People would want the Kashmir issue to be resolved, that would be a huge sign of relief.

KC: If Pakistan agrees to convert the Line of Control into the International Border, what will be the reaction?

RY: I think anything that is a face-saving solution for both the countries and it will be acceptable. Both will have to give and take. I think there will be greater support for such a move this time around -- we may not get the whole of Kashmir, but still it will be acceptable. Trade, economic relations have taken a priority.

KC: What does the average Lieutenant and Captain of the Pakistan army think?

RY: Their whole training is geared towards India as the enemy. The soldiers and officers who were asked to fight in Waziristan did not like that. They had to obey orders, they have their careers and they can't say no. A very few refused, some were even court-martialed. Privately they say that this [counterinsurgency] is not what they were trained to do. They don't want to fight their own people; they don't want to bomb their own villages. They don't want to become martyrs fighting their own people, that too Muslims and Pakistanis. Their whole orientation was against India. But that is changing now. There has been no war since Kargil. Also, they have a very big fight at hand. This is also affecting their orientation- Ok, India is not the only enemy, we have another enemy.

KC: What can India can do to normalise relations?

RY: India is much bigger, India is much stronger, it has more resources. It can absorb all this. It can put a lot of money on the defence. It can also create a lot of problems for Pakistan. We know that. We realise that if we try to match India, we will actually harm ourselves since we have lesser resources. India has to reassure Pakistan; act like a big brother, like an older brother. I realise that post-Mumbai it was very difficult; Mumbai was actually a very dangerous development.

KC: Who was behind Mumbai?

RY: I have no doubt that it was the Lashkar-e-Tayeeba. Not al Qaeda. I tell you, al Qaeda is not that strong or big [in Pakistan].

KC: Who controls Lashkar-e-Tayeeba?

RY: I don't know. Lashkar-e-Tayyeba had links with the Pakistan Army. I don't know how much of that still persists. But they are not backed the way they were earlier. LeT has been fighting in Kashmir, and it is a very efficient organisation. It has been getting a lot of funds from various people who think that it is fighting a jihad. I don't think that al Qaeda is behind LeT. It has different Islamic beliefs from al Qaeda.

KC: Do you think that it is right to accuse India of supporting the Taliban as Rehman Malik has been suggesting?

RY: We don't have any evidence. But India being a bigger power, why will it sit idle and not take revenge [for Pakistan's support to Kashmiri militants]. There is a feeling that India is supporting the Baloch separatists. I don't know whether India was supporting Baitullah Mehsud, there is no evidence of that, but Baitullah himself would not be willing to get any support from India.

Pakistan Counterinsurgency

KC: Post-Swat operations, do you think Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts are improving?

RY: Where is the success? There is no proper counterinsurgency policy. Only military means are being employed. I think that they are committing a big mistake by using only the army. They are using the army since the Taliban are very strong. They should have instead used Frontier Corps. The army is not trained for counterinsurgency. Frontier Corps, being Pashtun dominated, are better suited. Besides, the use of heavy weapons and air bombing has caused deep resentment. They are not taking prisoners, they are killing all the Taliban, and their bodies are being dumped. They are creating more Talibans. All these people who are losing family members, and their houses, they will never reconcile. There is no policy for reintegration- that's the weakest link.

They are forcing them to form lashkars. Salarazai lashkars in Bajaur was being sustained by the army. Their family members have been killed and they cannot sleep in peace. They are always at risk. I keep asking the big landlords in Swat, " how can you hope to go back and live in your previous grandeur".They can't have soldiers guarding them all times. For how long can you have the lashkars? Nobody is talking about the lack of justice. All the forest land is owned by the landlords, most members of the Parliament are feudal Khans. All the shelter-less, landless and jobless have joined the Taliban. Class war is not the only factor but it is one of the factors.

Many people who are being branded as the Taliban are those who think that they cannot get their political rights peacefully. That's why the army cannot stay there forever. The more it stays there, the more it bombs, more enemies it will create. The army was attacked in its own backyard in GHQ. There is no end to this.


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BBC interview with a child "suicide bomber"

I have for some time believed that it takes a huge degree of inhumanity, wickedness, to train children to become suicide bombers. It appears to be an industry among the Taliban/Al Qaeda. So many bombers have been produced that the process cannot exist without a number of adults being involved and other numbers being willing to ignore it. For me, it is easy to believe that eventually this activity will create such revulsion among the communities being mined for their children that there will be an extreme reaction. How can a society, once fully aware of the practice, continue to allow it? Given my faith on the subject, I am encouraged by the report of a 14 year old boy who was "recruited" to be a suicide bomber. The whole report follows below. RLC


'I agreed to become a suicide bomber' Thursday, 12 November 2009 BBC News

A 14-year-old boy in the tribal region of Bajaur, in north-west Pakistan, says he was detained by Taliban forces who tried to turn him into a suicide bomber. The boy is now in army hands.

He provided a detailed account to BBC correspondent Orla Guerin. His story cannot be independently verified.

"There were five people who came after me from a place in Bajaur. They tricked me. They told me they were going to behead my father.

I went with them but my father wasn't there. They tied me up.

They said: 'You have two choices. We will behead you, or you will become a suicide bomber.' I refused.

There were two more guys of my age. They were also training to be suicide bombers. If we refused they would tie our hands behind our backs, blindfold us and start beating us.

They brainwashed us and told us we would go to heaven. They said 'there will be honey and juice and God will appear in front of you. You will have a beautiful house in Heaven'.

We used to ask them to let us out to pray. They would reply 'you are already on your way to heaven. You don't need to pray.'

They beat me hard for five days. I wasn't given any food. While they were beating me I agreed to become a suicide bomber. They separated me from the other boys.

Mosque mission

They took me to a dark room and started giving me pills. I was handed over to Maulvi Fakir [the Bajaur Taliban commander]. After all this preparation they said I was to go and do the job in a mosque.

It was an ordinary mosque but the cleric there used to talk against the Taliban, and they declared him their enemy. They told me the cleric was a non-believer, a non-Muslim.

They took off my shirt and put the jacket on my shoulders. There were two hooks on my chest. They told me that when you go there you say'Allahu Akbar' [God is Great] and then you pull apart these two hooks. Then they took me there, showed me the mosque and went off.

I was drugged and I couldn't feel anything. I only came to my senses when I arrived in the mosque. I saw the peaceful kind face of the cleric, and I saw the mosque was full of holy books. I saw the people praying. And I thought, they are all Muslims. How can I do this? I decided not to and I came out.

I sat under a tree outside the mosque and waited for prayers to be over. After that I made my way back to the Taliban. Then they called me 'a son of a bitch' and asked why I had come back without doing it.

I told them I could not do it because they were carrying out body searches of all the people entering the mosque. They took off my vest and handed me over to Maulvi Fakir.

They tied me up but I told them to give me another chance and I would do it. They trusted me. I was roaming around with them for a couple of days. I got to the road, found transport and came home. They followed me to my house. They wanted to know if I was still there or had run somewhere else.

The Taliban had beaten me so harshly my back was scarred. When my parents saw that my mother started to cry, and told me not to go back to them. My father asked them why they were after his son. One day he took his weapon and went after them. But they wanted to kill him so he came back home and closed the door.

Before the Taliban came we used to enjoy freedom. We used to play, and go to our schools. There were no restrictions on us. Morning and evening we used to play games, and sit and chat with friends. We used to listen to music on our mobile phones. They banned that. They stopped us doing anything. They stopped us playing cricket and going to school. We felt like prisoners.

I want to join the army because they are the defenders of the land. They are fighting for the right cause. I want to fight against the Taliban. I have no other intention except to defend my country. The Taliban should be eliminated.

I want to tell the Taliban that they are cruel, and what they did to me was unjust. I can't kill innocent Muslims.

I am not afraid of them. I am only afraid of God. I am answerable only to Him."

The relation between Al Qaeda and the various Taliban groups

A lot of nonsense has recently been written about how distinguishable Al Qaeda is from the Taliban. This article, drawing from some knowledgeable sources, reveals several ways the two are interlinked and emphasizes how mutually dependent they are. RLC

Al-Qaida and the Taliban: Knowing your enemy

By Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON - Senior al-Qaida leaders are forging deeper relationships with Pakistani militants and often operating from their camps inside the Pakistan border, fueling Obama administration arguments for a shift in the Afghan war strategy that more narrowly targets the terrorists.

For eight years since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the U.S. has focused mostly on Afghanistan's Taliban as an unabashed ally of al-Qaida.

Now, however, forced to choose between sending more troops in an intensified counterinsurgency campaign against Afghanistan's Taliban or largely maintaining troop levels and using more drone strikes to take out al-Qaida along the border, U.S. officials must first determine which enemy is the greater priority.

That dilemma is complicated by the recent rise of a Pakistani faction of the Taliban that operates in close proximity with al-Qaida - even as al-Qaida has lessened activities with its former Afghan Taliban hosts, according to some administration officials.

U.S. officials face a tough challenge in dissecting the structure and leanings of the militant organizations on both sides of the often indiscernible Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and understanding their murky and evolving ties to al-Qaida.

"You cannot meaningfully distinguish between al-Qaida and the co-linked (militant) networks - either in terms of understanding the landscape or crafting a policy response," said Vahid Brown, a researcher at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

"If you think you can kill al-Qaida leaders, as opposed to doing a broader scale effort against the militant environment, that notion is based on a fundamental misapprehension of the nature of the terrain," said Brown, describing the complexity of the networks along the border and their threat.

With concerns about Pakistani militants growing, an influential faction inside the administration that includes Vice President Joe Biden is pushing for the U.S. to concentrate more on al-Qaida and less on the Afghan Taliban.

But the push for that strategy butts up against the long-perceived union between al-Qaida and the Afghan Taliban, ingrained in America's consciousness since the Sept. 11 attacks and the ensuing war in Afghanistan.

The 19 al-Qaida members behind the hijackings that sent planes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and the Pennsylvania countryside plotted their attacks from Taliban-protected safe havens in Afghanistan.

The Afghan Taliban took over Afghanistan in 1996. United in Islamic ideology, they sheltered Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida followers. Al-Qaida terrorist training camps flourished openly in the 1990s and the two groups shared weapons, financing and tactics.

In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, the Bush administration repeatedly linked al-Qaida and the Afghan Taliban in rhetoric and policy, pairing them in enemies' lists and economic penalties.

President Barack Obama and his advisers are debating whether U.S. policy should sever that linkage and target al-Qaida, which has appeared to have found new allies inside the Pakistani border.

Over the past 18 months, according to analysts and U.S. counterterrorism officials, al-Qaida leaders have deepened and solidified their relationship with Pakistan's Taliban and with other violent homegrown militant groups, including Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Janghvi, that are based in the northeastern Punjab province.

Al-Qaida also has strong ties with the network run by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj, who direct the fight against U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan from the Waziristan tribal region in Pakistan.

Brown pointed to the Haqqani network operating in Pakistan's tribal areas as an example of militants linked to al-Qaida who have demonstrated a growth in technical innovation. Its increased use of roadside bombs and different types of suicide attacks, and the employment of other international jihadists are evidence of the al-Qaida influence, he said.

According to U.S. officials and analysts, al-Qaida leaders have provided training and resources to these groups in camps along the border.

The stronger ties are also evident, the analysts said, in suicide bombings and other violent battlefield tactics long known to be associated with al-Qaida that are showing up more frequently in attacks staged by those Pakistan-based groups.

Pakistan's Taliban have unloosed a spree of violence inside the country over the past year, attempting to take over the Swat Valley region before being ousted by Pakistan's army.

In recent weeks, the Pakistani Taliban, aided by other militants, have targeted military and government installations in suicide bombings aimed at forcing the government to back off from its recent push into South Waziristan, the border area where many militants are based. Despite those attacks, the offensive began last week.

At the same time, said Richard Barrett, coordinator of the monitoring team for the U.N.'s Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, said there are hints of fracture between al-Qaida and its longtime Afghan Taliban allies.

Barrett said that Afghan Taliban leaders, including the reclusive, one-eyed Mullah Omar, may have changed their once-approving view of al-Qaida. Barrett said the Afghan Taliban may worry about U.S. repercussions if they "are seen as very closely wedded to al-Qaida" and likely to allow that group tore-establish sanctuaries there.

While the Afghan Taliban share many of al-Qaida's violent goals, including the defeat of the Kabul government, Barrett said, they are more regionally focused and do not hold the same global jihadist views.

Some U.S. military and intelligence officials, however, warn against underestimating the relationship between al-Qaida and the Afghan Taliban.

While the Taliban and al-Qaida may have differences, senior counterterrorism officials say that al-Qaida still has strong historical ties to Mullah Omar and that is not likely to go away. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, is arguing for an additional 10,000 and 80,000 troops to mount a counterinsurgency campaign against the Afghan Taliban to stabilize the country and boost Afghan security forces.

But rising U.S. casualties, escalating violence and declining American support for the war have put political pressure on the White House to rethink that strategy. The counterproposal urged by Biden and others would maintain current troop levels and use special operations forces and targeted unmanned aircraft strikes against al-Qaida and other insurgents.

Recent U.S. government estimates put the number of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan at about 25,000, while analysts and other officials say there are only about 100 al-Qaida members in the country. Totals for al-Qaida in Pakistan are more difficult to pin down, but estimates are in the low hundreds, while Taliban there number also in the thousands.

Biden and others argue that if the aim is to prevent future attacks against the United States, then the goal must be to defeat al-Qaida.

Military analyst Frederick Kagan told Congress this past week that any move to defeat al-Qaida cannot be separated from efforts to defeat its allies and proxies. The Afghan Taliban may not be planning attacks terrorist against the United States now, but he said that, with continued association with al-Qaida, the Taliban eventually may pursue global jihad.

Bruce Hoffman, a counterterrorism expert at Georgetown University and a longtime government adviser, said al-Qaida continues to work with the Taliban and other insurgents on both sides of the border, providing resources and training to bolster their fight.

He and others argue that to narrowly focus the fight on al-Qaida leaders, particularly those targeted by drone strikes inside the Pakistan border, would be to oversimplify a complex enemy, and ultimately fail.