Friday, November 19, 2004

Khalidi on Falluja

Khalidi is one of the best informed observers of the Middle East. Here he explains some of the history that informs the perspective of peoples in the Middle East. We Americans continue to miss the importance of the past in informing the present. This is worth the time to read. Best, RLC

IN THESE TIMES November 12, 2004

Fallujah 101 A history lesson about the town we are currently destroying.

By Rashid Khalidi

There is a small City on one of the bends of the Euphrates that sticks out into the great Syrian Desert. It's on an ancient trade route linking the oasis towns of the Nejd province of what is today Saudi Arabia with the great cities of Aleppo and Mosul to the north. It also is on the desert highway between Baghdad and Amman. This city is a crossroads.

For millennia people have been going up and down that north-south desert highway. The city is like a seaport on that great desert, a place that binds together people in what are today Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. People in the city are linked by tribe, family or marriage to people in all these places.

The ideas that came out of the eastern part of Saudi Arabia in the late 18th Century, which today we call Wahhabi ideas -- those of a man named Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhabâ -- took root in this city more than 200 years ago. In other words, it is a place where what we would call fundamentalist salafi, or Wahhabi ideas, have been well implanted for 10 generations.

This town also is the place where in the spring of 1920, before T. E. Lawrence wrote the above passage, the British discerned civil unrest.

The British sent a renowned explorer and a senior colonial officer who had quelled unrest in the corners of their empire, Lt. Col. Gerald Leachman, to master this unruly corner of Iraq. Leachman was killed in an altercation with a local leader named Shaykh Dhari. His death sparked a war that ended up costing the lives of 10,000 Iraqis and more than 1,000 British and Indian troops. To restore Iraq to their control, the British used massive air power, bombing indiscriminately. That city is now called Fallujah.

Shaykh Dhari's grandson, today a prominent Iraqi cleric, helped to broker the end of the U.S. Marine siege of Fallujah in April of this year. Fallujah thus embodies the interrelated tribal, religious and national aspects of Iraqs history.

The Bush administration is not creating the world anew in the Middle East. It is waging a war in a place where history really matters.

A change for the worse

The United States has been a major Middle Eastern power since 1933, when a group of U.S. oil companies signed an exploration deal with Saudi Arabia. The United States has been dominant in the Middle East since 1942, when American troops first landed in North Africa and Iran. American troops have not left the region since. In other words, they have been in different parts of the Middle East for 62 years.

The United States was once celebrated as a non-colonial, sometimes anti-colonial, power in the Middle East, renowned for more than a century for its educational, medical and charity efforts. Since the Cold War, however, the United States has intervened increasingly in the region’s internal affairs and conflicts. Things have changed fundamentally for the worse with the invasion and occupation of Iraq, particularly with the revelation that the core pretexts offered by the administration for the invasion were false. And particularly with growing Iraqi dissatisfaction with the occupation and with the images of the hellish chaos broadcast regularly everywhere in the world except in the United Statesâ -- thanks to the excellent job done by the media in keeping the real human costs of Iraq off our television screens.

The United States is perceived as stepping into the boots of Western colonial occupiers, still bitterly remembered from Morocco to Iran. The Bush administration marched into Iraq proclaiming the very best of intentions while stubbornly refusing to understand that in the eyes of most Iraqis and most others in the Middle East it is actions, not proclaimed intentions, that count. It does not matter what you say you are doing in Fallujah, where U.S. troops just launched an attack after weeks of bombing. What matters is what you are doing in Fallujah -- and what people see that you are doing.

Fact-free and faith-based

Most Middle East experts in the United States, both inside and outside the government, have drawn on their knowledge of the cultures, languages, history, politics of the Middle East -- and on their experience -- to conclude that most Bush administration Middle East policies, whether in Iraq or Palestine, are harmful to the interests of the United States and the peoples of this region. A few of these experts have had the temerity to say so, to the outrage of the Bush administration and its supporters, who are committed to what I would call a fact-free, faith-based approach to Middle East policymaking.

These experts predicted that it would be difficult to occupy a vast, complex country like Iraq, that serious resistance from a major part of the population was likely, and that the invasion and occupation would complicate U.S. relations with other countries in the region. It is clear today that all of these fears were well founded.

After 20 months of occupation, the United States continues to make the important decisions in Iraq. Instead of control being exercised through the Coalition Provisional Authority, it takes place through the largest U.S. embassy in the world and its staff of more than 3,000. You can be sure that should the Iraqis try to end the basing of U.S. troops, or try to tear up the contracts with Halliburton and other U.S. companies, or take any other steps that displease the Bush administration, they would be brought up short by the U.S. viceroy, a.k.a. Ambassador John Negroponte.

We, and even more so the Iraqi government and its people, are trapped in a nightmare with no apparent end, in part because those experts who challenged neoconservative fantasies about U.S. troops being received with rice and flowers simply were not heeded. They warned that it is impossible to impose democracy through force in Iraq. Mao Tse Tung said that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun; he did not say democracy does. And it doesn’t.

The stench of hypocrisy rises when the United States, a nation supposedly committed to democratization and reform, does not hesitate to embrace dictatorial, autocratic and undemocratic regimes like those of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia and now even Libya, simply because they act in line with U.S. security concerns or give lucrative contracts to U.S. businesses. The United States claims to be acting in favor of democracy, yet embraces Qaddhafi! People in the Middle East notice this gap between word and deed -- even if Americans don’t notice the things being done in our name.

The United States, in fact, has a far from sterling record in promoting democracy in the Middle East. Initially it started off on a better footing. It opposed colonial rule and -promoted self-determination, as in President Wilson’s Fourteen Points after World War I. But when the United States returned to the Middle East after World War II, it soon supported anti-democratic regimes simply because they provided access to oil and military bases.

If you look carefully, what the Bush administration seems to mean by democracy in the Middle East is governments that do what the United States wants.

Conquer and plunder

Middle Eastern economics is another area about which we hear very little in our media. Americans may not be aware of it, but the wholesale theft of the property of the Iraqi people through privatization was prominently reported all over the Middle East. A recent case involved the handover of Iraqi Airways to an investor group headed by a family with close ties to the Saddam Hussein regime. The airline is worth $3 billion, because in addition to valuable landing slots all over Europe and a few tattered airplanes, Iraqi Airways owns the land on which most of the airports are built.

Such cases, and there are many, cause deep anger against the United States, and evoke bitter resistance to pressures for economic liberalization that people in the region interpret as the looting of their country’s assets.

These privatization measures arouse deep suspicion in the Middle East, because of fears that the region’s primary asset, oil, may be next.

Here, too, history is all-important. Since commercial quantities of oil were discovered in the Middle East at the turn of the 20th century, decisions over pricing, control and ownership of these valuable resources were largely in the hands of giant Western oil companies. They decided prices. They decided how much in taxes they would pay. They decided who controlled the local governments. They decided how much oil would be produced. And they decided everything else about oil, including conditions of exploration, production and labor.

In those seven decades the people of the countries where this wealth was located obtained few benefits from it. Only with the rise of OPEC and the nationalization of the Middle East oil industries and the oil price rises in the ‘70s did the situation change. Sadly, it was the oligarchs, the kleptocrats and Western companies that benefited most from the increased prices.

Fears that they will lose their resources shape much of the nationalism of the peoples of the Middle East. And events in Iraq only enhance these fears.

By invading, occupying and imposing a new regime on Iraq, the United States may be following, intentionally or not, in the footsteps of the old Western colonial powers -- and doing so in a region that within living memory ended a lengthy struggle to expel colonial occupations. They fought from 1830 to 1962 to kick out the French from Algeria. From 1882 to 1956 they fought to get the British out of Egypt. That’s within the lifetime of every person over 45 in the Middle East. Foreign troops on their soil against their will is deeply familiar.

- Rashid Khalidi is the Edward Said Professor of Arab Studies at Columbia University and author, most recently, of Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East.

This article is permanently archived at:

Richard Bulliet and Bernard Lewis

This is a rewarding review of Bulliet's newest book. It seems odd to me that so much is attributed to Attaturk only. In fact, as Lewis says in his first book, there were several false starts by young progressive Turks, and in the end Turkey was in ruins after WWI, and also with Attaturk there was a large number of eager young Turks who wanted to restructure their country, who joined him in the cause. It is hard to see much of that in the Arab world now. There are lots of frustrated progressive Arabs but the economy and the rest of their world is so depressed that they are unlikely to win the enthusiastic support of the public for the kind of secular [and radical] reforms that Turkey went through in the 1920s -- even then, though, they did not succeed in bannishing the veil.
For me this was very helpful in understanding why Bernard Lewis [the dominant figure when I was at SOAS] is now so broadly criticized. Best, RLC

Misreading Islam

By Michael Hirsh, Washington Monthly

Posted on November 12, 2004, Printed on November 12, 2004

America's misreading of the Arab world ^Ö and our current misadventure in Iraq ^Ö may have really begun in 1950. That was the year a young University of London historian named Bernard Lewis visited Turkey for the first time. Lewis, who is today an imposing, white-haired sage known as the "doyen of Middle Eastern studies" in America (as a New York Times reviewer once called him), was then on a sabbatical. Granted access to the Imperial Ottoman archives ^Ö the first Westerner allowed in ^Ö Lewis recalled that he felt "rather like a child turned loose in a toy shop, or like an intruder in Ali Baba's cave." But what Lewis saw happening outside his study window was just as exciting, he later wrote. There in Istanbul, in the heart of what once was a Muslim empire, a Western-style democracy was being born.

The hero of this grand transformation was Kemal Ataturk. A generation before Lewis's visit to Turkey, Ataturk (the last name, which he adopted, means "father of all Turks"), had seized control of the dying Ottoman Sultanate. Intent on single-handedly shoving his country into the modern West ^Ö "For the people, despite the people," he memorably declared ^Ö Ataturk imposed a puritanical secularism that abolished the caliphate, shuttered religious schools, and banned fezes, veils, and other icons of Islamic culture, even purging Turkish of its Arabic vocabulary. His People's Party had ruled autocratically since 1923. But in May 1950, after the passage of a new electoral law, it resoundingly lost the national elections to the nascent Democrat Party. The constitutional handover was an event "without precedent in the history of the country and the region," as Lewis wrote in "The Emergence of Modern Turkey," published in 1961, a year after the Turkish army first seized power. And it was Kemal Ataturk, Lewis noted at another point, who had "taken the first decisive steps in the acceptance of Western civilization."

Today, that epiphany ^Ö Lewis's Kemalist vision of a secularized, Westernized Arab democracy that casts off the medieval shackles of Islam and enters modernity at last ^Ö remains the core of George W. Bush's faltering vision in Iraq. As his other rationales for war fall away, Bush has only democratic transformation to point to as a casus belli in order to justify one of the costliest foreign adventures in American history. And even now Bush, having handed over faux sovereignty to the Iraqis and while beating a pell-mell retreat under fire, does not want to settle for some watered-down or Islamicized version of democracy. His administration's official goal is still dictated by the "Lewis Doctrine," as The Wall Street Journal called it: a Westernized polity, reconstituted and imposed from above like Kemal's Turkey, that is to become a bulwark of security for America and a model for the region.

Iraq, of course, does not seem to be heading in that direction. Quite the contrary: Iraq is passing from a secular to an increasingly radicalized and Islamicized society, and should it actually turn into a functioning polity, it is one for the present defined more by bullets than by ballots. All of which raises some important questions. What if the mistakes made in Iraq were not merely tactical missteps but stem from a fundamental misreading of the Arab mindset? What if, in other words, the doyen of Middle Eastern studies got it all wrong?

A growing number of Middle Eastern scholars who in the past have quietly stewed over Lewis's outsized influence say this is exactly what happened. To them, it is no surprise that Lewis and his acolytes in Washington botched the war on terror. In a new book, provocatively titled "The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization," one of those critics, Columbia scholar Richard Bulliet, argues that Lewis has been getting his "master narrative" about the Islamic world wrong since his early epiphanic days in Turkey ^Ö and he's still getting it wrong today.

In Cheney's Bunker

Lewis's basic premise, put forward in a series of articles, talks, and best selling books, is that the West ^Ö what used to be known as Christendom ^Ö is now in the last stages of a centuries-old struggle for dominance and prestige with Islamic civilization. (Lewis coined the term "clash of civilizations," using it in a 1990 essay titled "The Roots of Muslim Rage," and Samuel Huntington admits he picked it up from him.) Osama bin Laden, Lewis thought, must be viewed in this millennial construct as the last gasp of a losing cause, brazenly mocking the cowardice of the "Crusaders." Bin Laden's view of America as a "paper tiger" reflects a lack of respect for American power throughout the Arab world. And if we Americans, who trace our civilizational lineage back to the Crusaders, flagged now, we would only invite future attacks. Bin Laden was, in this view, less an aberrant extremist than a mainstream expression of Muslim frustration, welling up from the anti-Western nature of Islam. "I have no doubt that September 11 was the opening salvo of the final battle," Lewis told me in an interview last spring. Hence the only real answer to 9/11 was a decisive show of American strength in the Arab world; the only way forward, a Kemalist conquest of hearts and minds. And the most obvious place to seize the offensive and end the age-old struggle was in the heart of the Arab world, in Iraq.

This way of thinking had the remarkable virtue of appealing powerfully to both the hard-power enthusiasts in the administration, principally Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, who came into office thinking that the soft Clinton years had made America an easy target and who yearned to send a post-9/11 message of strength; and to neoconservatives from the first Bush administration such as Paul Wolfowitz, who were looking for excuses to complete their unfinished business with Saddam from 1991 and saw 9/11 as the ultimate refutation of the "realist" response to the first Gulf War. Leaving Saddam in power in 1991, betraying the Shiites, and handing Kuwait back to its corrupt rulers had been classic realism: Stability was all. But it turned out that the Arab world wasn't stable, it was seething. No longer could the Arabs be an exception to the rule of post-Cold War democratic transformation, merely a global gas station. The Arabs had to change too, fundamentally, just as Lewis (and Ataturk) had said. But change had to be shoved down their throats ^Ö Arab tribal culture understood only force and was too resistant to change, Lewis thought ^Ö and it had to happen quickly. This, in turn, required leaving behind Islam's anti-modern obsessions.

Iraq and its poster villain, Saddam Hussein, offered a unique opportunity for achieving this transformation in one bold stroke (remember "shock and awe"?) while regaining the offensive against the terrorists. So, it was no surprise that in the critical months of 2002 and 2003, while the Bush administration shunned deep thinking and banned State Department Arabists from its councils of power, Bernard Lewis was persona grata, delivering spine-stiffening lectures to Cheney over dinner in undisclosed locations. Abandoning his former scholarly caution, Lewis was among the earliest prominent voices after Sept. 11 to press for a confrontation with Saddam, doing so in a series of op-ed pieces in The Wall Street Journal with titles like "A War of Resolve" and "Time for Toppling." An official who sat in on some of the Lewis-Cheney discussions recalled, "His view was: 'Get on with it. Don't dither.'" Animated by such grandiose concepts, and like Lewis quite certain they were right, the strategists of the Bush administration in the end thought it unnecessary to prove there were operational links between Saddam and al Qaeda. These were good "bureaucratic" reasons for selling the war to the public, to use Wolfowitz's words, but the real links were deeper: America was taking on a sick civilization, one that it had to beat into submission. Bin Laden's supposedly broad Muslim base, and Saddam's recalcitrance to the West, were part of the same pathology.

The administration's vision of postwar Iraq was also fundamentally Lewisian, which is to say Kemalist. Paul Wolfowitz repeatedly invoked secular, democratic Turkey as a "useful model for others in the Muslim world," as the deputy secretary of defense termed it in December 2002 on the eve of a trip to lay the groundwork for what he thought would be a friendly Turkey's role as a staging ground for the Iraq war. Another key Pentagon neocon and old friend of Lewis', Harold Rhode, told associates a year ago that "we need an accelerated Turkish model" for Iraq, according to a source who talked with him. (Lewis dedicated a 2003 book, "The Crisis of Islam," to Rhode whom "I got to know when he was studying Ottoman registers," Lewis told me.) And such men thought that Ahmad Chalabi ^Ö also a protégé of Lewis's ^Ö might make a fine latter-day Ataturk ^Ö strong, secular, pro-Western, and friendly towards Israel. L. Paul Bremer III, the former U.S. civil administrator in Iraq, was not himself a Chalabite, but he too embraced a top-down Kemalist approach to Iraq's resurrection. The role of the Islamic community, meanwhile, was consistently marginalized in the administration's planning. U.S. officials saw Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most prestigious figure in the country, as a clueless medieval relic. Even though military intelligence officers were acutely aware of Sistani's importance ^Ö having gathered information on him for more than a year before the invasion ^Ö Bremer and his Pentagon overseers initially sidelined the cleric, defying his calls for early elections.

Looking for Love in All the Wrong Places

Lewis has long had detractors in the scholarly world, although his most ardent enemies have tended to be literary mavericks like the late Edward Said, the author of "Orientalism," a long screed against the cavalier treatment of Islam in Western literature. And especially after 9/11, Bulliet and other mainstream Arabists who had urged a softer, more nuanced view of Islam found themselves harassed into silence. Lewisites such as Martin Kramer, author of "Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America" (a fierce post-9/11 attack on Bulliet) and other prominent scholars such as Robert Wood of the University of Chicago, suggested that most academic Arabists were apologists for Islamic radicalism. But now, emboldened by the Bush administration's self-made quagmire in Iraq, the Arabists are launching a counterattack. They charge that Lewis's whole analysis missed the mark, beginning with his overarching construct, the great struggle between Islam and Christendom. These scholars argue that Lewis has slept through most of modern Arab history. Entangled in medieval texts, Lewis's view ignores too much and confusingly conflates old Ottoman with modern Arab history. "He projects from the Ottoman experience onto the Middle East. But after the Ottoman Empire was disbanded, a link was severed with the rest of Arab world," says Nader Hashemi, a University of Toronto scholar who is working on another anti-Lewis book. In other words, Istanbul and the caliphate were no longer the center of things. Turkey under Ataturk went in one direction, the Arabs, who were colonized, in another. Lewis, says Hashemi, "tries to interpret the problem of political development by trying to project a line back to medieval and early Islamic history. In the process, he totally ignores the impact of the British and French colonialists, and the repressive rule of many post-colonial leaders. He misses the break" with the past.

At least until the Iraq war, most present-day Arabs didn't think in the stark clash-of-civilization terms Lewis prefers. Bin Laden likes to vilify Western Crusaders, but until relatively recently, he was still seen by much of the Arab establishment as a marginal figure. To most Arabs before 9/11, the Crusades were history as ancient as they are to us in the West. Modern Arab anger and frustration is, in fact, less than a hundred years old. As bin Laden knows very well, this anger is a function not of Islam's humiliation at the Treaty of Carlowitz of 1699 ^Ö the sort of long-ago defeat that Lewis highlights in his bestselling What Went Wrong ^Ö but of much more recent developments. These include the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement by which the British and French agreed to divvy up the Arabic-speaking countries after World War I; the subsequent creation, by the Europeans, of corrupt, kleptocratic tyrannies in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan; the endemic poverty and underdevelopment that resulted for most of the 20th century; the U.N.-imposed creation of Israel in 1948; and finally, in recent decades, American support for the bleak status quo.

Yet as Bulliet writes, over the longer reach of history, Islam and the West have been far more culturally integrated than most people realized; there is a far better case for "Islamo-Christian civilization" than there is for the clash of civilizations. "There are two narratives here," says Fawaz Gerges, an intellectual ally of Bulliet's at Sarah Lawrence University. "One is Bernard Lewis. But the other narrative is that in historical terms, there have been so many inter-alliances between world of Islam and the West. There has never been a Muslim umma, or community, except for 23 years during the time of Mohammed. Except in the theoretical minds of the jihadists, the Muslim world was always split. Many Muslim leaders even allied themselves with the Crusaders."

Today, progress in the Arab world will not come by secularizing it from above (Bulliet's chapter dealing with Chalabi is called "Looking for Love in All the Wrong Places") but by rediscovering this more tolerant Islam, which actually predates radicalism and, contra Ataturk, is an ineluctable part of Arab self-identity that must be accommodated. For centuries, Bulliet argues, comparative stability prevailed in the Islamic world not (as Lewis maintains) because of the Ottomans' success, but because Islam was playing its traditional role of constraining tyranny. "The collectivity of religious scholars acted at least theoretically as a countervailing force against tyranny. You had the implicit notion that if Islam is pushed out of the public sphere, tyranny will increase, and if that happens, people will look to Islam to redress the tyranny." This began to play out during the period that Lewis hails as the modernization era of the 19th century, when Western legal structures and armies were created. "What Lewis never talks about is the concomitant removal of Islam from the center of public life, the devalidation of Islamic education and Islamic law, the marginalization of Islamic scholars," Bulliet told me. Instead of modernization, what ensued was what Muslim clerics had long feared, tyranny that conforms precisely with some theories of Islamic political development, notes Bulliet. What the Arab world should have seen was "not an increase in modernization so much as an increase in tyranny. By the 1960s, that prophecy was fulfilled. You had dictatorships in most of the Islamic world." Egypt's Gamel Nasser, Syria's Hafez Assad, and others came in the guise of Arab nationalists, but they were nothing more than tyrants.

Yet there was no longer a legitimate force to oppose this trend. In the place of traditional Islamic learning ^Ö which had once allowed, even encouraged, science and advancement ^Ö there was nothing. The old religious authorities had been hounded out of public life, back into the mosque. The Caliphate was dead; when Ataturk destroyed it in Turkey, he also removed it from the rest of the Islamic world. Into that vacuum roared a fundamentalist reaction led by brilliant but aberrant amateurs like Egypt's Sayyid Qutb, the founding philosopher of Ayman Zawahiri's brand of Islamic radicalism who was hanged by al-Nasser, and later, Osama bin Laden, who grew up infected by the Saudis' extreme version of Wahhabism. Even the creator of Wahhabism, the 18th century thinker Mohammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, was outside the mainstream, notorious for vandalizing shrines and "denounced" by theologians across the Islamic world in his time for his "doctrinal mediocrity and illegitimacy," as the scholar Abdelwahab Meddeb writes in another new book that rebuts Lewis, "Islam and its Discontents."

Wahhabism's fast growth in the late 20th century was also a purely modern phenomenon, a function of Saudi petrodollars underwriting Wahhabist mosques and clerics throughout the Arab world (and elsewhere, including America). Indeed, the elites in Egypt and other Arab countries still tend to mock the Saudis as déclassés Bedouins who would have stayed that way if it were not for oil. "It's as if Jimmy Swaggert had come into hundreds of billions of dollars and taken over the church," one Arab official told me. The hellish culmination of this modern trend occurred in the mountains of Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s, when extremist Wahhabism, in the person of bin Laden, was married to Qutb's Egyptian Islamism, in the person of Zawahiri, who became bin Laden's deputy.

Critics were right to see the bin Laden phenomenon as a reaction against corrupt tyrannies like Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's, and ultimately against American support for those regimes. They were wrong to conclude that it was a mainstream phenomenon welling up from the anti-modern character of Islam, or that the only immediate solution lay in Western-style democracy. It was, instead, a reaction that came out of an Islam misshapen by modern political developments, many of them emanating from Western influences, outright invasion by British, French, and Italian colonialists, and finally the U.S.-Soviet clash that helped create the mujahadeen jihad in Afghanistan.

Academic Probation

Today, even as the administration's case for invading Iraq has all but collapsed, Bernard Lewis' public image has remained largely intact. While his neocon protégés fight for their reputations and their jobs, Lewis's latest book, a collection of essays called "From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East," received mostly respectful reviews last spring and summer. Yet events on the ground seem to be bearing out some of the academic criticisms of Lewis made by Bulliet and others. Indeed, they suggest that what is happening is the opposite of what Lewis predicted.

The administration's invasion of Iraq seems to have given bin Laden a historic gift. It has vindicated his rhetoric describing the Americans as latter-day Crusaders and Mongols, thus luring more adherents and inviting more rage and terror acts. (The administration admitted as much last summer, when it acknowledged that its "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report had been 180 degrees wrong. The report, which came out last June, at first said terrorist attacks around the world were down in 2003, indicating the war on terror was being won. Following complaints from experts, the State Department later revised the report to show that attacks were at their highest level since 1982.)

The new Iraq is also looking less and less Western, and certainly less secular than it was under Saddam. In the streets of Baghdad ^Ö once one of the most secular Arab capitals, women now go veiled and alcohol salesmen are beaten. The nation's most popular figures are Sistani and his radical Shiite rival, the young firebrand Moktada al-Sadr, who was permitted to escape besieged Najaf with his militia intact and is now seen as a champion of the Iraqi underclass. According to a survey commissioned by the Coalition Provisional Authority in late May, a substantial majority of Iraqis, 59 percent, want their religious communities to have "a great deal" of influence in selecting members of the new election commission. That's far more than those who favored tribal leaders (38 percent), political figures (31 percent), or the United Nations (36 percent). The poll also showed that Iraq's most popular political figures are religious party-affiliated leaders such as Ibrahaim Jaferi and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. To a fascinating degree, Islam now seems to be filling precisely the role Bulliet says it used to play, as a constraint against tyranny ^Ö whether the tyrant is now seen as the autocratic Americans or our man in Baghdad, interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.

Bremer once promised to ban Islamic strictures on family law and women's rights, and the interim constitution that he pushed through the Governing Council in March affirms that Islam is only one of the foundations of the state. But Sistani has dismissed the constitution as a transition democracy, and Iraq's political future is now largely out of American hands (though the U.S. military may continue to play a stabilizing role in order to squelch any move toward civil war). "I think the best-case scenario for Iraq is that they hold these parliamentary elections, and you get some kind of representative government dominated by religious parties," says University of Michigan scholar Juan Cole. Even Fouad Ajami, one of Lewis's longtime intellectual allies and like him an avowed Kemalist, concluded last spring in a New York Times op-ed piece: "Let's face it: Iraq is not going to be America's showcase in the Arab-Muslim world ^Å We expected a fairly secular society in Iraq (I myself wrote in that vein at the time). Yet it turned out that the radical faith ^Ö among the Sunnis as well as the Shiites ^Ö rose to fill the void left by the collapse of the old despotism."

Turkey Hunt

Today, the anti-Lewisites argue, the only hope is that a better, more benign form of Islam fights its way back in the hands of respected clerics like Sistani, overcoming the aberrant strains of the Osama bin Ladens and the Abu Mousab al-Zarqawis. Whatever emerges in Iraq and the Arab world will be, for a long time to come, Islamic. And it will remain, for a long time, anti-American, beginning with the likelihood that any new Iraqi government is going to give the boot to U.S. troops as soon as it possibly can. (That same CPA poll showed that 92 percent of Iraqis see the Americans as occupiers, not liberators, and 86 percent now want U.S. soldiers out, either "immediately" or after the 2005 election.) America may simply have to endure an unpleasant Islamist middle stage ^Ö and Arabs may have to experience its failure, as the Iranians have ^Ö before modernity finally overtakes Iraq and the Arab world. "Railing against Islam as a barrier to democracy and modern progress cannot make it go away so long as tyranny is a fact of life for most Muslims," Bulliet writes. "Finding ways of wedding [Islam's traditional] protective role with modern democratic and economic institutions is a challenge that has not yet been met."

No one, even Bush's Democratic critics, seems to fully comprehend this. Sens. Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) have introduced legislation that would create secular alternatives to madrassas, without realizing that this won't fly in the Arab world: All one can hope for are more moderate madrassas, because Islam is still seen broadly as a legitimating force. "What happens if the road to what could broadly be called democracy lies through Islamic revolution?" says Wood of the University of Chicago. The best hope, some of these scholars say, is that after a generation or so, the "Islamic" tag in Arab religious parties becomes rather anodyne, reminiscent of what happened to Christian democratic parties in Europe.

This may already be happening slowly in Turkey, where the parliament is dominated by the majority Islamic Justice and Development Party. The JDP leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan ^Ö who was once banned from public service after reciting a poem that said "the mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our soldiers" ^Ö has shown an impressive degree of pragmatism in governing. But again, Turkey is a unique case, made so by Kemal and his secular, military-enforced coup back in the 1920s. If Erdogan still secretly wants to re-Islamicize Turkey, he can only go so far in an environment in which the nation's powerful military twitches at every sign of incipient religiosity. Erdogan is also under unique pressure to secularize as Turkey bids to enter the European Union, which is not a card that moderate Arab secularists can hold up to win over their own populations.

Resolving the tension between Islam and politics will require a long, long process of change. As Bulliet writes, Christendom struggled for hundreds of years to come to terms with the role of religion in civil society. Even in America, separation of church and state "was not originally a cornerstone of the U.S. Constitution," and Americans are still fighting among themselves over the issue today.

In our talk last spring, Lewis was still arguing that Iraq would follow the secular path he had laid out for it. He voiced the line that has become a favorite of Wolfowitz's, that the neocons are the most forthright champions of Arab progress, and that the Arabists of the State Department who identified with the idea of "Arab exceptionalism" are merely exhibiting veiled racism. This is the straight neocon party line, of course: If you deny that secular democracy is the destiny of every people, you are guilty of cultural snobbery. But somehow Lewis's disdain for Islam, with its hagiographic invocation of Ataturk, managed to creep into our conversation. Threaded throughout Lewis's thinking, despite his protests to the contrary, is a Kemalist conviction that Islam is fundamentally anti-modern. In his 1996 book "The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years," for example, Lewis stresses the Koran's profession of the "finality and perfection of the Muslim revelation." Even though Islamic authorities have created laws and regulations beyond the strict word of the Koran in order to deal with the needs of the moment, "the making of new law, though common and widespread, was always disguised, almost furtive, and there was therefore no room for legislative councils or assemblies such as formed the starting-point of European democracy," he writes. In other words, Islam is an obstacle. "The Islamic world is now at beginning of 15th century," Lewis told me. "The Western world is at the beginning of the 21st century." He quickly added: "That doesn't mean [the West] is more advanced, it means it's gone through more." Following that timeline, Lewis suggested that the Islamic world is today "on the verge of its Reformation" ^Ö a necessary divorce between religion and politics that Lewis believes has been too long in coming. This view has become conventional wisdom in Washington, resonating not only with the neocons but also with the modernization theorists who have long dominated American campuses. Yet behind this view, say scholars like Bulliet, lies a fundamental rejection of Arabs' historical identity. The reason for that, Bulliet believes, resides in the inordinate influence that Lewis's historical studies of the Ottomans retain over his thinking ^Ö and by his 1950 visit to Turkey. Bulliet notes that as late as 2002, in the preface to the third edition of "The Emergence of Modern Turkey," Lewis "talked about the incredible sense of exhilaration it felt for someone of his generation, shaped by the great war against fascism and the emerging Cold War, to see the face of the modern Middle East emerge in Turkey." As a model, Bulliet argues, Turkey "was as vivid a vision for him 50 years later as it was at the time."

But again, Turkey's experience after the Ottoman empire's dissolution was no longer especially relevant to what was happening in the Arab world. Ataturk, in fact, was not only not an Arab, but his approach to modernity was also most deeply influenced by the fascism of the period (Mussolini was still a much-admired model in the 1920s). And Lewis never developed a feel for what modern Arabs were thinking, especially after he began to adopt strong pro-Israel views in the 1970s. "This is a person who does not like the people he is purporting to have expertise about," says Bulliet. "He doesn't respect them, he considers them to be good and worthy only to the degree they follow a Western path."

The neoconservative transformationalists of the Bush administration, though informed by far less scholarship than Lewis, seemed to adopt his dismissive attitude toward the peculiar demands of Arab and Islamic culture. And now they are paying for it. The downward spiral of the U.S. occupation into bloodshed and incompetence wasn't just a matter of too few troops or other breakdowns in planning, though those were clearly part of it. In fact, the great American transformation machine never really understood much about Arab culture, and it didn't bother to try. The occupation authorities, taking a paternalistic top-down approach, certainly did not comprehend the role of Islam, which is one reason why Bremer and Co. were so late in recognizing the power of the Sistani phenomenon. The occupation also failed because of its inability to comprehend and make use of tribal complexities, to understand "how to get the garbage collected, and know who's married to who," as Wood says. Before the war, Pentagon officials, seeking to justify their low-cost approach to nation-building, liked to talk about how much more sophisticated and educated the Iraqis were than Afghans, how they would quickly resurrect their country. Those officials obviously didn't mean what they said or act on it. In the end, they couldn't bring themselves to trust the Iraqis, and the soldiers at their command rounded up thousands of "hajis" indiscriminately, treating one and all as potential Saddam henchmen or terrorists (as I witnessed myself when, on assignment for Newsweek, I joined U.S. troops on raids in the Sunni Triangle last January).

There remains a deeper issue: Did Lewis's misconceptions lead the Bush administration to make a terrible strategic error? Despite the horrors of 9/11, did they transform the bin Laden threat into something grander than it really was? If the "show of strength" in Iraq was wrong-headed, as the Lewis critics say, then Americans must contemplate the terrible idea that they squandered hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of lives and limbs on the wrong war. If Bernard Lewis's view of the Arab problem was in error, then America missed a chance to round up and destroy a threat ^Ö al Qaeda ^Ö that in reality existed only on the sick margins of the Islamic world.

It is too soon to throw all of Lewis's Kemalist ideas on the ash-heap of history. Even his academic rivals concede that much of his early scholarship is impressive; some like Michigan's Cole suggest that Lewis lost his way only in his later years when he got pulled into present-day politics, especially the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and began grafting his medieval insights onto the modern Arab mindset. And whether the ultimate cause is modern or not, the Arab world is a dysfunctional society, one that requires fundamental reform. "The Arab Development Report" issued in the spring of 2002 by the U.N. Development Programme, harshly laid out the failings of Arab societies. Calling them "rich, but not developed," the report detailed the deficits of democracy and women's rights that have been favorite targets of the American neoconservatives. The report noted that the Arab world suffers from a lower rate of Internet connectivity than even sub-Saharan Africa, and that education is so backward and isolated that the entire Arab world translates only one-fifth of the books that Greece does. Some scholars also agree that in the longest of long runs, the ultimate vision of Lewis ^Ö and the neocons ^Ö will prove to be right. Perhaps in the long run, you can't Islamicize democracy, and so Islam is simply standing in the way.

Iran is the best real-world test of this hypothesis right now. A quarter century after the Khomeini revolution, Iran seems to be stuck in some indeterminate middle state. The forces of bottom-up secular democratic reform and top-down mullah control may be stalemated simply because there is no common ground whatsoever between their contending visions. That's one reason the Kemalist approach had its merits, Fouad Ajami argued in a recent appearance at the Council on Foreign Relations. "I think Ataturk understood that if you fall through Islam, you fall through a trap door. And in fact, I think the journey out of Islam that Ataturk did was brilliant. And to the extent that the Muslim world now has forgotten this ... they will pay dearly for it."

But there is no Ataturk in Iraq (though of course Chalabi, and perhaps Allawi, would still love to play that role). For now, Sistani remains the most prestigious figure in the country, the only true kingmaker. Suspicions remain in the Bush administration that Sistani's long-term goal is to get the Americans out and the Koran in ^Ö in other words, to create another mullah state as in Iran. But those who know Sistani well say he is much smarter than that. Born in Iran ^Ö he moved to Iraq in the early 1950s, around the time Lewis saw the light ^Ö Sistani has experienced up close the failures of the Shiite mullah state next door. He and the other Shiites have also suffered the pointy end of Sunni Arab nationalism, having been oppressed under Saddam for decades, and they will never sanction a return to that. So Sistani knows the last, best alternative may be some kind of hybrid, a moderately religious, Shiite-dominated democracy, brokered and blessed by him and conceived with a nuanced federalism that will give the Kurds, Sunnis and others their due. But also a regime that, somewhat like the Iranian mullahs, uses its distinctive Islamic character, and concomitant anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism, as ideological glue. For the Americans who went hopefully to war in Iraq, that option is pretty much all that's left on the table ^Ö something even Bernard Lewis may someday have to acknowledge.

© 2004 Independent Media Institute. All rights reserved.

View this story online at:

Monday, November 15, 2004

My Concerns for the World

My Concerns for the World

What will democracy look like among the PLO and in Iraq?

Bariatwan in this this note raises the question of what democracy can mean for the PLO. The problem I have with Bush's plan to implant democracy in the Middle East is that it takes a whole generation of people educated into what it means for it to work. Rwanda, once it became a "democracy" simply turned into a country in which those in power could organize their own genicide against the minority population. Now the tables are turned and Rwanda again claims to be a democacy -- in which the latest elections gave over 98% of the votes to one side [??]. What kind of democracy will Iraq actually be, once there are elections? My fear is that the lust of the Shiites [the majority] to pay the Sunnis back for what they had to put up with under Saddam could actually result in another round of oppression and exploitation. RLC

Published on Sunday, November 14, 2004 by the Observer/UK

Why I Fear for the Dream of My Life

by Abdul Bariatwan

I was born 54 years ago in a refugee camp in Gaza. My parents were illiterate and, like thousands of others, were forced to leave their home town in 1948 to create space for the Jewish immigrants pouring into Palestine from Europe.

My parents' abiding dream was to go back to the farm and mud-brick house in Ashoud, their sleepy home town on the Mediterranean. But they spent their lives in transit, waiting for this dream to come true. Their dream lives on in me and in my children, too.

Yasser Arafat worked very hard for 40 years towards the independent Palestinian state he longed for, yet never saw. Despite his mistakes, he brought this dream closer. He brought the Palestinian cause into the global arena and the resolution of this struggle is now of enormous significance in determining the security of the world, not only the Middle East.

I was deeply saddened by Arafat's death, not only because I knew him personally, but also because Arafat, like my parents, spent his life in transit, from Amman to Beirut to Tunisia and thence to Palestine. What an irony it is that, even in death, his coffin is in transit, awaiting his final transfer to Jerusalem.

Last Friday, George W Bush and his closest ally, Tony Blair assured us that we would see such a state within the next four years - but we have heard this story before. Before the invasion of Iraq, Bush assured the world that an independent Palestinian state would be in place before the end of 2005.

The American project in Iraq is a fiasco. The war which was supposed to be over on 9 April 2003 has started all over again.

This is the climate in which Bush and Blair have revived the notion ofThis is the climate in which Bush and Blair have revived the notion of an independent Palestinian state - without a single indication of how this will be achieved.

Bush asserts that an independent Palestinian state must be a democracy. But what constitutes democracy in this lexicon? Will this concept simply become a useful tool, replacing Arafat as justification for Israeli atrocities, delays to the peace process and the establishment of a Palestinian state? In 1996, Arafat was elected leader in an election supervised by US and Israel, yet how easily he was written off three years ago when those same powers found him insufficiently yielding in the peace process.

The US insists it is enabling democracy in Iraq - a benefit that has cost 100,000 lives. If this is the kind of democracy Bush wishes to impose on the Palestinians, we have every reason to be afraid. Very afraid.

Abdul Bariatwan is editor of al Quds Daily Newspaper

(c) 2004 Guardian Newspapers, Ltd.

Friday, October 29, 2004

What the Terrorists Have in Mind

October 27, 2004

With less than a week before the election, President Bush
is seeking to turn the favorable ratings he receives for
his prosecution of the war on terrorism into a clinching
advantage. His latest television advertisement, using a
pack of wolves to stand in for foreign terrorists, ends
with the line: "Weakness attracts those who are waiting to
do America harm." He has backed up this sentiment in his
foreign-policy stump speeches. "In a free and open society,
it is impossible to protect against every threat,'' he told
a New Jersey crowd. "The best way to prevent attacks is to
stay on the offense against the enemy overseas."

Of course, Mr. Bush is correct: A central part of our
strategy must be to pre-empt terrorists, attacking them
before they attack us. But not all offensive strategies are
equal, and Mr. Bush errs by arguing that the one being
employed is doing the job. One need only listen to the
terrorists and observe their recent actions to understand
that we face grave problems. After all, their analysis of
the battle is a key determinant of the level of terrorism
in the future.

To get a sense of the jihadist movement's state of mind, we
must listen to its communications, and not just the
operational "chatter" collected by the intelligence
community. Today, the central forum for the terrorists'
discourse is not covert phone communications but the
Internet, where Islamist Web sites and chat rooms are
filled with evaluations of current events, discussions of
strategy and elaborations of jihadist ideology.

Yes, assessing this material requires a critical eye since
there is plenty of bluster and some chat room participants
there is plenty of bluster and some chat room participants
may be teenagers in American suburbs rather than fighters
in the field. Some things, however, are clear: There has
been a drastic shift in mood in the last two years.
Radicals who were downcast and perplexed in 2002 about the
rapid defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan now feel
exuberant about the global situation and, above all, the
events in Iraq.

For example, an article in the most recent issue of Al
Qaeda's Voice of Jihad - an online magazine that comes out
every two weeks - makes the case that the United States has
a greater strategic mess on its hands in Afghanistan and
Iraq than the Soviet Union did in Afghanistan in the
1980's. As translated by the SITE Institute, a nonprofit
group that monitors terrorists, the author describes how
the United States has stumbled badly by getting itself
mired in two guerrilla wars at once, and that United States
forces are now "merely trying to 'prove their presence' -
for all practical purposes, they have left the war."

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist now wreaking
havoc in Iraq, sees things in a similar way. "There is no
doubt that the Americans' losses are very heavy because
they are deployed across a wide area and among the people
and because it is easy to procure weapons," he wrote in a
recent communiqué to his followers that was posted on
several radical Web sites. "All of which makes them easy
and mouthwatering targets for the believers."

Clearly, the president's oft-repeated claim that American
efforts are paying off because "more than three-quarters of
Al Qaeda's key members and associates have been killed,
captured or detained" - a questionable claim in itself -
means little to jihadists. What matters to them that the
invasion of Iraq paved the way for the emergence of a
movement of radical Sunni Iraqis who share much of the
Qaeda ideology.

Among the recurrent motifs on the Web are that America has
blundered in Iraq the same way the Soviet Union did in the
blundered in Iraq the same way the Soviet Union did in the
1980's in Afghanistan, and that it will soon be leaving in
defeat. "We believe these infidels have lost their minds,"
was the analysis on a site called Jamaat ud-Daawa, which is
run out of Pakistan. "They do not know what they are doing.
They keep on repeating the same mistake."

For the radicals, the fighting has become a large part of a
broader religious revival and political revolution. Their
discussions celebrate America's occupation of Iraq as an
opportunity to expose the superpower's "real nature" as an
enemy of Islam that seeks to steal the Arab oil patrimony.
"If there was no jihad, Paul Bremer would have left with
$20 trillion instead of $20 billion," one Web site

Moreover, the radicals see themselves as gaining ground in
their effort to convince other Muslims around the world
that jihad is a religiously required military obligation.
And the American presence in the region is making the case
for fulfilling this obligation all the more powerful.

Iraq, in fact, has become a theater of inspiration for this
drama of faith, in which the jihadists believe they can win
by seizing cities and towns, killing American troops and
destabilizing the country with attacks on the police, oil
pipelines and reconstruction projects. Although coalition
forces have retaken Samarra and pounded Falluja, we have
ceded control of much of western Iraq. Taliban-like
councils are emerging in places under the control of
extremists, some linked with Mr. Zarqawi's organization.

>From the militants' perspective, America's record has been
one of inconsistency and fecklessness. For example, we
signaled that we were going to attack Falluja last summer,
and then held off. We have allowed it and several other
cities to become no-go zones for coalition forces. The
apparent decision to postpone a major campaign to retake
western Iraq until after the Nov. 2 election is another
move that the militants will inevitably view as a sign of
weakness. In the end, we are stuck in the classic quandaryof counterinsurgency: we do not want to use the force
necessary to wipe out the terrorists because we would kill
numerous civilians and further alienate the Iraqi

Meanwhile, radicals in dozens of countries are increasingly
seizing on events in Iraq. Some Web sites have moved beyond
describing the action there to depicting it in the most
grisly way: images of Western hostages begging for their
lives and being beheaded. These sites have become
enormously popular throughout the Muslim world, thrilling
those who sympathize with the Iraqi insurgents as they see
jihad in action. Fired up by such cyber-spectacles,
militants everywhere are more and more seeing Iraq as the
first glorious stage in a long campaign against the West
and the "apostate" rulers of the Muslim world.

It is remarkable, for example, that the Pakistani Sunni
extremist group Lashkar-e-Tayba appears to be shifting its
sights away from its longtime focus on Kashmir and toward
Iraq. Probably the largest militant group in Pakistan, it
has used its online Urdu publication to call for sending
holy warriors to Iraq to take revenge for the torture at
Abu Ghraib prison as well as for what it calls the "rapes
of Iraqi Muslim women." "The Americans are dishonoring our
mothers and sisters," reads a notice on its site.
"Therefore, jihad against America has now become

The organization's postings speak of an "army" of 8,000
fighters from different countries bound for Iraq. While
that number is undoubtedly exaggerated, the statement is
not pure propaganda: members of the group have already been
captured in Iraq.

Another worrisome development is the parallel emergence of
a Shiite militancy that shares the apocalyptic outlook of
Al Qaeda. One citation that crops up frequently in chat
rooms is a quotation from a sheik describing the fighting
rooms is a quotation from a sheik describing the fighting
in Iraq as a harbinger of the arrival of the Mahdi, the
messiah figure whose expected return will bring about a
sort of final judgment: "The people will be chided for
their acts of disobedience by a fire that will appear in
the sky and a redness that will cover the sky. It will
swallow up Baghdad."

It seems clear that, while the administration insists that
we are acting strongly, our pursuit of the war on terrorism
through an invasion of Iraq has carried real costs for our
security. The occupation is in chaos, which is emboldening
a worldwide assortment of radical Islamists and giving them
common ground. The worst thing we could do now is believe
that the Bush administration's tough talk is in any way
realistic. If we really think that the unrest abroad will
have no impact on us at home - as too many thought before
9/11 - not even a vastly improved offense can help us.

Daniel Benjamin, a director for counterterrorism on the
National Security Council staff under President Bill
Clinton, is a co-author of "The Age of Sacred Terror."
Gabriel Weimann is professor of communications at the
University of Haifa in Israel and the author of the
forthcoming "Terror on the Internet."

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Notes on what worries me about the contemporary world

The following is an outline of concerns I put together after trying (with little success) to explain to someone with a very different point of view why I am so concerned about the world situation at this time. I fear that many of the values that most Americans take for granted are at risk. This is my own list of worries. It does not include the kinds of things that many people would include. There is nothing here about the environment or homeland security, etc. The statement seems at this moment to have two foci: my problems with the American administration; my problems with circumstances in the Muslim world.

1. Why am I so troubled about the contemporary situation?

1.1 The Bush administration has not made a serious enough commitment to Afghanistan/Pakistan.

  • They secured Kabul [daytime] but much uncertainty remains.
  • They have not found a way to deal with tribal territory, which currently not only protects Osama but is still running madrassas that teach young men to hate the West.

1.2 The Bush administration invaded Iraq in such a clumsy way that we are sure to have trouble there for years

1.3 The administration flouted the advice and opinion of other state leaders and so created distrust among our closest friends.

1.4 They invaded preemptively, a very un-American action

1.5 They supposed that Saddam has WMD and could use them to shut down Saudi oil flows with nuclear blasts [and thereby cut world oil supplies by 12% [the worst we have seen so far was only 3%]]

1.6 They thought it would not cost much because the oil production of Iraq could pay for it.

1.7 They thought it was a way to break up money flows that nourish the radical movement against Israel

>They could shut down Iran’s support for Hizbullah and Iraq / Syria’s support for radical Sunni groups among the Palestinians

1.8 They used the attack on Afghanistan as a kind of model for the Iraqi attack

1.9 They expected the Iraqis to welcome us as the Afghans did

1.10 They thought we could set up a ruling council similar to that which was put in motion in Afghanistan

1.11 They seem to have underestimated Saddam’s radical supporters.

1.12 They seem to have prepared inadequately for the post-war situation

>The presence of American troops in Iraq is providing grounds for the radical Islamists to train young men for anti-Western war, just as they are being trained to fight against the Russians in Chechnia, and against the Indians in Kashmir, and against the Christians in the Moluccas, and against the Serbs in Bosnia.

1.13 In general, the approach of the Bush administration and the elected representatives in congress and the senate has been to defer all the big problems/ questions to later.They are spending money in huge amounts but have no idea how it is to be paid for.They are leaving all the fiscal issues to be dealt with by the next two generations – “as far as the eye can see”.

>In general the Bush administration seems essentially responsive to large business interests and are secretive about the way they have come to their policies [Chaney re energy; Bush/Chaney are known to have personal connections with Kenneth Lay, former head of Enron.]

>The religious communities within the United States [Christian; but also Jewish?] seem tragically misaligned with regard to the current dangers to Western values:The leadership of the main denominations [Christian, but also Jewish?] seem too fixed on local issues – abortion, gay marriage, gay ordination – to focus on the serious threats to our society.The evangelical leaders are likewise fixed on the same provincial issues and also on the “signs” that these are the “last times” before the return of Christ; thus, they are committed to Israel [whose rise is considered a fulfillment of prophecy] without regard to the abuses of the Israeli government or the Israeli policies that are fostering hatred of the West among many Muslims.

>The “left” in the West seems fixed on opposing Bush policy in Iraq and therefore seems blindly unaware of the threat to their own values by the radical Islamist movements.

>The American public is dangerously apathetic:we are still getting less than 50% of eligible voters to participate in elections.

>In the mean time moneyed interests exert controlling interests on the behavior of elected officials, whereas the ordinary public – many of whom have no institutions to lobby for them – are apathetic.

>In particular, there is a dangerous informal tie between the leaders of our country and those of Saudi Arabia, representing interests that in other contexts are inimical to American culture – that is, they are working against notions of tolerance, pluralism of institutions, democracy.

>There is a movement against the US and the West that is truly antithetical to western values.It is a committed and dedicated although it lacks a clear alternative ideology. (NYT 12/8/03 “Rebels without a cause”; Napoleoni, Modern Jehad)

>What I think about most Muslims:

>Most Muslims are not Arabs

>Most Muslims are not much concerned about theMiddle East.

>Most Muslims are not radical

>But many are enticed and/ or offended by Western culture [Pakistan: control of films but not of videos; every kind of smut is available on video]

>What I think about radical Islam

>This is an infinitesimal number (out of 1.4 billion) but they are politically active and dangerously committed

>Islamists are a creation of radical strains of Islamic doctrine, some of them very old [Wahhabism, Deobandism].Some are modern applications of old traditions in more modern form [Jamaat-IslamiPakistan; Napoleoni calls Maududi a Marxist/Leninist]

>Wahhabism [Saudi Arabia]

>Muslim Brethren [a modern movement in Egypt]

>Deobandism [a reactionary movement in India from mid-19th century]

>Sudanese Islam [a recrudescence of 19th c. Mahdism?]

>Islamists were emboldened by

>the Iranian Revolution, in which after an internal struggle Shi`ite clerics took over Iran.

>the war in Afghanistan, where CIA/ISI invited and trained zealous mujahedin to fight the Soviet Union

>ManyIslamists are being recruited from the ranks of the young and unemployed.In much of the region of the Middle East and Central Asia half of the population are under 20 years of age.

>Islamists are being created and perpetuated

>in Pakistan,

>where mujahedin are needed to wage a war in the name of Islam in Kashmir:

>where, in Peshawar and Quetta, Taliban are running free.

>whose tribal peoples have traditionally seen themselves as faithful defenders of Islam against the encroachments of outsiders and outside religions into their territory.Their people are protecting Osama and Mulla M. Omar.

>in the Middle East, where Palestinians [presumed to be Muslim] are fighting Israel

>in Saudi Arabia ,where many radical mullahs still preach war and hatred of the West [NYT 11/29/03]

>And they are being deployed in wars they take to be holy wars,

>in the Middle East

>in Pakistan and Afghanistan

>in Bosnia which was a secular Muslim movement originally and was then co-opted by radical Muslims,

>in Chechnia which was a secular Muslim movement originally and has become co-opted by radical Muslims,

>In Sudan where Muslims are fighting tribal peoples in south

>And there are other wars where radical Islamic fighters are likely contributing to local conflict:

>In the Moluccas, where Muslims and Christians are fighting,

>In the Philippines, where local resistance to the state on Mindanau has been co-opted by “Abu-Sayyaf”, a radical Muslim group funded by Saudi Arabia,

>In Nigeria where Muslims in the north are trying to establish sharia law vs a mainly Christian south.


>believe the existence of the oppressive regimes of the Middle East is enabled by US and Western powers

>believe their zeal won the war against the Soviet Union; the most radical of them believe that American support against the Soviets was incidental;

>believe Westerners are effete and will cut and run if warfare becomes too costly in lives:Examples are the flight of American Marines from Lebanon (after a suicide bomber killed 241 marines), Mogadishu (Somalia), Vietnam.

>are well funded by huge amounts of money:some of it in legal enterprises [oil industry, other local industries], some of it in illegal trade and barter [drugs, weapons, other contraband] (Napoleoni, Modern Jehad; Baer, Sleeping with the Devil)

>At the same time the peoples of the Muslim world are diverse and very divided

>Many of the most educated people in Middle East have been Christians, although many of them have left/ fled to the West

>Pan- Arabism (which held several states together, including Saddam’s Iraqi state) was a secular movement encouraged by Christians (Saddam’s PM [or foreign minister?] came from a Christian community)

>There is among the Muslim populaces a strong distrust between Shi`a and Sunni

>Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan preached that it was a religious duty to kill Shi`a

>Iranian Shi`a are distrusted by most other Muslim nations because of theirShi`ism:even Iraqi Shi`a distance themselves from the Iranian Shi`a

>However, at higher levels there seems to be a clandestine accommodation between leaders of the two sects:

>Son of Osama has been living in Teheran

>Saudi and Iranian regimes seem to have made an accommodation on some issues (at the highest levels)

>Virtually all the oil resources of the Middle East are in Shi`a occupied territories, which adds to the tensions between Sunni and Shi`a.

>In eastern Saudi Arabia, where Shi`a are predominant

>In southern Iraq

>In Iran

>In the Muslim world a struggle has been going on between secularists and Islamists.[Will it continue and become more serious within the Muslim community?]

>Egyptian government vs Muslim Brotherhood; the radical elements of the Muslim Brethren fled to Saudi Arabia after Sadat’s assassination

>Algeria, where Arab-Afghans battled for control of the country for several years

>Libya: where Islamists have wanted to assassinate Ghaddafi

>Turkey:where army stands guard over secularism

>Indonesia:where radicals have been considered benign, although they have blown up a bar in Bali

>Some important Muslim countries are divided in multiple ways

>Pakistan [said to have 50 nuclear warheads]:BarelvisvsDeobandis; rich, self serving oligarchy vs poor, landless; tribalsvs government; Baluchistan, Punjab, vs Tribal Pushtun areas.And a few women are in virtual slavery.

>Afghanistan:westernized secular Muslims are conduit of Western support and money vs localized (and mainly rural) coalitions; Kabulis and other urban communities [Herat, Mazar, Kandahar] vs rural peoples

>A question: Is the younger generation up to these challenges?They will have to do better than my generation has done.