Thursday, June 19, 2008

McClatchy’s reporting on abuse of American prisoners

We need to appreciate McClatchy papers for their faithfulness in reporting; they have developed a fine reputation for seeking to know and report what is going on in contested places; they were, I gather, one of the best in reporting on the Iraq debacle. Here are some recent articles that should be broadly read [not pushed in the other papers].

McClatchy papers have recently published a series on the detention system of the American military. This is what they say about the series:

“An eight-month McClatchy investigation of the detention system created after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks has found that the U.S. imprisoned innocent men, subjected them to abuse, stripped them of their legal rights and allowed Islamic militants to turn the prison camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba into a school for jihad.

“READ THE EVIDENCE

“Browse an archive of documents obtained by McClatchy in the course of this investigation.”

Thursday, June 05, 2008

Pakistan: still the source of insurgency in the Middle East

It is hard to believe that the Pakistan government continues to deny that Pakistani territory is a source for Taliban and Al-Qaeda insurgents to base their activities in harassing Afghanistan. Once again an Afghan official is charging Pakistanis as giving sanctuary to insurgents. And once again the Pakistanis are ignoring and denying such claims.

We have just heard of another person's report, through personal sources. on a recent visit to Quetta. They report that Taliban and Al Qaeda members openly walk the streets of Quetta, and openly recruit fighters in their war against Afghanistan. They are paying families for allowing their young men to go off to the “holy war” against the Afghanistan government and the Americans. They seem, again, not to lack funds, and there are few jobs for the local recruits.

Pakistan is a festering source of insurgency – in fact, not only in Afghanistan but elsewhere in the Middle East.

The long-practiced denial in Washington is being emulated in Islamabad.

Tuesday, June 03, 2008

Recent Works on Radical Social Movements in Central and South Asia

[addendum June 9, 08, June 14, 08, June 16, 08]

So much stuff has been written on radical social movements in Central and South Asia that it is difficult to keep up. I recently made a list that was out of date within a few days. Here is a list, already in need of updating; I will add to it as I can, in order to try to keep a fairly current list at hand. [Note the addition of Rashid's Descent into Chaos below.]

Bajoria, Jayshree. 2008. Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists.” Council on Foreign Relations, February 6. [http://www.cfr.org/publication/15422/pakistans_new_generation_of_terrorists.html]

Crews, Robert D. and Amin Tarzi. 2008. The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Karagiannis, Emmanuel, and Clark McCauley. 2006. Hizb-ut Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a radical Islamic Group that Remains Nonviolent. Terrorism and Political Violence 18: 315-334.

Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.

Torres, Manuel R. 2006. Analysis and Evolution of the Global Jihadist Movement Propaganda. Terrorism and Political Violence 18: 399-421.

Weitz, Richard. 2006. Terrorism in Eurasia: Enhancing the Multilateral Response China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4(2): 11-17.

Wright, Lawrence. 2006. The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 911. New York: Knopf.

Wright, Lawrence. 2006. “The Master Plan: For the new theorists of jihad, Al Qaeda is just the beginning.” The New Yorker. September 11.

Addendum:

Rashid, Ahmed. 2006. "Jihadi Suicide Bombers: The New Wave." New York Review June 12, 08. Review article referring to 7 recent works on the topic.

Rashid, Ahmed. 2008. Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of National Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. New York: Viking. [This is a vigorous exposure of the failures of all the regimes involved in the Middle East -Central Asian crisis; should be read widely. If it will be read, it will be a bombshell.]

Kim Cragin, Bruce Hoffman. 2003. Arms Trafficking and Colombia. RandCorporation. 81 pages. ISBN:0833031449



Thursday, May 29, 2008

Scott McClellan's non-event: All this was already broadly known

The new dust-up over Scott McClellan’s new book declaring that the Bush administration “oversold” the Iraq situation in order to justify a “pre-emptive” attack is really a non-event. What McClellan is saying has been known for a long time. The problem for the Bush administration – which has hastened to reject MeClellan’s claims – is that this news comes from one of its own, one of the inner circle. Everyone in that group could not have missed the deliberate attempt by the administration to sell the attack in the face of world opposition and in the absence of concrete evidence for its claims. Those claims – now clearly known to be false – were reiterated many times.

Thursday, May 22, 2008

The new book by Rein Mullerson on Central Asia

It seems that Central Asia inspires books that are not only long but great, in the sense of a broad compass covered with erudition. The books that have awed me and helped me understand the historic processes in Central Asia are not numerous but have provided, for me, a basic education in how to think about social processes over a long trajectory. The most notable one was Lattimore’s Inner Asian Frontiers of China, which I had to teach several times in order to have felt I comfortably had internalized Lattimore’s sense of the sweep of history. From Lattimore I learned all the more how valuable Marx is for the understanding of history. Grosset’s Empire of the Steppes is of course another awesome work. And, even though much more modest in size but no less seminal, were the several works on Central Asia [“the world island”] by Halford MacInder. Another work that few would connect with Central Asia that has given me a sense of the impact of the Central Asia “hordes” has been Marc Bloc [Feudal Society, about a medieval world that regularly prayed for protection against “the arrows of the Hungarians,” p 41]. [Eric Wolf’s Europe and the People Without History, for all its coverage of the world elsewhere, says little about Central Asia per se.] And I am awed, even cowed, by the recent work of Djalili and Kellner, Géopolitique de la nouvelle Asia centrale: De la fin de l”URSS à l’après-11 septembre.

But the discovery of Rein Mullerson’s Central Asia : A Chessboard and Player in the New Great Game [Kegal Paul] has humbled me all the more. Mullerson displays a broad grasp of the literature of the region, including of course that in Russian, as well as a rich sophistication in the great works of the English speaking world. The price, however, is outrageous : $144.00. Such is the value of the dollar now.

Thursday, May 08, 2008

Signs of yet another crisis in Lebanon

The wars all across the so-called "Muslim world" in our times are violent manifestations of a series of critical issues powerfully at work in the region. There are now, or recently have been, wars -- mostly civil wars -- in Chad, Sudan, Somalia, the Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. And the wars in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Chechnya and Lebanon have only recently calmed down.

And now there is reason to worry about Lebanon -- again -- and as usual there isn't much reliable information about it. Or rather there isn't much analysis that would give outsiders a sense of how complex the issues are there now. Today's New York Times has an article about the disruptions in Beirut.

I am thankful that friends of ours have been willing to clue us occasionally to the slow tortuous decline toward another possible civil war. The note we got today was that the blog, "The Angry Arab News Service" by As'ad is a good summary of the situation there. Written hurredly and with verve, this site reveals how convoluted the alliances there are and how many crosscurrents are at work. And if not in his text itself then in the reactions to it by other Arabs, you can see how intense the opinions are. We need to be watching.
Click on the title for a link to that blog.

Tuesday, May 06, 2008

Torture in our name: An embarrassing library of evidences

[addenda and corrections 5/7/08, 5/15/08, 6/9/08]

Nicholas Kristof’s comment about prisoner abuse in our military facilities [NYTimes 5/4/08], notably in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, prompts me to wonder how many cases we know about. Here are the cases he mentions that are not as yet published:

  • Kristof says, “On Thursday, America released Sami al-Hajj, a cameraman for Al Jazeera who had been held without charges for more than six years. … [He] was beaten…” Arrived “so frail when he arrived that he had to be carried off the plane and into an ambulance.”
  • Also: Murat Kurnaz, a German citizen of Turkish descent, has just published a memoir of his nearly five years in Guantánamo. He describes prolonged torture that included interruptions by a doctor to ensure that he was well enough for the torture to continue.”
  • Also: "Italian Trial of CIA Operatives Begins with Torture Testimony." [NYTimes 5/15/08] A Muslim cleric's wife testifies of the capture and "extraordinary rendition" of her husband to Egypt by the CIA, where he was tortured.

I went looking on the web for recent publications on torture. There are more than I thought. How many more books will have to be published before the American people internalize what has been done to other human beings in their name? None of us believes that torture is consistent with the ideals of our country and yet the practice persists -- and few voices have been raised about it. When our country realizes what has been done in its name, many of us will be tempted to feign ignorance.

The sad thing is that our country, like so many others, is enveloped in fairly sealed "information worlds.” Like people elsewhere -- many Germans during WW II, like the Serbs under Miloshivich and in fact the populations of most countries -- most Americans cannot believe that our people could have done what they did (our troops), or authorized what they authorized (e.g., John Yoo), organized what they organized (our generals), and carried out the abuses they carried out. Witness the attitude of the Serbs, many of whom to this day believe their people were not guilty of the well documented abuses during the recent wars in Yugoslavia; witness also the Iranians and the Pakistanis, who reject all accusations of abuse. In fact, they are unaware of them. What has been going on in those countries has remained invisible to the common public as many abusive practices seem to be (but are not) invisible in our country.

One of our problems is that despite the presumed superiority of our media, the American people remain informed only of those events that are presentable on TV; what we know is limited to the moving images that someone has been able to get, and essentially only those that are current, of what is happening in the world.

In chronological order, from the newest to the oldest, I list here those works documenting instances of torture perpetrated by our government. This is what I could find easily; there must be more.

  • Steven Wax. (June 3) 2008. Kafka Comes to America. Other Press.

  • Philip Gourevitch and Errol Morris. 2008 [May 15]. Standard Operating Procedure. Penguin. [Reviewed, along with film of the same name, by Ian Buruma, New York Review June 26, 08, p 6,8]
  • Eric Lichtblau. 2008. Bush's Law: The Remaking of American Justice. Pantheon.
  • Philippe Sands. 2008 [May 13] Torture Team: Rumsfeld's Memo and the Betrayal of American Values. Palgrave.

  • Mahvish Rukhsana Khan. 2008. My Guantánamo Diary. Public Affairs. [A pediatrician who returned to Afghanistan in 2003 to help rebuild his country was then arrested by Americans, beaten, doused with icy water and paraded around naked. Finally, after three years, officials apparently decided he was innocent and sent him home.]
  • Darius Rejali. 2007. Torture and Democracy. Princeton University. [880 pp. “the most compendious and the most rigorous treatment of the subject yet written.”]
  • Tony Lagouranis and Allen Mikaelian. 2007. Fear Up Harsh: An Army Interrogator's Dark Journey Through Iraq. NAL. [A developed version of a story widely available in the media and on the Internet. Lagouranis became a central figure to Iraq war opponents by describing his role as an army interrogator at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere.]
  • Stephen F. Eisenman. 2007. The Abu Ghraib Effect. Reaktion Books. [“Scholarly, succinct, and flush with photos, Eisenman's analysis is art history at its most compelling.”]
  • Tara McKelvey. 2007. Monstering: Inside America's Policy of Secret Interrogations and Torture in the Terror War. Basic Books. [[A]buses at Abu Ghraib, in particular the abuses visited upon women prisoners]
  • Bob Brecher. 2007. Torture and the Ticking Bomb (Blackwell Public Philosophy Series). Wiley-Blackwell.
  • Jack L. Goldsmith. 2007. The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration. Norton.
  • Joseph Margulies. 2007. Guantanamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power. Simon & Schuster
  • Alfred McCoy. 2006. A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. Holt Metropolitan Books. [“From the start of the Cold War to the early nineteen-sixties, the C.I.A. spent billions of dollars developing psychological tools for interrogation. … [Documentation] from the Phoenix program in Vietnam—which was designed to ferret out high-level Vietcong, although of the more than twenty thousand people it killed most were civilians—to the actions of agency-trained secret police in Honduras in the nineteen-eighties, and the treatment of hooded detainees at Abu Ghraib.]
  • Tara McKelvey (Editor). 2006. One of the Guys: Women as Aggressors and Torturers. Seal Press.
  • Stephen Grey. 2006. Ghost Plane: The True Story of the CIA Torture Program. St. Martin's.
  • Sanford Levinson (ed). 2006. Torture: A Collection. Oxford University Press, USA. [Sections on "Philosophical Considerations"; "Torture as Practiced"; "Contemporary Attempts to Abolish Torture Through Law"; and "Reflections on the Post 9-11 Debate About Legalizing Torture.]
  • Stephen Grey. 2006. Ghost Plane: The True Story of the CIA Torture Program. St Martin’s Press.
  • Steven Miles. 2006. Oath Betrayed: Torture, Medical Complicity, and the War on Terror. Random House. [ … the work of the Behavioral Science Consultation Teams (known as BSCTs, or "biscuits") active in Iraq and Guantanamo: groups of psychiatrists and psychologists who used detainees' medical charts and test data to devise "physically and psychologically coercive interrogation plans" designed to break their resistance. In at least one camp in Iraq, all harsh interrogations reportedly were first approved by the medical team.]
  • Jennifer K. Harbury. 2005. Truth, Torture, and the American Way: The History and Consequences of U.S. Involvement in Torture. Beacon. [A "wink and nod" approach, sending clear signals to the Salvadoran team that the abductions, tortures, and kidnappings were to continue. ..."]
  • Dianna Ortiz.2004.Blindfold's Eyes: My Journey From Torture To Truth.Orbis.["... going through the court proceedings mirrored the situation of the torture, perhaps asserting myself and having a team of people with me to support me would be a ..."]
  • Karen J. Greenberg, Joshua L. Dratel, and Anthony Lewis (Eds). 2005. The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. Cambridge University Press. [Bush administration officials and top military brass continue to maintain that the well-documented abuses of prisoners at Abu Ghraib were the isolated actions of a few rogue guards. … [The editors] believe the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the claimed abuses at Guantanamo are the direct result of administration policies. … [A] compilation of administration documents … clearly reveal that, at the highest levels, the Bush administration sought legal justification to circumvent both the Geneva Convention and other international accepted norms regarding the interrogation and treatment of military detainees.]
  • Karen J. Greenberg, ed. 2005. The Torture Debate in America. Cambridge University. [The documents, memoranda, and reports that comprise the material in The Torture Papers.]
  • Michael Ignatieff. 2004. The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror. Princeton University.
  • John Conroy. 2001. Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People: The Dynamics of Torture. University of California Press. [His question: How is it that otherwise normal people can become part of the institutionalized practice of torture? … He investigates the "five torture techniques" (hooding, noise bombardment, food deprivation, sleep deprivation and forced standing against a wall) inflicted on 12 Irish prisoners in 1971; a late 1980s round-up on the West Bank of Palestinians, who were bound, gagged and beaten; and Chicago's notorious John Burge case, in which police officers systematically beat and electrocuted (on the head, chest and genitals) a man suspected (and later convicted) of killing a police officer.]
Addendum, August 5, 2008
  • Jane Mayer. 2008. The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How The War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals. New York: Doubleday. "What Woodward and Bernstein's book "All the President's Men" did to the Nixon administration, Jane Mayer's book "The Dark Side" will do to George Bush's administration: blow away, like a piece of straw, the last sliver of credibility that the few remaining supporters of George Bush desperately cling to. "We don't torture", said the President, and Jane Mayer has responded with this book, as if to say: "That is a lie"."

Friday, May 02, 2008

"Greater Central Asia," the new geopolitically reified region

The term Greater Central Asia seems to have caught on. I used the term in an article written as the Soviet Union seemed to be weakening and was published shortly after it expired.

  • Restructuring in Greater Central Asia: Changing Political Configurations,” Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 10 (Oct., 1992), pp. 875-887.

Two years later the Russian political scientist Vyacheslav Ya. Belokrenitsky used the term again in the same journal:

  • Russia and Greater Central AsiaAsian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 12 (Dec., 1994), pp. 1093-1108.

The term seemed to me useful even though its meaning was at that point somewhat imprecise, including the several nations (different ones, depending on how you count) that were liable to link up together, once the Soviet Union had expired.

It's interesting to track what has happened to the term since then.

The term was used in a paper written in January, 1996, and published in 2000:

The Environmental and Social Impacts Group used the term in 2002 in its proposal but they referred to a more easterly sector of the region (Xinjiang) than Belokrenitsky and I had in mind (see also their ESIG Alert # 1 report).

  • “Development of a Desert Affairs Center in Western China,” ESIG Alert #2, November, 2002.

In 2003 Rajan Menon used the term in a sense more consistent with our usage:

· “The New Great Game in Central Asia” by Rajan Menon. Survival, Volume 45, Number 2, 2003 , pp. 187-204(18).

Menon defined “Greater Central Asia” as “the region consisting of the five Central Asian states, plus Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Xinjiang, and Afghanistan” and he argued that it had been “strategically transformed” by the American commitment to the region after the attack of September 11, 2001. During that time the several authoritarian governments of the region were trying to take advantage of the new American interest in their neighborhood to escape the historic Russian hegemony. But they would be frightened by the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia (2003), the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (2004) and the government of Kyrgyzstan would itself be overturned by a similar movement (“Tulip Revolution”) in 2005. Also in 2005 the Americans clashed with President Karimov over the massacre of hundreds of Uzbek citizens in Andijan, and were forced to evacuate their airbase at Karshi-Khanabad.

It was not long before the political exigencies and economic possibilities of the time were being recognized in the term “Greater Central Asia.” Now the term stood for a new region of geopolitical interest, to the United States and to those becoming alarmed by its rising hegemony there. S. Frederick Starr promoted the importance of the region in his article,

Starr advocated the formation of a Greater Central Asia Partnership for Cooperation and Development in which, of course, Washington would be central. “Recent progress in Afghanistan,” he said, “has created a remarkable opportunity . . . . The United States now has the chance to help transform Afghanistan and the entire region into a zone of secure sovereignties sharing viable market economies, enjoying secular and open systems of government, and maintaining positive relations with the United States.” This was the hubristic language of that time, which like so many of the grand aspirations of sounds quaint and dated now. A reference to Greater Central Asia appeared in a report of the Rand Corporation in the same year.

· “Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus,” by Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna. Rand Corporation, 2005. www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/RAND_MR1598.sum.pdf

The new American interest in the region worried the Chinese, as reflected in another publication in 2005 that used the term:

And it had a similar impact on the Russians.

  • “Russian foreign policy experts debate interaction with America in Greater Central Asia,” by Igor Torbakov, Volume 2, Number 196, Friday, October 21, 2005. Eurasia Daily Monitor. [Jamestown Foundation.] http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370378

Greater Central Asia was now becoming a region of trade. A conference of “experts and officials from throughout Greater Central Asia” was convened in Kabul on April 1-2 of 2006 on a topic of:

At this conference Kassymzhomart Tokaev, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan said his Government “supports the idea of a a Greater Central Asia as a way to promote intra-regional trade and development and reconnect Afghanistan to the regional and global economy.”

Representatives of the United States government also participated and indicated an interest in “partnering” with the states of the region on matters of trade, and a panel discussion took place in Washington, DC, on July 18, titled “The New Silk Roads: Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia.” It was sponsored by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (CACI). One wonders if the drug trade was given much attention in either of these conferences, but clearly it was already a powerful source of wealth for some of the countries of the region. In fact, Svante E. Cornell was sounding an alarm at about this time.

  • “The Narcotics Threat in Greater Central Asia: From Crime-Terror Nexus to State Infiltration?” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4, No. 1 (2006) p. 37-67.

And Richard Weitz was warning that a “great game” was taking form like that of the nineteenth century.

  • “Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia.” The Washington Quarterly • 29:3 pp. 155–167. 2006.

And M. K. Bhadrakumar was suggesting that South Asia already being caught up in the geopolitical “game” of earlier times.

Indeed it was clear that the Russians were bothered by American meddling in their backyard:

  • Moscow making Central Asia its own.” M K Bhadrakumar. Asia Times Online, Aug 25, 2006. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/HH25Ag01.html

All of these articles referred to the region as “Greater Central Asia”.

The new geopolitical focus prompted research activity. In 2006 the Social Science Research Council announced that it would provide teaching tools on the history of Greater Central Asia.

In 2007 an important work was published, firmly anchoring the terminology for the region in the strategic discourse.

With chapters by S. Frederick Starr (overview), Masood Aziz (Afghanistan), councilor at the Afghanistan Embassy in Washington, D.C., Aftab Kazi (Pakistan), professor of international and comparative politics at American University in Bishkek, Abbas Maleki (Iran), director general of the Institute for Caspian Studies in Tehran, Niklas Norling (China), project director of the Silk Roads Studies Program, Taleh Ziyadov (Azerbaijan), deputy executive director of the U.S.-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce, and others.

Robert M. Cutler has delimited the region precisely, distinguishing “Central Asia” from “Greater Central Asia” from “Central Eurasia” from “Greater Southwest Asia” from “Greater South Asia.”

So the term “Greater Central Asia” is now a real place, having been reified by geopolitical policy and debate. Some recent works using the term are the following:

  • “Political Development and Organized Crime: The Yin and Yang of Greater Central Asia?” Niklas Swanström. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 5, No. 4 (2007) p. 83-101. http://www.isdp.eu/files/publications/cefq/07/ns07politicaldevelopment.pdf

· U.S. Aims in Central and South Asia Challenged by Russia and China,” by Richard Weitz World Politics Review Exclusive, 27 Jul 2007. http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/Article.aspx?id=964

· “Eurasian Trade And Transport: New Silk Roads Or Old Pipedreams?
Richard Weitz. Eurasianet 7/24/07 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav072407a.shtml

· “Americans Still Think All Stans Are Same,” Adam Kesher. Politics, Foreign Affairs, April 16th, 2008 http://kazakhstan.neweurasia.net/2008/04/16/americans-still-think-all-stans-are-same/

  • [seminar proposal] Security in Greater Central Asia, Tensions and possibilities of destabilization from Astana to Islamabad. Didier Chaudet. http://www.sciences- po.fr/formation/cycle1/programme_international/cours_pdf/chaudet.pdf

Friday, April 25, 2008

The Taliban: how many incarnations are there? And how will they affect the negotiations?

[addendum to this June 14, 08: Ahmed Rashid's Descent into Chaos is a major addition to the list below.]


Ismael Khan and Carlotta Gall are reporting that Pakistan is close to making a deal with the Islamist insurgents in the tribal territories [NYT 4/25/08]. The question is with which Islamists? And who will enforce the deal? We have known all along that there were various kinds of Islamist insurgents, but now it appears that the “Pakistani Taliban” are the real concern, and the object of the negotiations. We need to distinguish the various incarnations of the Taliban, as the new variants may now be the key players in the negotiations.

Original Taliban and their associates:

The first incarnation emerged out of Kandahar and were then joined by various other groups with somewhat different perspectives. This period of the Taliban has been well described in several works (in chronological order): William Malley, ed. 1998. Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban. New York: NYU; Peter Marsden. 1998. The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan; Ahmad Rashid. 2000. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven: Yale University; Neamoatollah Nojumi. 2002. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region. New York: Palgrave.

NeoTaliban:

The second incarnation of the Taliban has developed in the last few years, becoming a serious menace to the stability of Afghanistan in the last year or so, although the reconstitution of the group began soon after its near-destruction in 2002. This incarnation is described in the new work: Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi. 2008. The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan. Boston: Harvard University.

Pakistani Taliban

But from the NeoTaliban has appeared a new variant that now looks eastward. Rather than posed against the American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, the new Pakistani Taliban are posed against Islamabad, especially that is, the Pakistan army. This is blowback with a vengeance, for the Pakistanis have been protecting and nourishing various mujahedin groups (see Taliq Ali, “the Colour Khaki,” New Left Review, and Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift to Extremism) in order to have recruits ready for any potential conflict with India. Two authors have written about this group in the very recent past: Nocholas Schmidle. 2008. “Next-Gen Taliban.” New York Times, January 6; Jayshree Bajoria. 2008. Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists. [Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/15422/pakistans_new_generation_of_terrorists.html] The Pakistani Taliban are Pushtuns like the others but they have been attacked on their own ground by the army and so have come to regard the government not merely as an alien force but a surrogate for the “infidel” American government. Bajoria says “they have begun to organize themselves around a Taliban-style Islamic ideology pursuing an agenda much similar to that of the Afghan Taliban,” only now it is against their own government. They are even against their own tribal system, having killed as many as 200 tribal elders, according to Hassan Abbas [Schmidle’s source, p 9, says the number killed was 150.]. They have “effectively established themselves as an alternative to the traditional tribal elders,” taking the name “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
[Pakistan Taliban Movement] for themselves.

But these mujahedin are, as Bajoria say, “fiercer, younger and impatient for results.” Bajoria quotes Steve Coll: They “are a younger generation of more violent radical leaders who are in a hurry and have no patience with compromise with the state.” They are “hard-core breakaway children militias” who define “the law” in their own terms, considering music, TV, and luxuries like massage parlors to be un-Islamic. These Islamists are having a powerful impact on the situation in tribal territory. Schmidle’s interviews with the leaders of the Jamat-e Ulema-e Islami, an Islamist political party that was swept into power by the election of 2002, reveal what the appearance of these young militants has done. They have created fear even among other Islamists. A leader of the party said plainly “Everyone is afraid.” “These mujahedeen don’t respect anyone anymore.” The head of the party, Maulana Fazlur Rehmen, said “we are now afraid of the young men fighting.” Rehmen has at other times played up his connections with Islamists such as the Taliban but he has been sobered by, for instance, an intense clash between the new Pakistan Taliban and the military at the Red Mosque in Islamabad last July. “They have gone to the extreme” [p. 6] he said; “They are simply beyond me,” he admitted [p. 5]. Even before the clash someone had pointed out to Schmidle that “[e]verywhere you look, you can see youngsters rejecting the old ones because old people do not like change.” A notable leader of this sort was Maulana Fazlullah, leader of a militia in the Swat Valley. His men began taking over police stations in November, 2007, replacing the Pakistani flag with one of their own, and instituting their own version of Islamic law, rejecting leaders like Maulana Fazlur Rehmen as too moderate.

This is the context of the negotiations now taking place in Pakistan. Deals have been made with tribal insurgents in the past and failed, so what is the hope that the deal now being struck with the Pakistani Taliban will hold? Not much. But fear is a powerful force. Could such former radical Islamists like Maulana Fazlur Rehmen now become a help in bringing the Pakistani Taliban to a sustainable agreement?

Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Thank you, General Anthony Zinni







We have been hearing about generals who, connected with the military contractors, connived with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to trash the military experts who called it as they saw it. We can thank Gen. Zinni, in contrast, for calling a spade a spade at a time when American and Iraqi lives were at risk because of the decisions of the Bush administration. He was fired by Rumsfeld for saying that we would need 300,000 troops to do the job in Iraq. And he was trashed by self-serving generals for saying that the war in Iraq was in trouble. It is a shame that government officials like Rumsfeld would turn the job of administrating a war into mere public affairs and that formere generals would prostitute themselves and their profession by protecting the American public from the truth about what was going on in Iraq. Many people could not believe that things were as bad as they were until Bush final admitted it by proposing a "surge" to solve the problem. Anyway, Thanks, General Zinni. I wish we had more like you.

On his history: From 1997 to 2000, he was commander-in-chief of the United States Central Command, in charge of all American troops in the Middle East. Then became a special envoy to the Middle East of the Bush administration. But he broke ranks with the administration over the war in Iraq. He has even criticized senior officials at the Pentagon as guilty of dereliction of duty. Before the second war in Iraq Zinni advised against a pre-emptive attack. It is in his recent book on Iraq that he says the Pentagon was derelict in its duty, guilty of "negligence and irresponsibility, at worse, lying, incompetence and corruption."

Zinni believes it is part of your duty to speak out. “It is part of your duty. Look, there is one statement that bothers me more than anything else. And that's the idea that when the troops are in combat, everybody has to shut up. Imagine if we put troops in combat with a faulty rifle, and that rifle was malfunctioning, and troops were dying as a result,” says Zinni. “I can't think anyone would allow that to happen, that would not speak up. Well, what's the difference between a faulty plan and strategy that's getting just as many troops killed? It’s leading down a path where we're not succeeding and accomplishing the missions we've set out to do.”

Zinni said that "the books were cooked, in my mind. The intelligence (that supported the claims made to support the need for war) was not there."
There was a "lack of planning" for the post-war stablization and reconstruction of Iraq. There was “insufficiency of military forces on the ground."

Tuesday, April 22, 2008

Twenty-seven million slaves -- who could have imagined?

The world is moving so fast and in so many ways with so many complexities that we can only hope that we have a reasonable grasp of it. I have the funnest job in the world, even though my topics are often unsettling; one of the reason it is fun is my students, who help me attempt to track what is going on. Here are some notes that Traci Horner has produced regarding a book that everyone should read.

Bales, Kevin. 2004. Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

Twenty-seven million human beings are slaves in the modern world. Most of us thought that slavery has been abolished but it is not so. There are slaves in the sex industry in Thailand, in the delivery of water in Mauritania, in charcoal production in Brazil, in brick-making in Pakistan, and in farming in India – the main locations of slave labor. There are an estimated 3,000 household slaves in Paris. In every case there is a legal cover for the practice of slavery. Many are in debt; some were forced into debt by subterfuge and seduction of desperate people; some are sold or given away to pay debts. Even though slavery is illegal nearly everywhere, it is protected by exploitative practices. After World War II the population explosion produced a growing body of people who had so little to live on and such little leverage that they were easily exploited. Now there is an abundance of slaves, which drives the price of them down. Desperate and helpless people are now abundant and disposable. There is little incentive to pour resources into maintaining a slave and once one is exhausted and no longer useful her or she can simply be cast out, abandoned (p. 15). “Slaves are now so cheap,” Bales writes, “that they have become cost-effective in many new kinds of work, completely changing how they are seen and used” (p. 14). “[S]laves are cheap and disposable; control continues without legal ownership; slavery is hidden behind contracts; and slavery flourishes in communities under stress” (31).

An example is Sari, a 15-year-old woman in Thailand. She was sold into bondage by her parents. She will be bought by as many as 10 or 15 men every night. Her “resistance and her desire to escape the brothel are breaking down and acceptance and resignation are taking their place” (34). . The police and her pimp beat and rape her at will. The impact on her is to believe that “she is a bad person, very bad to have deserved what has happened to her” (36-7). The industrialization of Thailand has created a whole new class of men with money to spend. One place they spend it is in the brothels, so “commercial sex is a social event, part of a good night out with friends” (45). As it happens, early all of the society either participates in or accepts the sex industry. In fact, between 80 and 87 percent of the male population of Thailand has had sex with a prostitute (p. 45). Many officials are bribed into ignoring the laws; others are regular brothel visitors (64). Many see sex slavery as a way to spur the national economy. In the 1960s, Thailand’s interior minister championed the sex industry as a way to promote international tourism. Even brochures advertise the joys of a prostitute in Thailand: “little slaves who give real Thai warmth”, reads a brochure from the Netherlands (76). Sex tourism brings in a great deal of money to the nation, and makes the slavery practiced in Thailand a global issue. The entire world is complicit in this industry.

A different practice of slavery exists in Mauritania. There it is “less a political reality than a permanent part of the culture” (83). Slavery was abolished there in 1980, but no one bothered to pay attention. Scarcely anyone questions the practice. A slave named Bilal works for his master delivering water door to door every day. If Bilal does not return with the required amount of money he will be beaten or yelled at and his food will be reduced (102). Because slavery is so pervasive, and because Mauritanian slavery has a racial component, slaves have almost no other options. The racism is so strong “that no official segregation is needed: the lines of family and tribe are exact and impermeable” (119). So if a slave leaves a master, there is nowhere for him to go. He is immediately recognizable based on skin-color, as well as clothing and speech, and will not be able to find work (87).

In Brazil poor individuals are lured into isolated work camps in the forest where they are forced to work in squalid conditions, without pay or communication with the outside world. This work is temporary, however, because the destruction it involves is temporary, and slaves get used and then discarded (122). They are held as debt laborers who have no hope of paying off their debt. The system diffuses responsibility so that recruiters and landowners and officials all have an excuse.

In Pakistan an entire families are sold into debt bondage to work in brick kilns, working in extreme conditions with next to zero rewards. As elsewhere slaves have no hope of paying back their debt, and to ensure they remain in place a slaveholder may take a child hostage (152). All services to the slaves are accounted as debts and the owner manages accounts. And they are sold and re-sold: an extended family of forty-four were sold from one kiln to another, without the consent of any members of the family, then sold again; all the while the costs were added to their debt. Local governments largely ignore the slave industry.

The practice of slavery in India is “a survival of the oldest enslavement on the planet” (197). The debts of agricultural slaves in India can go back for centuries (202). Baldev, for instance, did not know how long his family had been enslaved. “We have always lived here…It’s a regular thing. Kohl people like us have always been bonded to Brahmins like my master” (206). And yet some slaves have come out of bondage thanks to government assistance (211). But many stories of corrupt government dealings lead Baldev and others to reject government help, for they have heard of government officials who receive bribes to forget about the slaves they were sent to free (214).

If any aspect of the human condition exposes the underside of human nature it has to be slavery. The willingness of modern human beings to tolerate such treatment diminishes all of us.

Sunday, April 20, 2008

World oil shortage: A fatality as sure as death and taxes?

Jad Mouawad, in today’s NYTimes [4/19/08] has pointed out some things about the oil reserves around the world that are worth noting and keeping track of. He provides a number of statistics that may be well enough known to the experts but are generally outside of the purview of most of us. Here are some notes on the present world situation that ought to cause serious concern – along with all the other conditions that we need to worry about.

  • The planet’s population is expected to grow by 50 percent to nine billion by sometime in the middle of the century. The number of cars and trucks is projected to double in 30 years
  • global oil consumption will jump by some 35 percent by the year 2030
  • The world’s total energy demand — including oil, coal, natural gas, nuclear power, as well as renewable energy sources like wind, solar and hydro power — is set to rise by 65 percent over the next two decades,
  • the energy crunch might … result in a global scramble for resources, energy wars, and much higher energy prices.
  • The North Sea and Alaska are slowly running out of oil and producers there are struggling to keep production from falling. Russia’s phenomenal oil surge is coming to an end
  • Fourteen of the world’s Top 20 oil companies are state-owned giants, like Saudi Aramco and Russia’s Gazprom. That leaves Western oil companies in control of less than 10 percent of the world’s oil and gas reserves.
  • Despite spending over $100 billion on exploration last year, the five largest international oil companies found less oil last year than they pumped out of the ground.
  • [G]iven the current rate of growth in demand, a trillion of [the 1.2 trillion barrels of known conventional oil reserves] will be used up in less than 30 years.
  • Oil now accounts for just 19 percent of China’s energy needs. But China’s oil demand is expected to more than double by 2030 to over 16 million barrels a day,
  • China has now surpassed both Germany and Japan to become the second-largest car market in the world, and is set to overtake the United States by around 2015 …

So what do you make of this? One more view of the future that makes us wonder.

In the mean time journalists are asking Presidential candidates why they don’t wear flags on their lapel.

[Click on the title for a link to the article.]

Wednesday, April 09, 2008

The NeoTaliban Movement, Some Clarifications



A couple of journalism students asked me to answer some questions about the situation in Afghanistan. Specifically they were asking about the prospects of NATO's getting control of the Taliban, etc. What follows is an edited version of what I sent them. I include it here merely to put down what I think is wrong about the way they and possibly others have been thinking about the situation. This is merely a hurried statement and I may come back to correct/revise it as I have time. But for the moment it is a formulation of the situation as I best can make of it. For the interest of anyone who wants to look in at it. RLC

_______________________________________________________
Dear Friends,

I think your frame of reference in these questions is inadequate: your categories are NATO, Afghanistan and Taliban – the implication being that all the issues are inside the borders of Afghanistan. What I have time to do here is clarify briefly who the Taliban are and how they are animated in hopes this my may help you frame your questions better, and in any case this will give me a chance to clarify how I would think about it.

The Neo Taliban who are operating now in Afghanistan and Pakistan are not the same as the earlier movement – at least they are now combined with other influences. The early group was constituted of several kinds of elements, each with its own agenda and perspective arising out of conditions in Afghanistan in the early and mid-1990s [see my “Fraternity, power, and time in Central Asia.” In, The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistn, edited by Robert Crews and Amin Tarzi. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. 2008.] Many of those elements are in some sense still part of the Taliban movement but since the demise and recent revival of the Taliban after 2002 other influences have contributed a lot to the organization.

To clarify: For one thing, the Taliban are a movement of Pushtuns largely ensconced in Pakistan. As you must know, about as many Pushtuns are in Pakistan as in Afghanistan, only in a sector of Pakistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA], the Pushtun tribes effectively rule themselves by an agreement with Pakistan government [and the British before that]. Within Afghanistan no such agreement existed so that the Afghan tribes were more closely linked into the national system – economy, politics, etc. – than in Pakistan. It is true, however, that there have long been pockets of Pushtun groups who remained effectively self-governing, but the declared intent of the Afghanistan government, ever since the time of Abdul Rahman [1881-1901], if not before, was that it had a right to rule the tribes directly. So what is wrongly called “lawless” territories in the FATA in Pakistan have not, in theory, existed in Afghanistan. [About 40% of the population in Afghanistan is Pushtun by birth [the government always claimed many more] but even among those populations many of them spoke Persian better than Pushtu.]

The Taliban are an essentially Pushtun movement: virtually no other Afghanistan ethnic group has any place in the Taliban organization or movement. There are non-Pushtuns among them, renegades from the wars in Central Asia [Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan] and also, of course, Arabs associated with Al Qaeda. There are also, at least participating in the group or sympathetic to the group, Pakistani Islamist groups of various sorts.

The Arab groups have contributed a lot that is new to the NeoTaliban. Suicide bombing is not native to Afghanistan or Pakistan: it is a practice imported from the Middle East where it has been practiced in various contexts by Arabs and notably recently in Iraq.

The most important dimension of the situation among the Taliban, it seems to me, is Pakistan’s involvement. Despite many denials by many officials, there are many signs of Pakistani involvement in the Taliban. Reporters have identified where Mullah Muhammad Omar, head of the Taliban, has his residence [in Quetta] and identified one of the main Pakistani pay-masters of the Taliban [General Hamed Gul, former head of the ISI]. Pakistan indeed not only tolerates organizations like the Taliban [see the list below] because of the preoccupation of Pakistan’s military with the struggle against India over Kashmir. Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir is based on its identity as a Muslim nation claiming the right to govern a Muslim people [most of the population in Kashmir] versus India’s current occupation of the country -- an illegal occupation, Pakistan claims. So for years Pakistan has in various ways sought both to control extremist Muslim groups and to allow them to exist, always with a view to keeping a pool of willing recruits available for the struggle with India over Kashmir. But as the American influence has forced Musharraf to get control of the extremist elements – and as they evidently are getting out of control – the conflicts with extremists have become dangerous even within Pakistan. As long as the Taliban and other extremist Pushtun groups infiltrated Afghanistan Pakistan’s attempts to control them have been perfunctory, but as the same groups have begun to cause trouble to Pakistan the issue has caused much more intense concern, and there have been much more vigorous attempts to control them.

It is also worth nothing that the Taliban are organized as an Islamic movement and thus are intrinsically constituted differently from the traditional tribal organizations. The Taliban organize authority around a person considered to have authentic religious authority [Mullah Muhammad Omar, the "Emir"]; the tribal leaders hold their positions by virtue of kinship connections among the networks of tribesmen. This then has been the context in which the tribal leaders and the religion organizations have clashed; in recent months many tribal elders have been assassinated -- signs of severe internal differences among the Pushtun peoples of FATA.

So, to gather these ideas together: The NeoTaliban don’t represent a very large segment of the Afghanistan people and their influence inside Afghanistan has grown only as they have been able to establish training bases and obtain other support inside Pakistan. And mostly their influence has grown among the Pushtun of Afghanistan , in Pushtun areas. And even then, it seems to me, a major reason for some who have switched from supporting the Afghanistan government to the Taliban has been the failure of the Afghanistan government to deliver on its promises.

The future very much depends on the kind of support that Afghanistan gets from the rest of the world, NATO being one form of it. In fact, the supporting nations seem to have botched the affair – Bush’s war in Iraq being the most notable blunder, but others being the ways that moneys were spent to enrich citizens of the donating nations while many Afghans were left out of work.

It also depends on the ability of the Afghanistan leadership to organize an effective administration, something that has scarcely ever been the case in Afghanistan. Currently, the drug industry seems to be a major corrupting influence in the country.

All of this is a mere, brief sketch of the situation as I best can put it together hurriedly, without indicating sources. But it is meant to suggest other questions than you are asking.

Best, RLC

PS: Below is a list of extremist movements tolerated inside Pakistan [most of it from Abbas 2005. Pakistan’s Drift to Extremism].

Sunni groups:
> Ahle-Hadith, Wahhabi-like, with historic links to Wahhabi movement of earlier times, now associated with Deobandis
> Harkat-ul-Ansar [HUA] [in 1993 created out of two groups, Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami and Harkat –ul- Mujahideen, which had been formed in 1980s]; this group was “ideologically sympathetic to JUI.
> Jamaat-i-Ulema-i-Islami [JUI], a Deobandi affiliated religious party
> Jamaat-i-Islami [JI] [founded by Maududi as Pakistan was being formed, as an elite “Leninist” party that often opposed the JUI]
> Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, founded by JI to operate in Kashmir
> Sipah-i-Sahaba [SSP], rabidly anti-Shia, came out of the city of Jhang where Shia/Sunni tensions were strong, was an offshoot of JUI. Founder, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, had been involved in the anti-Ahmadi movement in 1974. With Pakistan and Saudi support attacked Pakistani Shi’a groups at all levels in early 1980s. Were later joined by criminal groups and drug dealers [Abbas 2005. Pakistan’s Drift …, p. 206, 207]. Jhangvi was assassinated soon after assassination of TNFJ leader in 1988. A member of SSP killed Iranian consul general in Lahore in 1990.
> Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, formed in 1990s as splinter from SSP. [Other similar organizations were formed, essentially as “personal mafias” of local mullahs [Abbas 2005:207]]. Started operating in 1995-6 as terrorist group, attacking Shi’a sites; “the most violent sectarian force in Pakistan” [Abbas 2005:208]. Moved to Kashmir, first attacking Shia there, then the Indian military. Later found sanctuary in Afghanistan with the Taliban.
> Markaz Dawat-ul-Irshad [MDI, Center for Religious Learning and Propagation] founded by several men, including Abdullah Azzam, Palestinian with Wahhabi orientation. Eventually was headed by Hafiz Saeed, who was brought up in the Ahle-Hadith sect [i.e., strict Islamic order]. It was Hafiz Saeed who said, “We believe in Huntington’s clash of civilizations, and our jihad will continue until Islam becomes the dominant religion.” Emphasizes [science] education and jihad. Want to set up a model community prior to getting control of Kashmir, where they want to establish an “Islamic community.” With moneys from abroad pay handsomely to families whose sons are suicide bombers.
> Lashkar-i-Taiba, militant wing of MDI. Who carried out ideas of MDI.

Shia groups
> Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jafaria [TNFJ, Movement for the Implementation of Jafari Fiqh], Shi’ite movement with Iranian support, some leaders trained in Iran. Leader of this group was assassinated in August 1988.
> Sipah-i-Muhammad, Shia militant group formed in 1994.


فان neotaliban الحركة ، وبعض الإيضاحات زوجان من الصحافة الطلاب طلب مني الاجابه على بعض الاسءله حول الوضع في افغانستان. على وجه التحديد كانوا يسأل عن مستقبل منظمة حلف شمال الاطلسي للوصول الى سيطره حركة طالبان ، وما الى ما يلي هو الصيغة المحرره من اللي انا أرسلتهم. أنا هنا مجرد ادراجه لاخماد ما اعتقد من الخطأ عن طريقه ، وربما آخرين تم التفكير في هذا الوضع. ذلك لا يعدو ان يكون بيانا وسارع وقد أعود الى تصحيح / اعادة النظر فيه وكما قلت الوقت. ولكن في الوقت الحالي وهو صياغه الوضع كما اني افضل يمكن ان يجعل منه. لمصلحة من أراد ان ينظر في فيه. RLC ________________________________ اصدقائي الاعزاء ، اعتقد ان الاطار المرجعي الخاص بك في عدم كفاية هذه الاسءله هو : حسابك فئات هي منظمة حلف شمال الاطلسي ، وأفغانستان طالبان -- يعني ان كافة القضايا التي هي داخل حدود افغانستان. ما عندي وقت ان نفعله هنا هو توضيح بايجاز الذين طالبان وكيف انها متحركه وتأمل في هذا بلادي قد تساعدك الاطار اسئلتك افضل ، وهذا في أي حال سوف اعطوني فرصة لتوضيح الكيفيه التي أود أن نفكر فيه. النيو طالبان الذين يعملون الآن في أفغانستان وباكستان ليست هي نفس الحركة السابقة -- على الاقل وهم الان مجتمعة مع غيرها من التأثيرات. المجموعة الاولى كانت مؤلفة من عدة انواع من العناصر ، ولكل منها جدول الاعمال والمنظور ناشءه عن الاوضاع فى افغانستان فى اوائل ومنتصف التسعينات [أنظر بلدي "الاخوة ، والسلطة ، ومرة في آسيا الوسطى." ، وحركة طالبان وأزمة afghanistn ، حرره روبرت أطقم وامين tarzi. كامبريدج ، ودرجة الماجستير : جامعة هارفارد. 2008.] العديد من تلك العناصر في بعض الشعور لا يزال جزءا من حركة طالبان ، ولكن منذ وفاة والاخيرة احياء طالبان بعد 2002 تأثيرات اخرى ساهمت كثيرا الى المنظمه. توضيح : لشيء واحد ، فإن حركة طالبان هي من pushtuns محجوب الى حد كبير في باكستان. كما يجب ان تعرف ، كما عن كثير pushtuns في باكستان كما في افغانستان ، الا في قطاع من باكستان ، والمناطق القبلية الخاضعه للادارة الاتحادية [FATA] ، pushtun القبائل من حكم انفسهم بفعاليه عن طريق الاتفاق مع حكومة باكستان] والبريطانية قبل ان [. داخل افغانستان لا يوجد اتفاق من هذا القبيل حتى ان القبائل الافغانيه كانت أوثق صلة الى نظام وطني -- الاقتصاد ، والسياسة ، الخ -- مما كانت عليه في باكستان. ولكن صحيح ، ان هناك منذ زمن طويل جيوب pushtun الجماعات الذين بقوا على نحو فعال تتمتع بالحكم الذاتي ، ولكن النوايا المعلنة للحكومة افغانستان ، ومنذ ذلك الوقت عبد الرحمن [1881-1901] ، ان لم يكن قبلها ، وكان ذلك ومن له الحق في حكم القبائل مباشرة. فما هو خطأ يسمى ب "الخارجة عن القانون" في الاراضي FATA فى باكستان ليس لها ، من الناحية النظريه ، وجدت في افغانستان. [حوالي 40 ٪ من السكان في أفغانستان هو pushtun بالمولد [الحكومة دائما المطالب كثيرة اكثر] ولكن حتى بين هؤلاء السكان وكثير منهم تكلم الفارسيه افضل من الباشتون.] طالبان هي في جوهرها حركة pushtun : عمليا اي مجموعة اثنيه أخرى افغانستان قد اى مكان فى منظمة او حركة طالبان. وهناك غير pushtuns بينهم ، المرتدون من الحروب في آسيا الوسطى [اوزبكستان ، طاجيكستان ، تركمانستان] وايضا ، وبالطبع ، العرب المرتبطين بالقاعده. وهناك ايضا ، على الاقل المشاركة في الفريق او متعاطفه مع الفريق ، والجماعات الاسلامية الباكستانيه من مختلف الانواع. المجموعات العربية ساهمت كثيرا ان هو جديد الى neotaliban. تفجير انتحارى ليست القوميه لافغانستان أو باكستان : وهي ممارسة مستورده من الشرق الأوسط ، حيث انها مارسته في سياقات مختلفة من قبل العرب وخاصة في الاونة الاخيرة فى العراق. أهم البعد الحاله بين طالبان ، كما يبدو لي ، هو تورط باكستان. ورغم نفي العديد من العديد من المسؤولين ، وهناك دلائل كثيرة على تورط باكستاني في طالبان. مراسلون حددنا فيها الملا محمد عمر رئيس حركة طالبان ، فقد مسكنه [في كويتا] وحدد أحد أهم الباكستانيه الدفع سادة طالبان [العام حامد غول ، الرئيس السابق للالمخابرات الباكستانيه]. باكستان ليست في الواقع الا تتسامح مع منظمات مثل حركة طالبان [انظر القائمة ادناه] بسبب انشغال العسكرية في باكستان مع النضال ضد الهند حول كشمير. مطالبة باكستان الى كشمير على اساس هويتها بوصفها امة مسلمة تدعى الحق ليحكم الشعب المسلم [معظم السكان في كشمير] مقابل الهند الحالي للاحتلال البلد -- غير شرعيه الاحتلال ، ومطالبة باكستان. كذلك لسنوات في باكستان قد سعت بشتى الطرق سواء للسيطره على الجماعات الاسلامية المتطرفة ، وعلى السماح لهم في الوجود ، ودائما مع بغية الحفاظ على مجموعة من المجندين المتاحة على استعداد للكفاح مع الهند حول كشمير. ولكن كما النفوذ الاميركي وقد اضطر مشرف الى الحصول على السيطرة على العناصر المتطرفة -- والواضح أنها هي الخروج من السيطرة -- صراعات مع المتطرفين اصبحت خطرة حتى داخل باكستان. طالما ان طالبان وغيرها من الجماعات المتطرفة pushtun تسللت الى افغانستان وباكستان ومحاولات السيطرة عليهم وقد روتينيه ، ولكن نظرا الى ان نفس المجموعات بدأت تسبب مشكلة لباكستان المساله قد سببت الكثير من القلق اكثر كثافه ، وكانت هناك أكثر بكثير محاولات حثيثه لمكافحتها. كما أنها لا قيمة لها ان طالبان هي المنظمه باعتبارها الحركة الاسلامية ، وبالتالي هي في جوهرها تشكل بطريقة مختلفة عن الطريقة التقليديه القبلية المنظمات. طالبان تنظيم السلطة حول شخص قد نظرت الى الحجيه السلطة الدينية [الملا محمد عمر "امير"] ؛ زعماء القبائل مناصبهم بحكم صلات القربى بين شبكات من رجال القبائل. ثم تم هذا السياق الذي زعماء القبائل والمنظمات الدين قد اشتبكت ؛ في الاشهر الاخيرة العديد من شيوخ القبائل قد اغتالت -- بوادر خلافات داخلية حاده بين شعوب pushtun FATA. بذلك ، لجمع هذه الافكار معا : neotaliban لا تمثل شريحة واسعة جدا من شعب افغانستان ونفوذهم داخل افغانستان نمت الا انها تمكنت من اقامة قواعد تدريب والحصول على الدعم الاخرى داخل باكستان. ومعظمهم من نفوذهم نمت بين pushtun من افغانستان ، في pushtun المجالات. وحتى ذلك الحين ، ويبدو لي ان احد الاسباب الرئيسية لبعض الذين تحولوا من دعم حكومة افغانستان لطالبان قد فشل حكومة افغانستان على الوفاء بوعوده. المستقبل يتوقف الى حد كبير على نوع من الدعم ان يحصل على افغانستان من بقية العالم ، ومنظمة حلف شمال الاطلسي يجري شكل واحد منه. وفي الواقع ، فان دعم المتحدة لديها فيما يبدو botched الشأن -- حرب بوش فى العراق يجري ابرز خطأ ، ولكن الطرق الاخرى هي ان الاموال التي كانت تنفق على اثراء المواطنين للتبرع المتحدة في حين ان العديد من الافغان كانوا يستبعدون من العمل. ويتوقف ايضا على قدرة للقيادة افغانستان الى تنظيم ادارة فعالة ، وهو ما لا يتاح من اي وقت مضى كان عليه الحال في افغانستان. حاليا ، وصناعة المخدرات ويبدو ان رئيسي افساد النفوذ في ذلك البلد. كل هذا هو مجرد ، موجزة من رسم الحاله كما انني افضل يمكن وضعها معا بعجاله ، دون الاشارة الى المصادر. ولكن القصد منها هو اقتراح غيرها من الاسءله انكم تطلبون. أفضل ، RLC ملاحظه : فيما يلي قائمة الحركات المتطرفة التسامح داخل باكستان [أكثر من 2005 من عباس. باكستان الانجراف الى التطرف]. الجماعات السنيه : > Ahle - الحديث ، والوهابيه - مثل ، مع الروابط التاريخية لحركة الوهابيه في وقت سابق من الاوقات ، الآن المرتبطه deobandis > Harkat - UL - الانصار [هوا] [وفي عام 1993 انشئت من اصل فريقين ، harkat - UL - الجهاد الاسلامي - أنا وharkat - UL المجاهدين ، والتي كانت قد تشكلت في الثمانينات] ؛ هذه المجموعة هو "ايديولوجيا متعاطفه جوي . > الجماعة - أنا - من العلماء - ط - اسلامي [جوي] ، deobandi التابعة للحزب دينى > الجماعة - أنا - اسلامي [جي] [اسستها maududi باكستان كما كان يجري تشكيلها ، كما النخبه "لينينيه" ان الحزب كثيرا ما عارض جوي] > UL حزب المجاهدين ، أسستها جي تعمل فى كشمير > Sipah - ط - الصحابة [ssp] ، بشكل متطرف ضد الشيعه ، وخرج من مدينة jhang فيها الشيعيه / السنيه كانت التوترات القويه ، وكان فرعا من جوي. مؤسس ، والحق نواز Jhangvi ، قد شارك في الحركة المناهضه للطائفة الاحمديه فى عام 1974. مع باكستان والسعودية بدعم الباكستانيه هاجمت جماعات الشيعه على جميع المستويات في اوائل الثمانينات. وقد انضم فى وقت لاحق من جانب الجماعات الاجراميه وتجار المخدرات [عباس 2005. باكستان الانحراف… ، p. 206 ، 207]. Jhangvi اغتيل بعد فترة وجيزة من اغتيال زعيم tnfj في 1988. عضو ssp قتل القنصل العام الايراني في لاهور في عام 1990. > Lashkar - ه - Jhangvi ، التى تشكلت فى التسعينات كما المنشقه عن ssp. [المنظمات المماثله الاخرى ، وتم تشكيل ل، أساسا باعتبارها "شخصية مافيا" المحلية الملالي [عباس 2005:207]]. بدأ التشغيل في 1995-6 بوصفها جماعة ارهابية ، والهجوم على مواقع الشيعه ؛ "اعنف قوة طاءفيه في باكستان" [عباس 2005:208]. انتقل الى كشمير ، الاولى في الهجوم على الشيعه هناك ، ثم العسكرية الهندية. في وقت لاحق وجد ملاذا في افغانستان مع حركة طالبان. > Markaz dawat - UL - irshad [واجهة المستندات المتعددة ، ومركز التعلم الديني واكثار] اسستها عدة الرجل ، بما في عبد الله عزام ، الفلسطيني مع التوجه الوهابي. في نهاية المطاف كان يرأسها حافظ سعيد ، الذي كان ترعرعت في ahle - الفرع الحديث [اي ، واتباع قواعد صارمه من اجل الإسلامي]. وكان حافظ سعيد الذي قال : "نعتقد's هنتنغتون في صراع الحضارات ، ونحن الجهاد سيستمر حتى أصبح الاسلام الدين الغالب. "تشدد [العلوم] التعليم والجهاد. يريدون اقامة نموذج للمجتمع قبل الحصول على السيطرة على كشمير ، حيث انهم يريدون اقامة "المجتمع الاسلامي". مع اموال من الخارج لدفع handsomely ابناء الاسر التي هي انتحاريين. > Lashkar - ط - taiba ، الجناح المسلح للواجهة المستندات المتعددة. الذين نفذوا الأفكار من واجهة المستندات المتعددة. الجماعات الشيعيه > Tehrik - nifaz - انا - انا - أنا - الفقه - jafaria [tnfj ، الحركة من اجل تنفيذ jafari الفقه] ، الحركة الشيعيه مع الدعم الايراني ، وبعض قادة تدريب في ايران. زعيم هذه المجموعة اغتيل في اب / اغسطس 1988. > Sipah - أنا - محمد ، المجموعة الشيعيه المتشدده التى تشكلت فى عام 1994.


該neotaliban運動,一些澄清一對夫婦的新聞專業的學生問我,回答了一些問題,阿富汗局勢。具體來說,他們所問的前景北約的越來越塔利班控制等,以下是剪輯版,我送他們。我需要包括它在這裡只是放下我的想法是錯的方式,他們也可能有其他人一直在思考的情況。這只是一個匆匆發表聲明,我可能回來更正/修改,因為我有時間。不過,目前這是一個制定有關的情況正如我最好的,可以作出的。對於有興趣的任何人想看看在這件事。 RLC的_______________________________________________________ 親愛的朋友們, 我認為你的參照系,在這些問題,是不夠的:你的分類是北約,阿富汗和塔利班-其含義是說所有問題都內阿富汗邊界。我有時間來這裡做的是簡單澄清誰是塔利班和如何將它們的動畫,希望我這可幫你框你的問題更好,並在任何情況下,這將會給我一個機會,以澄清如何我會去想它。 新保守主義塔利班誰經營,現在在阿富汗和巴基斯坦是不一樣的較早的運動-至少他們現在再加上其他因素影響。早防組是構成幾種元素,每個國家都有它自己的議程和角度產生的條件,在阿富汗,在1990年代初期和中期[見我的"博愛,權力,時間在中亞" ,塔利班和危機的afghanistn ,主編羅伯特船員和阿明tarzi 。劍橋, MA :哈佛大學。 2008 。 ]許多的這些要素,在一定意義上仍是部分的塔利班運動,但由於光船承租人和最近死灰復燃,塔利班在2002年後其他的影響有很大貢獻的組織。 澄清:一,塔利班是一個運動的pushtuns基本上常年奔走於巴基斯坦。因為你要知道,因為很多pushtuns是巴基斯坦作為阿富汗,只有在一個部門的巴基斯坦,由聯邦政府管理的部落地區[的FATA ] , pushtun部落有效地統治自己的一項協定,與巴基斯坦政府[和英國之前] 。在阿富汗境內沒有這樣的協議存在,使阿富汗部族的聯繫更加密切,成為全國系統-經濟,政治等-比在巴基斯坦。這是事實,然而,早已有之口袋pushtun群體,他們仍然有效自治,但宣稱打算向阿富汗政府,自從時間的阿卜杜勒拉赫曼[ 1881年至1901年,而不是像以前那樣,是它有一個統治權部落直接。那麼什麼是錯誤地稱為"無法無天"的地區中的FATA在巴基斯坦沒有,從理論上講,存在於阿富汗。 [約40 %的人口在阿富汗是pushtun出生[政府一直宣稱有更多] ,但即使是在這些人群他們中的許多人以波斯語優於pushtu 。 ] 塔利班是一個基本上pushtun運動:幾乎沒有其他阿富汗族群上任何一個地方的塔利班組織或運動。有非pushtuns其中,叛徒,從戰爭在中亞[烏茲別克斯坦,塔吉克斯坦,土庫曼斯坦和當然,還有一種人,阿拉伯人與基地組織有關。也有一些,至少在參與小組或同情集團,巴基斯坦伊斯蘭組織的種種。 阿拉伯團體有很大貢獻,就是新加入neotaliban 。自殺性爆炸事件,是不是在向阿富汗或巴基斯坦:它是一個實踐的進口來自中東,而已經施行了各種情境,由阿拉伯人和顯著,最近在伊拉克。 最重要的方面的情況,其中塔利班,在我看來,是巴基斯坦的參與。儘管許多人否認許多官員,也有許多跡象顯示巴基斯坦參與推翻塔利班政權。記者發現那裡毛拉穆罕默德奧馬爾,團長是塔利班,有他的居住地在奎達] ,並確定了其中的一個主要巴基斯坦付費的主人塔利班[一般哈米德古爾,卸任元首三軍情報局] 。巴基斯坦的確不僅容忍類似組織塔利班[見下面列表]因為專注於巴基斯坦的軍事行動與反印度的克什米爾問題。巴基斯坦聲稱克什米爾是基於它的身份,作為一個穆斯林國家聲稱有權統治一個穆斯林人[大部分人口在克什米爾]銀兩印度目前佔領的國家-一個非法佔領,巴基斯坦索賠。這麼多年來,巴基斯坦一直在以各種方式尋求既要控制,穆斯林極端主義團體,並允許他們存在的,總是以期使一批願意新兵供鬥爭與印度的克什米爾問題。但正如美國的影響力已迫使穆沙拉夫得到控制極端分子-因為他們顯然是失控的控制-與衝突的極端分子,已成為危險的,即使在巴基斯坦。只要塔利班和其他極端pushtun集團滲入阿富汗巴基斯坦的企圖控制它們一直敷衍應付,但由於同組已經開始尋釁滋事,向巴基斯坦問題,已引起更為尖銳的關注,並且有更多的嚴厲試圖控制它們。 它也是不值錢的說,塔利班組織作為一個伊斯蘭運動,因此在本質上構成了不同的是從傳統的部落組織。塔利班組織管理局左右的人認為有正宗的宗教權威[毛拉穆罕默德奧馬爾, "埃米爾" ] ;部落領袖舉行他們的立場,憑藉親情之間連接網絡的部落成員。這則一直上下文中的部落領袖和宗教組織發生衝突,在最近幾個月來,許多當地部族長老被暗殺-的跡象,嚴重的內部分歧,其中p ushtun人民的F ATA。 因此,要蒐集這些想法一起: neotaliban並不代表一個非常大的部分對阿富汗人民和他們的影響力在阿富汗境內已經長大只因為他們已能建立培訓基地,並獲得其他支援巴基斯坦境內。而且大部分他們的影響力已成長當中pushtun在阿富汗全境, pushtun地區。即使如此,在我看來,一個重要原因就是一些人已轉由支持阿富汗政府向塔利班一直未能對阿富汗政府兌現自己的諾言。 未來在很大程度上取決於該種支持阿富汗得到來自世界其餘地區,北約正的形式之一。事實上,在支持國家似乎都拙劣事情-布什的伊拉克戰爭被認為是最顯著的失誤,但其他人正在研究各種方法的款項,都用,以豐富市民的捐贈國,而許多阿富汗人被遺漏的工作。 這也取決於能否在阿富汗領導組織一個有效的政府,這已幾乎從未阿富汗的情況。目前,毒品業似乎是一個主要的敗壞風氣的影響,在該國。 所有這一切都僅僅是一種雖短,素描的情況正如我最好的,可以把它一起匆匆,但沒有說明消息來源。但這樣做是要建議其他問題,而不是你們所提出的。 最好的, RLC的PS :如果下面列出了極端主義運動不能容忍在巴基斯坦境內[大部份也由阿巴斯2005 。巴基斯坦的漂移,以極端主義] 。 遜尼派團體: > ahle -聖訓,瓦哈比樣,與歷史的聯繫,以瓦哈比運動較早的時代,現在與班蒂斯> ( Harkat -經UL安薩爾[華] [在1993年創造出2組, ( Harkat -經UL聖戰組織-伊斯蘭和( Harkat極端組織,並已成立於20世紀80年代] ,這組" ,在思想上同情瑞。 >孟加拉內政部長一烏里瑪我是伊斯蘭[瑞] , deobandi所屬宗教黨>孟加拉內政部長一伊斯蘭[紀寶成] [創辦茂都迪作為巴基斯坦正在形成的,作為一個優秀的"列寧式"的黨,經常反對瑞] >此次是該極端組織,成立由紀,以經營在克什米爾> sipah - - Sahaba的[過磷酸鈣] , rabidly反什葉派教徒,但出來的市jhang那裡的什葉派/遜尼派緊張關係強勁,是一個分支瑞。創辦人,哈克納瓦茲jhangvi ,曾參與反阿赫馬迪運動在1974年。與巴基斯坦和沙特的支持,攻擊巴基斯坦什葉派團體在各個層面與80年代初。後來加入的犯罪團伙和毒品販子[阿巴斯2005 。巴基斯坦的漂移…頁206 , 207 。 jhangvi被暗殺後不久,暗殺tnfj領導人在1988年。會員過磷酸鈣殺害伊朗總領事在拉合爾市在1990年。 >拉什卡-電子jhangvi ,形成於20世紀90年代,作為分裂過磷酸鈣。 [其他類似組織的形成,從根本上的"個人黑手黨"的地方毛拉[阿巴斯2005:207 ] 。開始運作,在1995-6為恐怖集團,攻擊什葉派地盤" ;最為激烈的派系力量在巴基斯坦" [阿巴斯2005:208 ] 。遷移到克什米爾,首先攻擊什葉派存在,那麼,印度軍方。後來發現避難所在阿富汗與塔利班的關係。 > markaz dawat -經UL伊爾沙德[ MDI的中心,宗教學和傳播]創辦的幾名男子,其中包括阿卜杜拉阿扎姆,巴勒斯坦與瓦哈比方向。最終被為首的哈菲茲賽義德,他們被帶到了在ahle -聖訓節[即,嚴格的伊斯蘭秩序。據哈菲茲賽義德說: "我們相信,在亨廷頓的文明的衝突,而我們的聖戰將繼續,直到伊斯蘭成為佔主導地位的宗教" 。強調[科學]教育和聖戰。希望建立一種社區模式,事先得到控制的克什米爾地區,他們希望成立一個"伊斯蘭社會"的款項與從國外付出可觀的,以家庭,其兒子是自殺炸彈客。 >拉什卡我是虔誠軍,激進右翼MDI的。世衛組織進行的想法MDI的。 什葉派團體> tehrik - - nifaz - -學-一jafaria [ tnfj ,調度,為實施jafari學] ,什葉派運動與伊朗的支持,一些訓練有素的領導人在伊朗。領導這個小組的被刺殺在1988年8月。 > sipah - -穆罕默德,什葉派激進團體成立於1994年。

В NeoTaliban передвижения, некоторые разъяснения Несколько студентов факультета журналистики попросил меня ответить на некоторые вопросы по поводу ситуации в Афганистане. В частности они просят о перспективах НАТО получения контроля над движением "Талибан" и т.д. Что стоит отредактированный вариант, что я послал их. И включить его здесь лишь для того, чтобы сложить то, что я думаю, это неправильно по поводу того, как они, и, возможно, другие были осмысления ситуации. Это просто поспешили заявление и я могу вернуться к правильной / внести в него изменения, как я уже времени. Но на данный момент она является разработка положения, как я лучше всего может сделать из него. В интересах тех, кто хочет взглянуть в ее. RLC _______________________________________________________ Дорогие друзья! Я думаю, ваши системы отсчета в этих вопросах является неадекватной: ваши категории НАТО, в Афганистане и движение "Талибан" - на подразумевается, что все вопросы находятся внутри границ Афганистана. То, что я успел сделать здесь пояснить кратко, которые "Талибан" и как они анимированные в надеется, что это моя могут помочь Вам в кадр на ваши вопросы лучше, и в любом случае это даст мне возможность разъяснить, как я думаю о нем. В стиле "Талибан", которые действуют в настоящее время в Афганистане и Пакистане, не то же самое, что ранее движение - по крайней мере в настоящее время они в сочетании с другими факторами. В начале группа была сформирована из нескольких видов элементов, каждый из которых имеет свою собственную повестку дня и перспективы, вытекающие из условий, в Афганистане в начале и середине 1990s [см. мои "Братство, власть, и время, в Центральной Азии." В, "Талибан" и Кризис Afghanistn, под редакцией Роберта экипажей и Амин Тарзи. Cambridge, MA: Гарвардский университет. 2008.] Многие из тех элементов, в некотором смысле все еще входит в движение "Талибан", однако после недавнего падения и возрождения движения "Талибан" после 2002 других влияний способствовало много для организации. Для уточнения: С одной стороны, талибы движение пуштуны в основном, укрывшимся в засаде в Пакистане. Как вы должны знать, примерно, как многие пуштуны в Пакистане, как и в Афганистане, только в секторе, Пакистан, федеральным управлением племенных районов [FATA], с пуштунским племенам эффективно правило себя соглашение с правительством Пакистана, [и британские до этого ]. В Афганистане нет такого соглашения существуют с тем, что афганские племена были более тесно связаны в национальной системе - экономики, политики и т.д., - чем в Пакистане. Это верно, однако, что там уже давно карманы пуштунским групп, которые остаются фактически самоуправления, но объявленное намерение в Афганистане правительства, когда-либо со времени Абдул Рахман [1881-1901], если не раньше, заключается в том, что она имеет право на правило колен напрямую. Так что ошибочно называют "беззаконной" территории в FATA в Пакистане, которые не в теории, существовала в Афганистане. [Около 40% населения в Афганистане пуштунским по рождению [правительства всегда утверждали многие другие], но даже среди тех, население многих из них говорил персидский лучше, чем Пуштунского.] Движение "Талибан", являются в основном пуштунским движением: практически ни одна другая этническая группа Афганистана в любом месте, в движение "Талибан" и организации движения. Есть, не-пуштуны из них, ренегатов из войн в Центральной Азии [Узбекистан, Таджикистан, Туркменистан], а также, разумеется, арабов, связанных с "Аль-Каидой". Есть также, по крайней мере, участвующих в группе или симпатиях к группе пакистанских исламистских группировок различного рода. В арабских групп, которые способствовали много, что является новым для NeoTaliban. Самоубийство взрыв не является родным в Афганистан или Пакистан: это практика, импортируемых из стран Ближнего Востока, где она была на практике в различных контекстах арабами и, в частности, в последнее время в Ираке. Самый важный аспект ситуации между движением "Талибан", как мне кажется, является Пакистан участия. Несмотря на многочисленные опровержения многие должностные лица, есть много признаков пакистанской причастности к движению "Талибан". Журналисты определили, где мулла Мухаммад Омар, глава движения "Талибан", в своей резиденции [в Кветте], и определило одну из главных пакистанских платить-мастеров "Талибан" [Общие Хамид Гул, бывший глава МСИ]. Пакистан действительно, не только допускает организаций, как движение "Талибан" [см. список ниже] в связи с заботой пакистанской военной с борьбой против Индии в Кашмире. Пакистан претензии на Кашмир, основывается на его личность, как мусульманская страна претендовать на право управлять мусульманского населения [большинство населения Кашмира] в сравнении с Индией в настоящее время оккупации страны - незаконной оккупации, Пакистан претензий. Так, лет Пакистан различными путями стремится осуществлять контроль мусульманских экстремистских групп, и дать им возможность существует, всегда с целью удержания пула готовы новобранцев для борьбы с Индией по поводу Кашмира. Но, как американское влияние заставило Мушаррафом, чтобы получить контроль над экстремистскими элементами, - и, поскольку они, очевидно, получают из-под контроля - конфликты с экстремистами стали опасными даже в Пакистане. До тех пор, как "Талибан" и других экстремистских групп, проникших пуштунским Афганистане Пакистан попытки борьбы с ними были поверхностный характер, но как же групп стали причиной проблем в Пакистан вопрос вызывает гораздо больше волнует, и там было гораздо больше энергичные попытки контролировать их. Также стоит ничего, что талибы организованы как исламское движение, и, таким образом, представляет собой по сути отличается от традиционных племенных организаций. Движение "Талибан" организовать власть вокруг лицо считается, аутентичные религиозного авторитета [мулла Мухаммад Омар, то "эмира"]; племенных лидеров проводят свои позиции на основании родственных связей между сетями племени. Это тогда был контекст, в котором племенные вожди и религии организаций имели место столкновения, в последние месяцы многие старейшины племен были убиты - признаки серьезных внутренних разногласий между пуштунским народов FATA. Таким образом, чтобы собрать эти идеи вместе: В NeoTaliban не представляют собой весьма значительной части населения Афганистана, и их влияние в Афганистане выросло только как им удалось создать тренировочные базы и получить другую помощь на территории Пакистана. И в основном их влияние выросло число пуштунским Афганистана, в пуштунским районах. И даже тогда, как мне кажется, одной из основных причин для некоторых, которые перешли от поддержки правительства Афганистана с талибами был провал в Афганистане правительства выполнить свои обещания. В будущем очень многое зависит от того, какую поддержку, что Афганистан получает от остального мира, НАТО как одной из форм ее. В самом деле, поддержка стран, как представляется, неудачных дело - Буша, война в Ираке является наиболее заметным ошибку, но также другие способы, что денежные средства были израсходованы на обогащение граждан на безвозмездной наций в то время как многие афганцы остались без работы. Он также зависит от способности в Афганистане руководство по организации эффективного управления, то, что вряд когда-либо имело место в Афганистане. В настоящее время в фармацевтической промышленности, как представляется, является основным коррумпированного влияния в стране. Все это лишь краткое описание ситуации, как мне лучше всего могут поставить его вместе в спешке, без указания источников. Но это означало бы предложить другие вопросы, чем вы просите. Best, RLC PS: Ниже приведен список экстремистских движений терпеть внутри Пакистана [большинство из Аббаса 2005. Пакистан дрейфа к экстремизму]. Суннитских групп: > Ахле-Хадит, ваххабитские-как с исторической ссылки на ваххабитские движение прежних времен, в настоящее время, связанных с Deobandis > Харкат-уль-Ансар "[гривен] [создана в 1993 году в результате объединения двух групп, Харкат-уль-Джихад-и-Ислами" и Харкат-уль-Муджахеддин ", которая была образована в 1980s]; этой группе было" идеологически симпатизируют JUI . > Джамаат-и-Улема-и-Ислами "[JUI], то Deobandi аффилированных религиозной стороной > Джамаат-и-Ислами "[СО] [основана Маудуди, как Пакистан в настоящее время формируется, в качестве элиты" ленинской "партии, которые нередко выступают против JUI] > "Хизб-уль-Муджахеддин", основанная СО действовать в Кашмире > "Сипах-и-Сахаба" [ПВУ], rabidly против шиитов, вышли из города, где шииты Жханг / суннитской напряженность сильных, является вытекает из JUI. Основатель, Хак Наваза Джангви ", приняли участие в анти-Ахмади движения в 1974 году. В Пакистане и Саудовской поддержки атаковали пакистанских шиитов групп на всех уровнях в начале 1980s. Если позднее присоединились преступных групп и наркоторговцев [Аббас 2005. Пакистан дрейфа…, p. 206, 207]. Джхангви был убит вскоре после убийства TNFJ лидера в 1988 году. Один из членов ПВУ убили иранских генеральный консул в Лахоре в 1990 году. > "Лашкар-э-Джангви", созданная в 1990 году, отколовшуюся от ПВУ. [Другие подобные организации были сформированы, в основном, как "персональный мафии" местного муллы [Аббас 2005:207]]. Начало эксплуатации в 1995-6, как террористические группы, нападения на шиитов места; "наиболее насильственные сектантской силы в Пакистане" [Аббас 2005:208]. Перенесено в Кашмире, в первую нападения на шиитов существует, то в индийской армии. Позже найти убежище в Афганистане с талибами. > Марказ Дават-уль-Иршад [МДИ, Центр обучения и религиозным Распространение] основана на нескольких мужчин, в том числе Абдулла Аззам, палестинские с ваххабитские ориентации. В конце концов возглавил Хафиз Саид, который был воспитан в Ахле-Хадит раздел [т.е. строгого исламского порядка]. Было Хафиз Саид, который сказал: "Мы верим в Хантингтона о столкновении цивилизаций, и наш джихад будет продолжаться до тех пор, пока ислам становится господствующей религии". Подчеркивает [науки] образование и джихада ". Хотите создать модель сообщество до получения контроля в Кашмире, где они хотят создать "Исламское сообщество." Что денежных средств из-за рубежа платить handsomely семьям, чьи сыновья террористов-смертников. > "Лашкар-и-Тайба, воинствующего крыла МДИ. Кто осуществляются идеи МДИ. Шиитских групп > Техрик-и-Nifaz-и-Фикх-и-Jafaria [TNFJ, Движение за осуществление Джафари Фикх], шиитской движение с иранской поддержкой, некоторые руководители подготовку в Иране. Лидер этой группы был убит в августе 1988 года. > "Сипах-и-Мухаммад, шииты воинственные группы, сформированной в 1994 году.

El NeoTaliban movimiento, algunas aclaraciones Un par de estudiantes de periodismo me pidió que responder a algunas preguntas sobre la situación en Afganistán. En concreto se les pregunta sobre las perspectivas de la OTAN obtener el control de los talibanes, etc Lo que sigue es una versión editada de lo que me enviaron. Incluyo aquí simplemente para poner lo que me parece mal es la forma en que unos y otros han sido, posiblemente, pensar en la situación. Esto no es más que una declaración apresurada y yo podría volver a corregir y revisar que como tengo tiempo. Pero, de momento, se trata de una formulación de la situación mejor que yo puede hacer de la misma. Por el interés de cualquier persona que quiera buscar en en la reunión. RLC _______________________________________________________ Queridos amigos, Creo que su marco de referencia en estas cuestiones es insuficiente: las categorías son la OTAN, Afganistán y los talibanes - la implicación de que todas las cuestiones que están dentro de las fronteras de Afganistán. Lo que tengo tiempo de hacer es aclarar brevemente que los talibanes son y cómo se espera que esta animado en mi cuadro puede ayudarle mejor a sus preguntas, y, en cualquier caso, esta me dará la oportunidad de aclarar cómo quiero pensar en ello. El Neo talibanes, que están actualmente en funcionamiento en el Afganistán y el Pakistán no son los mismos que el anterior movimiento - por lo menos que se combinan ahora con otras influencias. El grupo se constituyó a principios de los varios tipos de elementos, cada uno con su propio programa y perspectiva derivadas de las condiciones en el Afganistán en los principios y mediados del decenio de 1990 [véase mi "Fraternidad, el poder, y el tiempo en el Asia central.", Los talibanes Y crisis de la Afghanistn, editado por Robert tripulación y Amin Tarzi. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. 2008.] Muchos de estos elementos son, en cierto modo, sigue siendo parte del movimiento de los talibanes, pero desde el fallecimiento y la reciente reactivación de los talibanes después de 2002 otras influencias han contribuido mucho a la organización. Para aclarar: Por un lado, los talibanes son un movimiento de gran Pushtuns apostada en el Pakistán. Como usted debe saber, sobre la mayor cantidad de Pushtuns están en el Pakistán como en Afganistán, sólo en un sector de Pakistán, las Zonas Tribales de Administración Federal [FATA], la norma Pushtun tribus eficazmente por sí mismos un acuerdo con el gobierno de Pakistán [y antes de que los británicos ]. Dentro de Afganistán no existe un acuerdo para que las tribus afganas están más estrechamente vinculados en el sistema nacional - economía, la política, etc - que en el Pakistán. Es cierto, sin embargo, que existe desde hace mucho tiempo los focos de Pushtun grupos que se quedaron efectivamente autónomas, pero la intención declarada del gobierno de Afganistán, desde el momento de Abdul Rahman [1881-1901], si no antes, es que Que tienen derecho a la norma de las tribus directamente. Entonces, ¿qué está mal llamada "sin ley" en los territorios FATA en el Pakistán no lo han hecho, en teoría, existe en Afganistán. [Alrededor del 40% de la población de Afganistán es Pushtun por nacimiento [el gobierno siempre cobrado muchas más], sino incluso entre poblaciones de las que muchos de ellos habla persa mejor que Pushtu.] Los talibanes son un movimiento esencialmente Pushtun: Afganistán prácticamente ningún otro grupo étnico tiene cabida en la organización o el movimiento talibán. Hay no Pushtuns entre ellos, renegados de las guerras en Asia Central [Uzbekistán, Tayikistán, Turkmenistán] y también, por supuesto, árabes vinculados con Al Qaeda. También hay, por lo menos participan en el grupo o que simpatizan con el grupo, pakistaníes grupos islamistas de varios tipos. Los grupos árabes han contribuido mucho que es nuevo en la NeoTaliban. Atentado suicida no es nativo a Afganistán o Pakistán: se trata de una práctica importada de Oriente Medio donde se ha practicado en distintos contextos por los árabes y en particular recientemente en el Iraq. La dimensión más importante de la situación entre los talibanes, me parece a mí, es la participación del Pakistán. A pesar de los muchos desmentidos por muchos funcionarios, hay muchos indicios de la participación pakistaní en los talibanes. Los reporteros han determinado que el Mullah Muhammad Omar, jefe de los talibanes, tiene su residencia [en Quetta] e identificó uno de los principales maestros pakistaní de pago de los talibanes [Hamed General Gul, ex jefe de los ISI]. Pakistán no sólo tolera de hecho, organizaciones como el Talibán [ver en la siguiente lista] debido a la preocupación de los militares de Pakistán con la lucha contra la India en Cachemira. De la reclamación de Pakistán a Cachemira se basa en su identidad como nación musulmana reclama el derecho a gobernar un pueblo musulmán [la mayoría de la población de Cachemira] frente a la India actual de la ocupación del país - una ocupación ilegal, Pakistán reclamaciones. Así que durante años Pakistán ha buscado de diversas maneras tanto para el control de los grupos extremistas musulmanes y para que puedan existir, siempre con miras a mantener un grupo de reclutas dispuestos para la lucha con la India sobre Cachemira. Pero a medida que la influencia americana ha obligado a Musharraf para lograr el control de los elementos extremistas - y tal y como se están evidentemente fuera de control - el conflicto con los extremistas se han convertido en peligrosos incluso dentro de Pakistán. Mientras que los talibanes y otros grupos extremistas Pushtun infiltrado en Afganistán Pakistán de los intentos de control de ellos han sido superficial, pero como los mismos grupos han empezado a causar problemas a la cuestión Pakistán ha causado mucho más intensa preocupación, y ha habido mucho más Vigorosa a los intentos de control de ellos. También vale la pena nada de lo que los talibanes están organizados como un movimiento islámico y, por lo tanto se constituye intrínsecamente diferente a la tradicional de las organizaciones tribales. Los talibanes organizan en torno a la autoridad de una persona considera que tiene auténtica autoridad religiosa [Mullah Muhammad Omar, el "Emir"]; los jefes de las tribus tienen sus posiciones de parentesco, en virtud de las conexiones entre las redes de la tribu. Esto ha sido el contexto en el que los líderes tribales y organizaciones de la religión se han enfrentado, en los últimos meses muchos ancianos de la tribu han sido asesinados - signos de graves diferencias internas entre los pueblos de Pushtun FATA. Así, para recoger estas ideas juntos: La NeoTaliban no representan un gran segmento de la población Afganistán y su influencia en el Afganistán ha aumentado, ya que sólo se han podido establecer las bases de formación y obtener otro tipo de apoyo dentro de Pakistán. Y la mayoría ha aumentado su influencia entre los Pushtun de Afganistán, en zonas Pushtun. Y aún así, me parece a mí, una de las principales razones para que algunos han pasado de apoyar el gobierno de Afganistán a los talibanes ha sido el fracaso del gobierno de Afganistán a cumplir sus promesas. El futuro depende en gran medida de la clase de apoyo que obtiene de Afganistán en el resto del mundo, la OTAN se una forma de la misma. De hecho, el apoyo a las naciones parecen haber fracasado el asunto - la guerra de Bush en Irak es el error más notable, pero otros son las formas en que los fondos se gastaron para enriquecer la donación de los ciudadanos de las naciones mientras que muchos afganos se quedaron sin trabajo. También depende de la capacidad del Afganistán de liderazgo para organizar una administración eficaz, algo que casi nunca ha sido el caso de Afganistán. Actualmente, la industria de la droga parece ser una importante influencia corruptora en el país. Todo esto es una simple, breve esbozo de la situación que mejor puede poner juntos apresuradamente, sin indicar fuentes. Pero sirve para sugerir otras preguntas que usted está pidiendo. Mejor, RLC PS: A continuación se muestra una lista de movimientos extremistas tolerada dentro de Pakistán [más de Abbas de 2005. Deriva a Pakistán del extremismo]. Sunni grupos: > Ahle-Hadith, al igual que los wahabíes-, con vínculos históricos con el movimiento Wahhabi de épocas anteriores, ahora asociado con Deobandis > Harkat-ul-Ansar [HUA] [creado en 1993 de cada dos grupos, Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami y el Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, que se había constituido en 1980]; este grupo era "ideológicamente simpatizan con JUI . > Jamaat-i-Ulema-i-Islami [JUI], un partido religioso Deobandi afiliados > Jamaat-i-Islami [JI] [fundada por Maududi como Pakistán se estaba formando, como una élite "leninista" parte que, a menudo, se opuso a la JUI] > Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, fundada por la aplicación conjunta para operar en Cachemira > Sipah-i-Sahaba [SSP], rabidly anti-chiítas, salió de la ciudad de Jhang, donde chiítas y sunitas eran fuertes tensiones, era una rama del JUI. Fundador, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, han participado en el movimiento anti-ahmadi en 1974. Pakistán y Arabia Saudita, con apoyo de los grupos chiítas atacaron pakistaní en todos los niveles de principios de 1980. Más tarde se sumaron los grupos de delincuentes y traficantes de drogas [Abbas 2005. Deriva del Pakistán…, p. 206, 207]. Jhangvi fue asesinado poco después del asesinato del líder TNFJ en 1988. Un miembro de la SSP muertos iraníes cónsul general en Lahore en 1990. > Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, creado en 1990 como escisión de la SSP. [Otras organizaciones similares se formaron, en esencia, como "personal mafias" de los mullahs locales [Abbas 2005:207]]. Empezó a funcionar en 1995-6 como grupo terrorista, atacando los sitios chiítas; "la más violenta sectaria vigor en el Pakistán" [Abbas 2005:208]. Trasladado a Cachemira, en primer lugar atacar a los chiítas, entonces los militares indios. Más tarde encontraron refugio en el Afganistán con los talibanes. > Markaz Dawat-ul-Irshad [MDI, Centro de Aprendizaje y Propagación Religiosa], fundada por varios hombres, entre ellos Abdullah Azzam, el palestino con orientación wahabí. Eventualmente fue encabezada por Hafiz Saeed, que se crió en la sección Ahle-Hadith [es decir, estricto orden Islámica]. Se Hafiz Saeed, quien dijo, "Creemos en Huntington del choque de civilizaciones, y nuestra yihad continuará hasta que el Islam se convierte en la religión dominante". Subraya [ciencia] la educación y la jihad. ¿Quiere establecer un modelo de la comunidad antes de conseguir el control de Cachemira, donde quieren establecer una "comunidad islámica". Con fondos procedentes del extranjero pagar compensación a las familias cuyos hijos son los atacantes suicidas. > Lashkar-i-Taiba, ala militante del MDI. ¿Quién lleva a cabo las ideas de MDI. Grupos chiítas > Tehrik Nifaz-i--i-Fiqh-i-Jafaria [TNFJ, Movimiento para la Aplicación de Jafari Fiqh], el movimiento chiíta iraní, con el apoyo, algunos dirigentes entrenados en Irán. Líder de este grupo, fue asesinado en agosto de 1988. > Sipah-i-Mohammed, grupo militante chiíta formado en 1994.