The behavior of Rayomnd Davis in Lahore, the more we know about it, looks obviously like what someone has called "imperialistic arrogance." The American government should apologize and Davis should be tried in a Pakistani court for shooting two Pakistanis in the back in cold blood on the street in Lahore [see details in the Guardian as indicated below].
One sad element of the affair is that the Pakistanis still retain the old resentments for the way the peoples of South Asia were exploited by the British for generations, even up until 1947, to the last minute before "independence." The Americans, blithely indifferent to that history, have taken over the role of hegemon in South Asia and accordingly have received some of the sentimental baggage associated with the British. So the rash killing of Pakistanis by an American outrages the Pakistanis. They are right to demand that Davis be tried for murder.
Of course the Pakistanis, famous for the conspiracies they worry about, have no doubt that Davis was CIA. The Guardian newspaper, however, has no such inclination, and it reports that by all appearances Davis was CIA. This is not Pakistani paranoia; it appears to be true. Read the Guardian's report in the two articles below.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/20/us-raymond-davis-lahore-cia
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/20/cia-agent-lahore-civilian-deaths
It's hard for us Americans to own up to the abuses our empire has been guilty of. The Germans and Japanese should have apologized, we assume; also the British for abuses in many parts of its empire; also, now, the governments of Egypt and Iran and elsewhere who have gunned down their own people. But we see ourselves as the good guys. Our programs aim to improve, deliver, heal. I believe some of the American sponsored programs have indeed been valuable and in any case good-intentioned, but some activities by our government reflect a general indifference to the feelings and attitudes of the folks in other countries.
We should apologize. For what it's worth, to the Pakistani people I apologize. I'm sorry and ashamed for the behavior of one of my countrymen; as far as I know, he behaved cruelly and brutally. His behavior does not represent my feelings toward the Pakistani people or the feelings of most Americans I know.
Showing posts with label The American empire. Show all posts
Showing posts with label The American empire. Show all posts
Sunday, February 20, 2011
Friday, January 28, 2011
American duplicity in the Middle East could be dangerous
American double-sided diplomacy in the Middle East can be dangerous
The American government policy in the Arab world has a double aspect that may be catching up with it. On one hand the official policy is to support democracy and representative government; this poses the Americans against the regimes in the Arab world where authentic representation scarcely exists. On the other hand, the Americans have a working relationship with the current dictators in the Arab world, so they are reluctant for these regimes to change. It is no secret that if there were honest elections in the Middle East none of those elected would be pro-American; in fact, one would have to be anti-American to get elected. So the American interest in the Middle East, despite the high-minded claims, is for the regimes in place to remain in power. By simply encouraging "all sides" to resolve their differences peacefully the American government is displaying its support for ruthless leaders in the Middle East -- their responses to the demonstrations will display how ruthless they are.
This is a dangerous game. When Jimmy Carter was elected he was much admired by the young people of Iran because he initiated a policy of what he called "human rights." The Shah regime had become broadly despised for its repressive policies and they hoped for Carter's support against the Shah. But Carter went to Iran and claimed that the Shah was his friend, alienating the young people, indeed people from all elements of the society, from him. They turned against Carter, despised him. And when students took over the American Embassy they refused to release their hostages until Jimmy Carter was out of office. The Iranians believed they had driven Carter from office.
By claiming that all sides in the demonstrations in the Middle East should sit down and talk the American government may be losing whatever respect it still has in the Middle East.
The American government policy in the Arab world has a double aspect that may be catching up with it. On one hand the official policy is to support democracy and representative government; this poses the Americans against the regimes in the Arab world where authentic representation scarcely exists. On the other hand, the Americans have a working relationship with the current dictators in the Arab world, so they are reluctant for these regimes to change. It is no secret that if there were honest elections in the Middle East none of those elected would be pro-American; in fact, one would have to be anti-American to get elected. So the American interest in the Middle East, despite the high-minded claims, is for the regimes in place to remain in power. By simply encouraging "all sides" to resolve their differences peacefully the American government is displaying its support for ruthless leaders in the Middle East -- their responses to the demonstrations will display how ruthless they are.
This is a dangerous game. When Jimmy Carter was elected he was much admired by the young people of Iran because he initiated a policy of what he called "human rights." The Shah regime had become broadly despised for its repressive policies and they hoped for Carter's support against the Shah. But Carter went to Iran and claimed that the Shah was his friend, alienating the young people, indeed people from all elements of the society, from him. They turned against Carter, despised him. And when students took over the American Embassy they refused to release their hostages until Jimmy Carter was out of office. The Iranians believed they had driven Carter from office.
By claiming that all sides in the demonstrations in the Middle East should sit down and talk the American government may be losing whatever respect it still has in the Middle East.
Saturday, April 17, 2010
The Enduring Strategic Importance of Afghanistan for the Industrial World
Andrew Bacevich said on Bill Moyers Journal [4/9/10 PBS] that the war with the Taliban/Al Qaeda in Afghanistan/Pakistan is the longest war in American history and is “utterly devoid of strategic purpose.” Moyers was enough convinced of this himself that he quoted Bacevich in the program that was aired last night. I have a great respect for Bill Moyers [and am outraged that his program and NOW have both been taken off PBS without sufficient explanation] but on this I think he has it wrong.
Bacevich's view represents the usual American short term vision -- we seem only to think ahead in four-year segments -- and is unworthy of a man of his intellect and justly respected reputation.
I am of course dismayed at any suggestion that the United States should again abandon its oft-repeated commitment to the Afghan peoples. The American government supported the war against the Soviets during the 1980s and then disappeared in 1990s as the mujahedin fought over control of the country. Similarly, the Americans entered Afghanistan in 2001 and crushed the Taliban/AlQaeda, but then, again, withdrew its serious military assets to wage war in Iraq. If the Americans again abandon the Afghanistan peoples, a third time in as many decades, they would forever seal their reputation as untrustworthy and entirely self-serving.
But that is not the relevant reply to Bacevich's claim that the war has "no strategic purpose." The reply is to look ahead to see what American and other industrial nation's interests are. If we look at the long term trajectory of affairs we see a world whose needs for hydrocarbons are rising exponentially. And in the region of Afghanistan, immediately to the north in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, are situated huge reserves of minimally developed gas and oil [leaving aside those that may exist in Afghanistan where the necessary research has yet to be done]. These reserves are just now being developed. And already there is a race for access to the reserves by the industrial nations of Eurasia. As Afghanistan is situated between Central Asia and the South Asian and Middle Eastern states it will eventually be a natural corridor of export from Central Asia to the many industrial countries already clamoring for it. [http://www.theforbiddenknowledge.com/hardtruth/oil_war.htm]
In fact, three different pipeline plans are already in place: two of them from Turkemenistan's Daulatabad gas field into Pakistan, one across the north, the other following the ring road through Herat and Kandahar, and the third running due south to Baluchistan and its Indian Ocean coast.
It is for this that the great powers are involved in the Afghanistan/Pakistan war, in their own interest. [http://www.sras.org/geopolitics_of_oil_pipelines_in_central_asia] The United States already is trying to make sure that the hydrocarbon pipelines of Central Asia avoid Russia and Iran in order to avoid interdiction. So, for the Americans no less than the Indians and Pakistanis and Chinese and Japanese, etc. etc. Afghanistan needs to have peace, a secure peace, so that the pipeline construction festivities can begin. When that happens the United States needs to be in position to influence the agreements that will for a good while anchor the political and economic alliances of the industrial powers.
The Obama administration surely must understand this. The European leaders must know this, even if their own citizens don't. Certainly the Chinese are demonstrating how well they understand it for they have been making deals with the Afghans for long term development. The Chinese are Afghanistan's largest trading partner even now. And the Chinese have already -- note already -- built the port at Gwadar in Pakistan which will be the terminus of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Baluchistan pipeline on the Indian Ocean. One and a half billion dollars they have already invested in what was once a small fishing village. The ostensible reason is to construct a port that will accommodate ocean-going oil tankers. That Gwadar just happens to control the mouth of the Persian Gulf . . . well, is that merely an incidental circumstance?, or did it have something to do with other long term plans? The Chinese seem to be thinking decades ahead.
BGR, the German energy development company, estimates that within a crucial ellipse that includes the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea region, western Kazakhstan and northwestern Russia reside 74% of the worlds oil supplies and 70% of the world's gas supplies. [http://www.bgr.bund.de/nn_335082/EN/Themen/Energie/Erdoel/erdoel__inhalt__en.html] The huge resources lying directly north of Afghanistan will someday be transported by pipeline through either Afghanistan or Iran to the Indian Ocean whence it will be shipped to a thirsty industrial world.
That's what can reasonably be seen in the moderately near future.
Why doesn't Bacevich see that?
Bacevich's view represents the usual American short term vision -- we seem only to think ahead in four-year segments -- and is unworthy of a man of his intellect and justly respected reputation.
I am of course dismayed at any suggestion that the United States should again abandon its oft-repeated commitment to the Afghan peoples. The American government supported the war against the Soviets during the 1980s and then disappeared in 1990s as the mujahedin fought over control of the country. Similarly, the Americans entered Afghanistan in 2001 and crushed the Taliban/AlQaeda, but then, again, withdrew its serious military assets to wage war in Iraq. If the Americans again abandon the Afghanistan peoples, a third time in as many decades, they would forever seal their reputation as untrustworthy and entirely self-serving.
But that is not the relevant reply to Bacevich's claim that the war has "no strategic purpose." The reply is to look ahead to see what American and other industrial nation's interests are. If we look at the long term trajectory of affairs we see a world whose needs for hydrocarbons are rising exponentially. And in the region of Afghanistan, immediately to the north in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, are situated huge reserves of minimally developed gas and oil [leaving aside those that may exist in Afghanistan where the necessary research has yet to be done]. These reserves are just now being developed. And already there is a race for access to the reserves by the industrial nations of Eurasia. As Afghanistan is situated between Central Asia and the South Asian and Middle Eastern states it will eventually be a natural corridor of export from Central Asia to the many industrial countries already clamoring for it. [http://www.theforbiddenknowledge.com/hardtruth/oil_war.htm]
In fact, three different pipeline plans are already in place: two of them from Turkemenistan's Daulatabad gas field into Pakistan, one across the north, the other following the ring road through Herat and Kandahar, and the third running due south to Baluchistan and its Indian Ocean coast.
It is for this that the great powers are involved in the Afghanistan/Pakistan war, in their own interest. [http://www.sras.org/geopolitics_of_oil_pipelines_in_central_asia] The United States already is trying to make sure that the hydrocarbon pipelines of Central Asia avoid Russia and Iran in order to avoid interdiction. So, for the Americans no less than the Indians and Pakistanis and Chinese and Japanese, etc. etc. Afghanistan needs to have peace, a secure peace, so that the pipeline construction festivities can begin. When that happens the United States needs to be in position to influence the agreements that will for a good while anchor the political and economic alliances of the industrial powers.
The Obama administration surely must understand this. The European leaders must know this, even if their own citizens don't. Certainly the Chinese are demonstrating how well they understand it for they have been making deals with the Afghans for long term development. The Chinese are Afghanistan's largest trading partner even now. And the Chinese have already -- note already -- built the port at Gwadar in Pakistan which will be the terminus of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Baluchistan pipeline on the Indian Ocean. One and a half billion dollars they have already invested in what was once a small fishing village. The ostensible reason is to construct a port that will accommodate ocean-going oil tankers. That Gwadar just happens to control the mouth of the Persian Gulf . . . well, is that merely an incidental circumstance?, or did it have something to do with other long term plans? The Chinese seem to be thinking decades ahead.
BGR, the German energy development company, estimates that within a crucial ellipse that includes the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea region, western Kazakhstan and northwestern Russia reside 74% of the worlds oil supplies and 70% of the world's gas supplies. [http://www.bgr.bund.de/nn_335082/EN/Themen/Energie/Erdoel/erdoel__inhalt__en.html] The huge resources lying directly north of Afghanistan will someday be transported by pipeline through either Afghanistan or Iran to the Indian Ocean whence it will be shipped to a thirsty industrial world.
That's what can reasonably be seen in the moderately near future.
Why doesn't Bacevich see that?
Friday, December 11, 2009
Robin Wright on what's at stake in the Afghanistan/Pakistan war
Many of us have been trying to say that the stakes in Afghanistan are higher than most Americans recognize, so I appreciate Robin Wright’s formulation of the issues in the Washington Post yesterday. The point is: the issues are serious and the long term consequences are momentous. The most interesting thing she says here is, “Bin Ladenism can't provide answers to everyday challenges such as education, housing, jobs and health care. There's an air of fatigue about al-Qaeda; it's becoming somewhat passé. The search is on for something better.” Yes. Indeed, many populations around the world are looking for something better. The American project in Afghanistan is being watched closely. Will the Americans again cut and run? Will they follow through? This is Obama's -- and the Western world's -- burden. RLC
The real stakes in Afghanistan
Washington Post
By Robin Wright Thursday, December 10, 2009
Oddly, President Obama's West Point speech never probed the critical long-term stakes for the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Three issues central to the outcome should enter the public debate as his strategy is launched. The first is America's place in the world in the 21st century. Officials from Moscow to Beijing, from Iran's revolutionaries to Somalia's pirates, will scrutinize this last-ditch U.S. effort -- and weigh their actions, reactions and interactions with the United States on how Obama's effort fares.
Failure by the world's mightiest military power, backed by the largest military alliance, to uproot the Taliban -- a force without an air force, armored corps, long-range artillery, satellite intelligence or powerful foreign backer -- would vividly illustrate the limits of U.S. power. The consequences could dwarf those of the defeat in Vietnam, even if the loss of life was smaller.
The era of a unipolar or uni-power world is effectively over, but a U.S. failure in Afghanistan and Pakistan could mark its formal end, just as it did for the bipolar world when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. Indeed, the period from Vietnam to Afghanistan -- with withdrawals under pressure from Hezbollah extremists in Lebanon and warlords in Somalia along the way -- could come to be seen as the period marking the demise of American power.
And not just "gun" power. At its core, American power is also supposed to be about moral power -- using might to confront, contain or prevent fascist, totalitarian or unjust regimes from unacceptable aggression, repression or injustice. American power has been abused. Neither party has clean hands. But few other nations have been willing or able to assume that role.
U.S. standing in the Islamic world is also at stake. The historic rule of thumb is that winners have influence; losers don't. Winners get to set standards. Their ideas get more attention. Their leaders gain greater authority.
And the outcome of the U.S. confrontation with various branches of al-Qaeda and the Taliban is pivotal to the future of the Islamic world. Almost a decade after the Sept. 11 attacks, the Muslim world is at a crossroads. Polls show key Muslim societies are increasingly rejecting extremism -- even if respondents are still not enamored of the United States. Vast numbers of Muslims now recognize that Bin Ladenism can't provide answers to everyday challenges such as education, housing, jobs and health care. There's an air of fatigue about al-Qaeda; it's becoming somewhat passé. The search is on for something better.
U.S. strategy in South Asia is now based not only on defeat of the forces behind the Sept. 11 attacks; it's also designed to help build credible alternatives to extremist ideologies and governance. Winning on this front in Pakistan and Afghanistan is as important -- and potentially harder -- than the military campaign. The winner is likely to have greater sway among the world's 1.3 billion Muslims. And "winner" means not so much the United States as the principles, such as more accountable government, modern education and economic opportunity from legitimate trades.
Finally, U.S. interests in the wider region are also at stake, notably on two fronts.
Obama's strategy will deeply affect India, the world's largest democracy. Long-standing tensions between Pakistan and India have taken the world closer to the brink of nuclear war than any conflict has since World War II -- and still could, since Pakistan has failed to contain extremists responsible for terrorist atrocities in India, including the Mumbai attacks last year. U.S. failure to help nuclear Pakistan expand or shift its military focus from India to the more immediate threat from its internal extremists risks allowing those tensions to deepen.
Just as worrisome are the stakes with Iran, which borders both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan has become for Iran what Iraq once was: a surrogate battlefield with the United States. Once Afghanistan's rival, Shiite-dominated Iran has reportedly supplied the same weapons and explosives to Sunni Taliban fighters that it provided Shiite militias in Iraq, on the principle that the enemy of my enemy is my friend -- at least for now.
Iran manipulated (and often fueled) the problems that ensued after the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. In the process, it has become a regional superpower rivaled only by Israel. U.S. failures in Afghanistan and Pakistan would further strengthen Iran's position as its increasingly authoritarian government cracks down on a legitimate opposition movement and threatens to expand its nuclear program.
Many Americans are tired of the war in Afghanistan. We're alarmed at the cost in human life to all sides, the drain on our national treasury and armed forces -- not to mention on the Afghan people -- and the length of this conflict. We have doubts that the fast-paced initiative Obama has proposed will work. But as U.S. actions are evaluated over the next 18 months, we should remember that the outcome will determine America's goals and standing far beyond the South Asian theater for years to come.
Robin Wright is a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace and the author of "Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East." A former diplomatic correspondent for The Post, she has reported on Afghanistan since the 1980s.
The real stakes in Afghanistan
Washington Post
By Robin Wright Thursday, December 10, 2009
Oddly, President Obama's West Point speech never probed the critical long-term stakes for the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Three issues central to the outcome should enter the public debate as his strategy is launched. The first is America's place in the world in the 21st century. Officials from Moscow to Beijing, from Iran's revolutionaries to Somalia's pirates, will scrutinize this last-ditch U.S. effort -- and weigh their actions, reactions and interactions with the United States on how Obama's effort fares.
Failure by the world's mightiest military power, backed by the largest military alliance, to uproot the Taliban -- a force without an air force, armored corps, long-range artillery, satellite intelligence or powerful foreign backer -- would vividly illustrate the limits of U.S. power. The consequences could dwarf those of the defeat in Vietnam, even if the loss of life was smaller.
The era of a unipolar or uni-power world is effectively over, but a U.S. failure in Afghanistan and Pakistan could mark its formal end, just as it did for the bipolar world when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. Indeed, the period from Vietnam to Afghanistan -- with withdrawals under pressure from Hezbollah extremists in Lebanon and warlords in Somalia along the way -- could come to be seen as the period marking the demise of American power.
And not just "gun" power. At its core, American power is also supposed to be about moral power -- using might to confront, contain or prevent fascist, totalitarian or unjust regimes from unacceptable aggression, repression or injustice. American power has been abused. Neither party has clean hands. But few other nations have been willing or able to assume that role.
U.S. standing in the Islamic world is also at stake. The historic rule of thumb is that winners have influence; losers don't. Winners get to set standards. Their ideas get more attention. Their leaders gain greater authority.
And the outcome of the U.S. confrontation with various branches of al-Qaeda and the Taliban is pivotal to the future of the Islamic world. Almost a decade after the Sept. 11 attacks, the Muslim world is at a crossroads. Polls show key Muslim societies are increasingly rejecting extremism -- even if respondents are still not enamored of the United States. Vast numbers of Muslims now recognize that Bin Ladenism can't provide answers to everyday challenges such as education, housing, jobs and health care. There's an air of fatigue about al-Qaeda; it's becoming somewhat passé. The search is on for something better.
U.S. strategy in South Asia is now based not only on defeat of the forces behind the Sept. 11 attacks; it's also designed to help build credible alternatives to extremist ideologies and governance. Winning on this front in Pakistan and Afghanistan is as important -- and potentially harder -- than the military campaign. The winner is likely to have greater sway among the world's 1.3 billion Muslims. And "winner" means not so much the United States as the principles, such as more accountable government, modern education and economic opportunity from legitimate trades.
Finally, U.S. interests in the wider region are also at stake, notably on two fronts.
Obama's strategy will deeply affect India, the world's largest democracy. Long-standing tensions between Pakistan and India have taken the world closer to the brink of nuclear war than any conflict has since World War II -- and still could, since Pakistan has failed to contain extremists responsible for terrorist atrocities in India, including the Mumbai attacks last year. U.S. failure to help nuclear Pakistan expand or shift its military focus from India to the more immediate threat from its internal extremists risks allowing those tensions to deepen.
Just as worrisome are the stakes with Iran, which borders both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan has become for Iran what Iraq once was: a surrogate battlefield with the United States. Once Afghanistan's rival, Shiite-dominated Iran has reportedly supplied the same weapons and explosives to Sunni Taliban fighters that it provided Shiite militias in Iraq, on the principle that the enemy of my enemy is my friend -- at least for now.
Iran manipulated (and often fueled) the problems that ensued after the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. In the process, it has become a regional superpower rivaled only by Israel. U.S. failures in Afghanistan and Pakistan would further strengthen Iran's position as its increasingly authoritarian government cracks down on a legitimate opposition movement and threatens to expand its nuclear program.
Many Americans are tired of the war in Afghanistan. We're alarmed at the cost in human life to all sides, the drain on our national treasury and armed forces -- not to mention on the Afghan people -- and the length of this conflict. We have doubts that the fast-paced initiative Obama has proposed will work. But as U.S. actions are evaluated over the next 18 months, we should remember that the outcome will determine America's goals and standing far beyond the South Asian theater for years to come.
Robin Wright is a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace and the author of "Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East." A former diplomatic correspondent for The Post, she has reported on Afghanistan since the 1980s.
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